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Glossary of non-english words
The field work was conducted in an area where Tagalog is the most
common language. Tagalog derives from a malay-language, but has several
Spanish or Spanish-like words. The pronunciation of Tagalog words is
fairly easy for Europeans, since it is very similar to the pronunciation of
MexicanSpanish. In words with two consonants,both are normally
pronounced with equal weight, as in tapasaan; tapasa-a-n.
baliktad
barangay
bola
buko
cabezas de barangay
can tina
carabao
contratista
coprahan
creoles
dumaan
encomienda
hacienda
haciendero
harabas
ilustrados
indio
inquilinos
insulares
jeepney
x
"Turned around", a sharing system giving 70 per
cent of gross output to,thetenant
Vill age community
Long-bladed knife
y oung, green coconut
Head of the barangay. Local official
Eating-place provided for the sugar-plantation
workers
Water buffalo
Recruiter of sacadas
Place where the copra is made
See insulares
Tenant at sugar plantation
Formally state owned tenant-based plantation
Privately-owned tenant-based plantation
Owner of hacienda
A 10-12 meter long pole with a sickle at the end.
Used for nut-picking. Also called kawit
Middle-dass Filipinos during the colonial period
Old name for a Filipino native
Overseer and representative of the haciendero for
the tenants
Philippine-born Spaniards ("islanders")
V ehic1e modeled after American military jeeps
present in the Philippines during the second world
war. The most common car for both private and
public transportation
tapahan
tapasaan
Slash-and-burn agriculture
Cart for horse
Used as a term for tenants. The literal meaning is
comrade, as well as together.
Overseer, local Candelarian word
See harabas
Coconut liquor
Old-fashioned oil mill
Mixed race Filipino, most commonly Chinese and
Spanish mestizo
Un-husked rice
Wage-payment per piece, per kilo or per 1000
Casual worker in the sugar producing sector
1-1.5 meter long stick with a hook at theend. Used
for collecting coconuts
A very simple cart with no wheels but with skies or
rails underneath. Drawn by a carabao
Iberian-born Spaniard
Indigenous notable in the Spanish colonial period
Migrant sugarcane harvester. Farm worker
Small variety store. Very common in the
Philippines
Commercial trans action where the market-
mechanisms are imperfect. Leads normally to lower
prices but more stable markets. On the farm level
Old-fashioned coprahan
A ground-based axe or spear, used for de-husking
the coconuts
A special haggling system, where only half of the
final price is directly paid the salesperson
Debt of gratitude
kaingin
kariton
kasama
katiwala
kawit
lambano g
langisan
mestizo
palay
pakiaw
pangayaw
pangipon
paragas
peninsulares
p rincipa les
sacada
sari-sari store
suki
tawad
utang na loob
Prices referred to in this thesis are normally referred to in pesos, the
currency of the Philippines. The exchange rate to US dollars varied during
the stay, but the average exchange rate in 1991 was roughly 25 : 1, i.e; 25
pesos per US dollar.
The terms Filipino and Philippine are used as they do in the Philippines;
when something "personalized" (as a person, a folk-culture) the term
Filipino used, otherwise; Philippine .
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1. The Philippines, the coconuts and the
peasantry
1.1 Coconuts in the Philippines
On J anuary 22, 1987, approximately one year after President Aquino came
to pOWti:,jmpatient peasants marched in the streets of Manila to protest the
lack of land reforms, which had been promised by President Aquino as well
as by former presidents. They were answered with gunshots from the
military's M-16s, killing twenty-two peasants in front of the Presidential
palace at the Mendiola' bridge. Several:of these peasants were coconut
producers.About 1/3 of those engagedin agricultural production in the
Philippines, produce coconuts.
The land reform law was presented the following year. According to the
largestpeasant organization In,.the country, The Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP), the land reform offer no positive impact on the peasantry.
The payments for land, demanded from the beneficiary peasants are either
too big to handle for poor peasant families, or the loopholes in the law are
so demonstratively large that any landlord easily can exempt his land from
the land reform bill (KMP 1988).
A study tour to a variety of provinces in the Philippines in 1989 left me
with a similar conc1usion. The peasants were poor as they always had been
in the Philippines and most of the respondents, representing all the major
agricultural sectors were as landless as always. More importantly, the
insurgency in the country, which should be seen as a result of the desperate
econoinc situation for the majority of the people, seemed persisting,
recruiting widely among the peasants to fight the present regime with all
possible means.
It is not only in the Philippines that the agrarian sector suffers from a
seemingly constant economic and political crisis. Peasants throughout the
third world are denied the resources needed in order to create a decent li fe
with democratic rights. A peasant family, at least in the Philippines, works
extremely hard to obtain their necessary means of livelihood. The problem . I
is that they hardly receive anything for their efforts in providing both the
domestic and international market with agricultural goods. In order to
understand this, it is necessary to look into the arangement of the work
1
performed, and the relation the peasants have to production. This is the
entry point for thisresearch on coconut production in the Philippines.
The coconuts in the Philippines are important both in terms of the
national income derived from the coconuts and also for employment. The
national economy has over the last ten years been facing severe problems
because of dedining international prices on coconuts. The Philippines is the
largest coconut exporter in the world (Lactao 1990 b). This export item
constituted approximately 7 per cent of the total export income in 1989
(Republic of the Philippines 1990), and is the single largest export item in
terms of value in the Philippines. Of the ten principal export artides, which
in 1989 counted for 36 per cent of the total export value, three are major
coconut products, i.e; copra, coconut oil and desiccated coconiits (Republic
of the Philippines 1990). At least 20 million people depend on coconut
production for aliving. Their living standard has not improved with better
international prices. They were poor when the prices were relatively good
and are poor today.Perhapstheý are made even poorer from a higher co st
of living.
Development research should always be done as an effort to understand
and improve the situation for the poor. The study of fluctuations in
international prices-is not. the major factor forthis thesis. Rather, the
poverty of the coconut producing peasantry is assumed to be rooted in the
production sphere itself. This production governs the socIal, politieal,
economical and cultural relations, i.e; a total socIal formation. By analyzing
this socIal formation, it should be possible to identify the causes for poverty
and thus create a necessary basis for change.
1.2 The Philippines
The Philippines is an archipelago in South East Asia, bounded by the
pacific Ocean, the Chinese Sea and the Celebes Sea (Map 1). The country,
approximately 300,000 square kilometres in size, consists of 7,100 islands,
about 100 of which are inhabited. The people counted around 62 million
in 1990, with an annual growth-rate of 2.3 per cent. The Filipinos
communicate in more than 100 different languages and dialects. The
national language, Filipino, is based on the dialect Tagalog which is a
language derived from ancient Malay and influenced by Spanish.
The Philippines is rich in natural resources. Iron, gold, copper, nickel,
chrome and other minerals are found in substantial amounts. A
mountainous terrain with rich water supplies and a tropical dimate makes
the country suitable for agriculture during the whole year. The rainforest,
once significant in size has been reduced by 80 per cent. The rate of
2
deforestation is 5:4 per cent yearly(George 1992). Many of the mountains
are vo1canic. The Philippines lies on the border of the Philippine plate and
experiences both earthquakes and vo1canic activities. This thesis will reveal
that the dramatic events in the mountains are not only caused by the core
mantel activity but also by the happenings on the surface of the land. A
civil war is going on in the Philippines. This is a war between those who
have and those who have not. The majority of those who have nothing are
peasants.
To understand contemporary Filipino society, particularly contemporary
socIal formations, it is necessary to investigate its socIal history. The
Philippines have been under colonial rule for more than 400 years. In the
period, .after independence in 1946, the economy has been characterized by
the export of raw materials or light manufactured agricultural goods and a
stagnant domestic-oriented manufacturing sector. The ties to the former
colonial empire is still tight, through American dominance and control of
Philippine economy and.thereföre'also,Philippine êulture.
At this pointjt is useful to. emphasise that the Philippines is a nation of
contrasts. The majority of the population are poor. This economic situation
has led to a massive flight away from the countryside to the urban centres
andshanties as well'as abroad. Womenflee unpaid work on the farm or
elsewhere, to work abroad as maids, entertainers and prostitutes, but also
as educated employees. However, they do not flee their family
responsibilities. The main reason for going abroad is not their personal
happiness. It is a search for funds to their family at home. The women sell
themselves on the altar of family-responsibility. Alinost 500,000 Filipinos
were registered to work abroad in 1989 and of these 34 per cent are
characterized as service workers, i.e; maids and so-called entertainers
(Republic of the Philippines 1990).
Not only individuals but also entire families migrate. The new homes of
the former peasants can be seen along the highways in Manila. The urban
shanties are made of paper, corrugated sheets and cardboard while the rural
version is made of nipa and other plant materiaL. Manila, the capital city,
has an infrastructure designed for only two million people, but a population
of more than eight million people (Putzel 1992). When it rains, it floods.
When it floods the poor lose the houses of cardboard and perhaps their
lives as well.
On the other side there are those Manileños who do not share the reality
of their urban pOOL They have their own gardens, sometimes with golf-
links and often with swimmng pools. Their houses are well guarded, and
unbreakable walls with broken glass and barbed wires on top secure them
from the reality outside. A large proportion of the spending of these rich
3
families is on imported luxury goods. Many of these rich families drain the
capital from the coconut production.
The Philippines received the attention of the world media in 1986. The
long time dictator Ferdinand Marcos was ousted by millions of mobilized
civilians. His period as a President was recognized as dictatorial, supporting
a patronage system the world has seldom seen so unmasked, so blatantly
self-centred. The new President Aquino was the widow of Benigno Aquino,
the head of a family dynast y that opposed Mr. Marcos. She had seemingly
the support of a whole world when she entered the national stage as a
president with the agenda of creating democracy in the Philippines. It is
still fair to daim that 60-100 families rule the country, as before. A total
of 83 per cent of the new members of Congress in 1986 were familiar
political faces, or dose relatives of those dynasties ruling the country
during the Spanish period, the American period and the period of Mr.
Marcos (Gutierrez 1992). None of the majority of the people, the peasants
and the workers, were Tepresented in thelegislative body of the state.
In ,the beginning, the. .new regime made certaingestures to democracy.
The President released several political prisoners and initiated peace talks
with the leftist underground mo ve ment - the National Democratic Front
(NDF). However, in 1987 the government changedits strategy. The unrest
in the countryside, which earlier was to be sol ved through land reform, was
now to be solved through "total war" against what the government
considered to be a subversive movement. The country became increasingly
militarized and human rights were violated. After 1987, the regime of
President Aquino violated human rights more intenselyand more frequently
than had been done by the government of President Marcos, even during
the period of martial law. 2 The basic cause of socIal unrest, the problem
of unequal distribution of land, remained unsolved.
Even though land is not the only determinant of economic wealth and
power, Figure 1.1 reve als the striking inequality in land ownership in the
Philippines. A perfectly equal distribution of land would render a
coefficient of 0.0 and a curve which followed the diagonal from O. A
perfectly unequal distribution would arrive at a coefficient of 1.0 and its
curve would follow the x and y axis. The curve shows a high degree of
inequality, with a gini coefficient of 0.647 (Putzel 1992).
2 Interviews with organizations like KMU, TFDP and KMP 1990.
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The Philippine state has shown itself to be incapable of carring out
effective land reforms to increase the peasant productivity and raise the
living standards of the majority of the people and thereby remove a major
reason for the insurgency in the country. One possible reason for this is that
the majority of the legislature are also liig landholders. Former President
Aquino herself is one of the largest landowners in the country, owning a
6000 hectare sugar plantation (Hacienda Luisita) in Central Luzon. The
Philippine state and policy making bodies have been practising a form of
"elitist democracy". (Rocamora 1993) "Elitist democracy" is to be
understood as politics dominated by patron-dient relationships, and
permeated by the "ilustrado syndrome" , which relies on "bossism" and
"warlordism" (see among others Gutierrez 1992, Rocamora 1993, Anderson
1988). The Philippine state and politics have been studied by several
researchers, like Carl Lande (1965), J. Clark Soriano (1987), and EdicIo
de la Torre (1988). A common general conc1usion is that strong vertical
dyadic ties exist between patrons (landlords and employers) and dients
(tenants, workers and employees) (Gutierrez 1992). For the dient, the
patron is commonly the only source of means of production, food and
credit, and for the patron, the dient represents cheap labour power and
loyal defenders. In that sense the relationship is dyadic - and expresses a
continuing relationship in which the patron and dient interact upon each
other. This is also true for the coconut sector.
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1.2.1 External trade and policy linkages
The Philippines' external trade is still dominated by the historically strong
linkage with the United States. Recently, Japan has become a major source
of foreign investments as well as an important trading partner (Villegas
1990, Rocamora 1993, Republic of the Philippines 1990). Whereas the
United States was the one major receiver of exported goods throughout the
1980s, Japan became the most important source of imported goods in 1989.
Philippines' export trade still depends largelyon the American market,
while Japan is the second largest importer of Philippine raw materials and
other light manufactured goods. A substantial share of the exports are also
sold within the European Unity. Countries in the Middle East, on the other
hand, export substantial quantities of goods to the Philippines, but import
less than 2 per cent of the value of Philippine export goods (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 reveals opposite trends for exports and imports for the different
areas during the 1980s. Whereas US, Japan, EC and the Middle East
counted for more than 70 per cent of the imports in 1981, their market
share on the import side was less than 60 per cent in 1989. On the other
side, approximately 65 per cent of the export earnings in 1981 were deri ved
from markets in the US, Japan, EC and the Middle East. By 1989, this
percentage had grown to almost 7 5 per cent. The market for export artides
have thus been increasingly concentrated, while the sources -for imported --
goods are more di versified.
Table 1.1
Percentage share of value of import and export trade for the most
important foreign trade-partners, 1981-1989
Area US J ap an EEC Middle East
Year Imp Exp Imp Exp Iinp Exp IniP . .Exp
22.5 27.6 18.8 20.0 10.3 16.2 21.3 1.7
22.1 31.4 20.0 22.8 10.6 14.5 19.0 1.8
23.2 36.0 16.9 20.3 11.7 16.3 19.4 1.6
26.8 37.2 13.4 19.3 11.1 12.7 16.1 1.2
24.9 35.0 14.4 18.9 8.3 13.6 12.4 1.5
24.8 34.1 17.2 17.6 11.3 18.9 10.2 2.0
22.0 34.5 16.6 17.2 11.6 19.0 12.4 1.7
21.0 34.4 17.4 20.0 12.7 17.7 9.7 1.4
19.0 35.8 19.6 20.3 11.3 17.0 9.7 1.6
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Of total
Imp Exp
72.9 65.5
71.7 70.5
71.7 74.2
67.4 70.4
60.0 69.0
63.5 72.6
62.6 72.4
60.8 73.5
59.6 74.7
Source: Republic of the Philippines 1990
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A large part of export earings is, according to official statistics, derived
from the industrial sector. They indicate a country with a fairly developed
industrial sector . The reality is that the principal export artides are very
lightly manufactured goods from the agricultural sector such as coconut oil,
desiccated coconuts and copra, as well as sug ar, bananas, pineapple and
lumber. Copper and gold are also exported in substantial amounts (Republic
of the Philippines 1990).
Table 1.2
The sectoral share of Gross National Product and export earnings
Export earnings
Sector/year
Agriculture
Industry
Service
1960
29
28
43
1970
29
29
42
1980
26
36
38
1989
27
33
40
1965
84.4
15.6
1979
45.3
54.7
1987
24.4
75.6
Sources: Quisimbing 1990, Putzel 1992.
1.3 The political economy of the peasantry
The inequalities in Philippine society have created a series of social
uprisings. The main cause of the uprisings and the insurgency has been the
unequal distribution of economic wealth and political power. Half of the
working population earned the major part of their income directly through
agricultural activities and the majority of them are poor. Poverty seems to
be endemicjn the Philippines and is most widespread in rural communities.
In the 1980s, the Philippines had one of the worst records of poverty in
South- East Asia. Official statistics do not always catch the reality of
poverty for a number of reasons. Nonetheless, when the Philippine
government surveyed the poverty-situation in 1986, 67 per cent of the
population was found to be living below the official poverty line (Republic
of the Philippines 1990). The World Bank estimates that 58 per cent of the
rural and 48 per cent of the urban families live below the official poverty
line (Putzel 1992). The absurdity of the poverty in the Philippines resides
in the fact that the food producers and the agricultural based population are
those which live in absolute poverty. Malnutrition among children, lack of
health care, education, proper housing and food are part of the everyday life
for an average Filipino, particularly if he or she produces food for aliving.
7
The proposed solution by each new President has therefore been land
reforms, as a way of solving the problem of poverty or rather the problem
of socIal insurgency. Despite suggested and even implemented land
reforms, the distribution of land ownership is still highly skewed (Figure
1.1). Within the coconut sector, it has been found that 2 per cent of the
coconut farms cover 40 per cent of the coconut land, while 91 per cent of
the coconut farms are left with only 33 per cent of the total area grown
with coconut trees in other parts of the country (Putzel 1990).
This research was undertaken in a municipality of Quezon Province. The
land in this area is owned by a few large landowners and a larger number
of small landowners. Many of the small holders have white-collar jobs
beside being smalllandowners. Candelaria is a "sleeping cross" along South
Super Highway in the direction of Bicol Province. Social unrest has broken
out here. There were guerilla activities as late as in 1989.3 At that time, a
large-scale military operation forced the guerilla organization New Peoples
. Army (NPA) to withdraw: 'It áppears'~ that the löcal-people have good
memories about the. days of the. NPA. They have a careful and quite
sceptical attitude toward the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the
militia called Civilian Armed Forces of Geographical Units (CAFGU).
Quezon Province is a heavilymilitarized province compared with other
provinces in the country. Bombings of municipalities in the province have
occurred during the fieldwork, particularly in the nearby Bondoc Peninsula.
An assassination attempt was also made against a resource person for the
research project. He survived but had to immediately flee the area with his
family. Although the NPA was forced out in 1989 and there is no active
peasant organizations in the municipality, the national problem of
insurgency is affecting the everyday life of the people. The people are poor
and are desperately making efforts to provide food for themselves. In
Candelaria, no reliable data exist on the participation of the population in
coconut production and processing but it is estimated that between 50-70
per cent of the people are directly engaged in these activities.4
When martiallaw was dedared by President Ferdinand Marcos in 1972,
the peasantry was the main socIal group of concern for both the President
and the revolutionary movement. Today, the problem of the peasantry is
3 Interviews with several people who must remain anonymous, gave a vivid picture of
those days.
4 The number vary, and no official survey have been done in the area since 1981.
However, both resource persons and others interviewed stated that the majority, i.e: more
than 50 per cent of the labour force was engaged in the coconut sector.
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still dominant. They are stilllargely landless and are more economically
marginalized than ever.
In South East Asia, Marxism has been extensively used in the effort to
liberate the oppressed masses. The revolutionary victory of the Communist
Party of China in 1949 was an important source of inspiration for the
movements that based their programmes on the thoughts of Marx, Lenin
and Mao Tsetung. The Vietnamese experience also proved to people in the
region that therewere strategies that could successfully wipe out the
enemy. In Indonesia, the Communist Party (PK!) had at its peak three
million members and 20 million supporters before it was brutally crushed
by the Indonesian regime in the late 1960s. Marxist ideology and strategy
have.also been extensively used by liberation movements and organizations
in Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines
(Castro and Nemenzo 1987).
Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) (Communist Party of the
Philippines )was establishedasearly as i 930 and had from the outset a
Marxist-Leninist framework for the Philippine struggle for national
liberation and democratization. Internal contradictions led to a split in the
then very small party in the early 1960s. The Communist Party of the
Philippines(CPP) was 're-established on the' birthday of Mao Tsetung,
December 26, 1968." The new party based their analysis on the theory that
the mode of production in the Philippines was dominated by feudalism.
Consequently, the peasantry was seen as the key agents for the ne ed ed
revolution:
The semi-feudal character of Philppine society is principally determined
by the impingement of D.S. monopoly capitalism on the old feudal mode
of production and the subordination of the latter to the former. The
concrete result of the intertwining of foreign monopoly capitalism and
domestic feudalism is the erosion and dissolution of a natural economy of
self-sufficiency in favour of a commodity economy. Being dictated by
foreign monopoly capitalism, this commodity economy is used to restrict
the growth of a national capitalism, and force owner-cultivators and
handicraftsmen into bankrptcy (Guerrero i 979 p.64).
The abolition of feudalism was to be achieved through a revolution,
following the strategy of Mao Tsetung, by a protracted people's war led by
the people' s army:
The New People' s Army is the main instrument of the Communist Party
of the Philppines, the National Democratic Front and the entire Filipino
people for carrying out the central task of smashing the military-
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bureaucratic machinery of the reactionary state, seizing political power
and bringing about the total victory of the national democratie
revolution... (CPP 1989, p. 1).
This revolutionary strategy was first expressed in writing in the late 1960s
by Guerrero, who is said to be the founder of the CPP. It is still the official
analysis and policy of the underground movement in the Philippines. This
movement is called the National Democratic Front (NDF) and CPP is a
member organization. It is not known how many members and supporters
the NDF has. Military sources estimate that around 20,000 men and women
were full time guerilla soldiers around 1986 (Shirmer and Shalom 1987).
An NDF. spokesperson in 1981 stated that there were 26 guerilla fronts all
over the country. According to this source, these were actively supported
by around 5 million peasants, fisherfolks and indigenous people. 800,000
of these were said to be organized in the NDF and 10 million people were
considered as direct-supportersof;the underground moyement (KSP 1981).
Their strength has '., increasëd dramatically from the mid 1970s. It has
experienced a temporary dedine after the downfall of Marcos. Today, the
NPA is still present in all of the provinces. The NDF is one of the strongest
oppositiQn move.ients in Asia.. and is als.o.considered to be a major threat
by the government. At present, however, internal contradictions regarding
the future revolutionary strategy of NDF seem to be leading to the most
severe and major split the national democratic movement has experienced
since the foundation of the CPP in 1968.
1.4 The organization of the thesis
All of the above makes the case of the Philippine peasantry as participants
in political struggle interesting to study. In chapter two the theoretical as
well as the methodological approach of this thesis will be presented. The
international debate between developmentalists with a Marxist entry-point,
has from time to time been intense after the second world war. The so-
called "mode-of-production controversy" created a development of the
Marxist framework, sugge sting a possible co-existence of modes of
productions in the third world. This could best been analyzed by searching
for mechanisms in the concrete socIal formation. An introduction to these
debates, which has been constructive as far as development of development
theory is concerned, will be presented in chapter two.
It there is such a co-existence of more than one mode of production, how
does this co-existence express itself in the social formation ? What mode of
surplus value is produced and what actors are found in the production?
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Does this co-existence operate independently from the state, or is the state
crucial for this mode to be maintained? These questions are raised in
chapter two, and the consecutive chapters will try to find an answer. It is
necessary to understand contemporary Filipino sOcIety in order to
understand the context of such a debate and the social history as well as the
contemporary Filipino social formation will be presented in chapter three.
The historical analysis of the Philippines will illustrate that the
contemporary social formation of the Philippines is tightly linked to its
past. The analysis of the Filipino society could not be properly understood
without an historical background. The presentation of chapter three will
present the conditions necessary to move down to a local society. The
municipality of Candelaria, where coconuts are. produced, will be used as
an example.
The agenda of this study is to not only describe but also explain the
social formations in the coconut producing sector in Candelaria. Chapter
four will reve al a complex:;~o~existencebetwèeh more~than one mode of
production, which creates a .,societyincapable of either increasing
productivity or creating the possibilities for the peasantry to increase their
living standards. The economic basis in the research area was found to be
disarticulated in sO'\Íar as ,the producers are becoming more and more
marginalized both in terms of political power and economic power. Are all
producers of coconuts marginalized? Do the different types of coconut
producers relate to each other? It coconut production not is enough to
secure reproduction of the household, what strategies do they follow?
Further, is it only economic deprivation that the coconut producers
experience?
Finally in chapter five, the findings will be collected. Bottlenecks that
hinder development in the sector and possible development patterns will be
emphasized. What kind of economicbasis is there to be found in the
coconut producing sector in the Philippines? What are the linkages between
the socIal formation at the national lev el and the socIal formation at the
local lev el ? Can local changes occur? What should the coconut producers
do in Candelaria, provided they have the resources to do it? The task is
genuine development for those engaged in the coconut producing sector -
as producers of coconuts.
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2. Social formations and modes of
production
Why are the peasantspoor? This question has been asked time and again,
and was one of the key questions during the 1950s and 1960s when the
school of unequal developmene and the "mode of production-controversy"
arose. The controversy opened the way for an expansion of the Marxist
theoretical framework indicating that this framework was unable to
understand the specific difficulties of the third world countries in our time.
The thesis of unequal developinent and stagnation in the periphery was
presented for the first time at the Congress of the Comintern in 1928 by
Otto Kuusinen (de Janvry 1981). Based on the expefience of colonized
India, Kuusinen had conduded that colonialism by introducing capitalism
in non-capitalist countries allowed capitalism to eKploit the resources of the
colonies for developing the centre, while creating a bottleneck for
industriaIIzation and thus a stagnation in the colonized country. This was
a critique of the contemporary view of the Marxists whose more linear
development thesis suggested that introductionof capitalism in the colonies
would lead to development .of a capitalist mode of production.
The debate is highly abstract and participants have problems in finding
empirical evidence supporting their theoretical understanding. It has been
criticised for bein g both reductionistic and teleological by, among others,
Althusser (Stokke 1992). Althusser introduced the concept "socIal
formation" in his attack on what he called Marxist humanism and Stalinism
(Elliot 1987). Re argued that the mode of production consists of three
articulated leveIs: the economic base, the political and the ideological
superstructures, and that the economic base determined which one of these
would be determinant only in the last instance. In Althusser' susage, a
Particularly Paul M. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy opposed the Lenin- and Bhukarin-thesis,
which stated that lack of capitalist development was the prime cause for poverty in the
colonies. Baran and Sweezy explained unequal development through a drainage of
surplus from the so-called periphery to the centre while capitalism as such was already
operating in the poor nations (Baran 1968). Andre Gunder Frank developed this thesis
in the "dependency" school in his explanation of the Latin American situation (Frank
1969).
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socIal formation corresponded to a concrete society which comprised the
co-existence of several modes of production and a corresponding
superstructure (Althusser 1990).
The task of this research is limited in scope geographically as well as
thematically. We will study social formations in the coconut producing
sector in the municipality of Candelaria in Quezon Province in the
Philippines. The use of the term socIal formation dearly implies that the
society has a definite pattern of socIal relations of production between the
various groups of actors. SocIal formations in Candelaria are analyzed to
identify the dominant mode of production within the coconut sector. An
identification of the specific mechanisms of surplus value extraction in
coconut production can give indications about the economicsystem the
producers operate under.
De J anvry (1981) does not use the concept of social formations himself,
but he observes the concrete expressions of co-existence between several
modesof production, 'andthusis indirectly discússing social formations,
although at a rather,macroJevel. Taylor (1981) refers to socIal formation
in his discussion of how modes of production and their co-existence
manifest themselves in concrete societies. One of his main thesis is that the
social formations inthird worldpost-'colonial societies 'are characterised by
a serIes of dislocations between their various leveIs. These dislocations lead
to difficulties in analyzing the practice of the different social dasses,
because they do not always coincIde with the objective interests of dasses.
The traditional basis and superstructure distinction is not readily discernable
within one socIal setting, since the ideological superstructure in addition to
being influenced by the economic structure in one mode of production, is
also influenced and ruled by other modes of production. As Taylor says:
(...) the practico-socialand theoretical ideologies that constitute
ideological subjects who wil interpret their lived relations to the world in
terms of the ideological requirements for the reproduction of the labour
proeess dominant at a paricular time in the development of the capitalist
mode of produetion, may not be adequately secured within the ideological
apparatus, in that their reproduction may remain partially blocked by the
dominance of pre-existing ideologies; again, the dass allance represented
as dominant at the politicallevel may hinder the proeess of subsumption
of the productive forces under the dominant relation of production (Taylor
1981, pp. 122-123).
In other words, we might experience a mixture of modes of production;
where capitalism is supposed to exist, yet a political and ideological
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structure based on a pre-capitalist mode of production may be dominant and
may hinder development.
In Marxist political economy, the mode of production is decisive for the
explanation of the dynamics of a social formation at any time. Marx defines
the mode of production in A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy, where he writes that people (or men, as the English translation
puts it) enter specific relations of production. These relations of production
are independent of their will. The totality of these relations of production,
he continues:
(...) constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on
whicharises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond
definite forms of socIal conscIousness. The mode of production of
material life conditions the general process of socIal, political and
intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their
existence, but their socIal existence thatdeterminestheir conscIousness.
At a certain stage of developmênt,the' material productive forces of
society come into conflictwith the existing relations of production or -
this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the property
relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto
(Marx 1981 a, p. 21).
Marx identifies several different modes of production and mentions
specifically the ancient, Asiatic, feudal and capitalist modes of production
as antagonistic modes. This implies that built-in contradictions in these
modes will force a'development to a new stage. The change from one mode
to another will occur through social revolutions, as a result of dass
struggle. In our understanding of Marx, when the mode of production leads
to an empowerment of the direct producers, the contradiction in the society
will necessarilybe antagonistic, not solvable and enforce changes by means
of a dass struggle.
However, Marx wrote little about the possible co-existence of several
modes of production, or more concretely about how the capitalist mode of
production affects and relates to pre-capitalist modes of production. This
undarity has led to a controversy among Marxists, internationally as well
as in the Philippines. This "mode of production-controversy" has infIuenced
the development of theoretical understanding for the causes of poverty and
economic misery in the third world.2
We will concentrate on the existing social formation and mode of
production in Candelaria, with an understanding shared with Althusser: in
2 See Foster-Carter 1978 for auseful survey of the "made of produetion controversy".
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pre-capitalist societies, surplus tends to be appropriated by political and
ideological mechanisms, where state and church institutions play a crucial
role. In capitalist societies, surplus is extracted through economic
mechanisms. However, pre-capitalism and capitalism can co-exist in a
social formation and it is on this particular level of analysis that we will be
able to understand the present situation in Candelaria.
There are mainly two pre-capitalist modes of production we should be
aware of in this study, the feudal mode of production and the Asiatic mode
of production. There is one significant difference between the two. Whereas
peasants in the feudal mode of production are unfree by their relationship
to their landowner, the peasants within the Asiatic mode of production pay
taxesand labour service to the representatives of the state, i.e. a King. or
an Emperor (Alavi 1987). SamI Amin calls the Asiatie mode ofproduction
the tributary mode of production where the peasantry is subordinated to a
superior "external force", the state, which extracts taxes and tributes from
the peasantry. 'The state and the ',eliteäre exteth'al in the sense that the
peasant community operatesas a self-sufficientcorporate community (Amin
1977) .
In a pre-capitalist mode of production there are two major antagonistic
dasses': the tenants and ,the owners of land,either private landlords or state
representatives. Capitalist dass structure can be discerned by the existence
of the workers, who have no ownership in the means of production, and the
capitalists, the owners of the means of production. Under capitalism, the
ownership of the means of production, governs socIal relations between
various groups of actors involved in the production process. The drive for
production, the need for the continuous generation of surplus value through
competition, gives the capitalist mode of production its peculiar intern al
dynamism. Production depends, however, on the existence of a market
where a price can be obtained that is more than the cost of production. The
profit derived from surplus value is appropriated by those owning the
means of production, the capitalists, and not by the producers, the workers.
The surplus value can principally be created in three ways. Marx
mentions two of them, namely absolute surplus value and relative surplus
value. Absolute surplus value coincides historically with primitive
accumulation, where reinvestment in production has the purpose of
maintaining productivity at the same intensity rather than increasing it.
Primitive accumulation is mainly labour intensive. The surplus is generated
by keeping the cost of inputs as small as possible; in other words by
keeping wage-expenses as low as possible and the working hours as long
as possible.
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The production of relative surplus value is derived from an increased
productivity and thus indudes a higher degree of reinvestment than absolute
surplus value. The driving force of the generation of relative surplus value
is found within capitalism itself. McFarlane and Beresford argue that:
(...) the aim of the capitalist is to get hold of more money, to realise a
profit. To do this, he needs to struggle in competition with others; he
needs to seek new markets and organise the produetion of new
commodities - even to create new needs. This in turn requires that profits,
realIzed as money-capital, are accumulated and used for new investments
(McFarlane and Beresford 1985, p. 34).
Surplus is extracted from an increasingly' intensified production, where
productivity increases are due to higher capital-inputs in production. The
high level of productivity can decrease the market-value of the product
because of competition. This can lead to a market-widening (more buyers
can buy the product) aswell ,as mark6t-deepening (each buyer can buy
more), if the wage of the workers increasesproportionally with the
productivity increase.
One factor in the development toward relative surplus value is also the
creation of trade unions" fightlng for warkers' interests. The unions tend, in
their struggle against capital owners, to fight against any extension of the
working day. The production of relative surplus value is dynamic, in the
sense that the system forces the development of the means of production:
i.e. technology. Creation of relative surplus value is therefore dominant in
the capitalist mode of production. Because of the division of labour and
high costs of machinery created through the drive for relative surplus value,
labour is in these cases subordinated under and alienated from the means
of production, the machinery.
General surplus value is also mentioned as a form of surplus value by,
among others, Bunzel (1979). Bunzel insists on the possibility to increase
the surplus value by simply increasing both the labour power as well as the
number of tools. This occurs in contexts where absolute as well as relative
surplus value is produced, and indicates a quantitative increase of
production and surplus value created.
However, development in third world countries depends on a variety of
mechanisms within as well as outside the nation state. Taylor discusses the
effects of penetration of a certain type of capitalism in a country with
predominant pre-capitalist modes of production in From Modernization to
Modes of Production (1981). According to him, the major effect of the
penetration of merchant capitalism is a "reinforcement of already existing
forms of extra-economic coercion in agricultural production in the non-
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capitalist mode of production" (Taylor 1981). This is achieved by utilising
and perpetuating existing relations of production or by creating forms of
landed property and relations of production similar to those during the
European feudal period. He particulary makes reference to the Spanish
colonizers' practices in Latin America. As Spain also colonized the
Philippines, his argument can be used here.
Merchant capitalism was first of all introduced in what we today call
third world countries through colonialism and imperialism, i.e. exogenous
factors, in contrast to the endogenous introduction of capitalism in countries
like the US and Western Europe. Imperialist powers as Spain, the US,
Portugal, Great Britain as well as the Netherlands penetrated non-capitalist
socIal formations, and used their local arangements in these socIeties for
the betterment of their own states and elites. Export production in the
colonies made colonization profitable and created a production beneficIal
first of all for those well-off back home in the colonial centre. Furthermore,
the cheap labour,~powercreated under non-capìtalist social formations,
Intensified the colonizers' orientationtowards the creation of absolute
surplus value. Competition in export-production was met not by intensified
productivity - via technology - but by intensified cheap production.
J anvry argues that there '.is asurplus .transfer from those countries
struggling with a disarticulated capitalist economy (called the periphery) to
those countries with an articulated capitalist economy (called the centre).
The centre has a necessarily external relationship with the periphery in
order to overcome the cydical tendency for the rate of profit to fall, and
this is made possible via twö particular mechanisms:
The first mechanism results from industrial and financial imperialism
associated with foreign investments and loans. The second is associated
with international trade, and canmaterialize through three specific
mechanisms of different relative importance: unequal exchange in trade,
unequal trade, and rewards in the formation of international prices (de
Janvry 1981, p. 50).
De Janvry thus argues against the thesis of Emmanuel (1972) who states
that lower wage in the periphery is the main reason for the lower reward.
Rather, it is lower productivity in the periphery that leads to lower rewards
and therefore to lower wages in the periphery.
It foreign capital investments are to be attracted to the third world, the
rate of profit must be higher than that in the centre - higher than even a
monopolistic sector could provide in the centre. De Janvry, together with
Kalecki (1954) and Baran (1968), argues that super-profit in the centre
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originates in a biased distribution of the surplus value towards the
monopolistic sector away from the competitive sector. As he puts it:
The tendency towards equalization of the rate of profit that characterizes
competitive capitalism thus disappears, and monopolistic super-profit can
occur without necessarily decreasing the relative participation of labour
in the social product. In the periphery, by contrast, lack of an established
competitive sector implies that super-profits on foreign investment
originate elsewhere: in the joint occurrence of high productivity and low
wages, wages that are kept down through suppression of workers'
demands, functional dualism (cheap semiproletarian labour), the
internationalization of value (imports of cheap wage foods), and the
increasingly efficient production of wage goods (development of
capitalism in response to market widening) (de Janvry 1981, p. Sl).
Absolute surplus value demands less reinvestment in production than
relative surplus value, since.Jabour intensity is themain factor facilitating
this kind of accumulation. In practice, this means that a larger proportion
of the surplus value can be taken out of the production sphere and invested
elsewhere.
2.1 Social formations and rural modes of production in the
Philippines
Several scholars and political activists have tried toapply the Marxist
theoretical framework in the political and social context of the rural
Philippines. An elaborate discussion exists, reflected in an extended
literature. We will present the main arguments in this discussion before
going into the empirical study of socIal formations in Candelaria.
Unfortunately, the Philippine discussion is at times very theoretical and
difficult to comprehend, and at times it is hard to grasp its relevance.
Participants in the Filipino discussion often insist on min or distinctions of
concepts and interpretations, leading to a particular Filipino discussion
dimate. They have in part developed specific terms which distinguish
themselves from the ongoing more general universal Marxist discussion,
thus creating a kind of a local branch of Marxist theory. However, if
analyzing peasants in the Philippines, with a theoretical "mode of
production" concept, it is inevitable to do it with an understanding of the
indigenous discussion on this concept, as it dominates to date the political
consciousness and practice in rural areas.
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As the existing economic system was created in the interest of the
colonial power elite, it is natural to expect that these interests in one way
or another are still maintained - particularly in those cases where the
colony received its independence in understanding with the colonial power.
In the Philippines, this would mean that we would find an economic
interest and linkage with the last former colonizer of the Philippines - the
United States.
It is easy to confirm the present linkage between the US and the
Philippines by analyzing the country' s international trade and business
statistics. A glimpse in the monthly IBON Facts and Figures in 1988 gives
us the presence of Trans National Corporations in the Philippines in 1987
(IBON 1989). The figures show that the average percentage o(.American
controlled direct foreign equity investments in 1970 to 1987 was 56.8 per
cent, while Japan controlled 13.6 per cent. In the same period, the net flow
of capital out of the country (inflow minus net outflow) averaged more than
USD 65 million per year (Ibid.):, Most'of it wastransferred to the United
States, in the form of net profit.This indicates a support for the already
presented suggestion about the economic position ofpost-colonial countries.
We expect to findmechanisms in the socIal formations in Candelaria
supported.by' both a.merchant capitalistmode ofproduction and traditional
feudal mode of production. Webelieve that the elite in the Philippines uses
low-cost pre-capitalist, production mechanisms to generate profit from
absolute surplus value. It this assumption is correct, the profit of coconut
production is not reinvested in the coconut production to increase the
productivity, but tends to disappear out of the coconut producing sector.
This is considered to be a counter-tendency which blocks capitalist
dèvelopment.
Some scholars analyze the articulation, or inter-relationship between
several modes of production in one nation, and even, in one sector. De
Janvry (1981) states that this mode of co-existence can create a
disarticulated capitalist mode of production, which should be seen as a
result of the articulation or co-existence between pre-capitalist and capitalist
modes of production. Although there is an intern al contradiction between
feudalism and capitalism, the articulation between these modes seems to
reproduce both modes. Labour can be hired for wages below subsistence,
because of a functional dualism between wage-labour on the one hand and
subsistence-agriculture and the so-called informal sector on the other hand.
This functional dualism seems to reproduce the existing economic pattern
and to pre vent the dynamic changes of capitalism to occur.
The disarticulation of modes which leads to the lack of progressive
development is recognized by de Janvry in two types of economies: the
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export-endave economy and the import-substitution economy. Export
endave economies are recognized as being export oriented in production,
while the import substitution economy produces luxury goods for the
domestic market under tariff-protection (de Janvry 1981). The division of
traditional and modern sector is found in both types of disarticulated
economies. While the traditional sector is producing wage goods for the
domestic market, the modern sector is producing luxury goods for the
international market or for a small segment of the domestic market: i.e. the
bourgeoisie. The export endave economy is present in the Philippines in
the coconut sector as well as in other sectors. The disarticulation between
the modern and traditional sector leads to a labour force that is in practice
only semi-proletarianized. They receive wages under the minimum wage
standard,3 since part of the labourers' subsistence needs are derived from
production for home consumption.
An export endave economy may indude the control of several steps in
the manufacturing and purchasing side of the products. Export endaves in
the coconut sector in the Philippines comprise monopolized ownership
structures in land, factories, banks, trade companies and other links in the
production and export of coconut products. The export-endave economy
strongly depends on the export trade and foreigneapital. For the coconut
trade in the Philippines, this foreign capital is first of all Ametican.
According to Janvry, a disarticulated import substitution economy differs
from the export endave economy by the division between the industrial and
the external sector; while export endave economies depend on an
international market, the import substitution economy produces luxury
goods also for a segment of the domestic population. However, basic food
production for the majority of the population still operates in a traditional
form. A disarticulated economy results in a society polarized both in
political and economic power.
The definition of the peasantry and its role in the constitution of the
mode of production has been controversial during the last decades. Simply
put, there are two positions in the debate. One side argues that the peasant
mode of production constitutes a specific and stabile mode of production,
which can be influenced by other modes (see for example FeITer 1984 b)
This is in opposition to those who state that no such specific peasant mode
of production exists under an internationally dominant capitalist mode of
production. Their condusion is that the peasantry should be regarded as
3
"Minimum wage standard" means the minimum wage needed for having aliving
standard just above the poverty line. The minimum wage standard is therefore strongly
normative. The problem in defining this is briefly discussed later in this chapter.
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a transitory faction of a dass which is about to disintegrate into two main
socIaldasses, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (see for example Magno
1985). This view might seem similar to that of de Janvry (1981), but in the
Philippines, this vie w implies urban legal dass struggle as a development
strategy, since peasants as such does not hold the necessary political
strength. De Janvry on the other hand, focus on the peasantry as a vital
force in the struggle for change and development (de Janvry 1981).
Taylor' s focus is slightly different. He seems more concerned about the
dass position of the peasantry in order to understand their political position
and strength. Taylor asks "why, in so many transitional formations (as de
Janvry subscribes to), have capitalist relations not developed in the
agricultural sector?" (Taylor 1981, p. 243). In other words, why docertain
sectors seem to maintain a pre-capitalist social formation, which indudes
a subjective dass understanding among people doser to a pre-capitalist
mode of production, even if capitalism òbjectively seen is present in the
country?
This question has to be asked in the case of the socIal formation in
Candelaria as well. Even though tenancy still is very common in Candelaria
- as well as in other areas in the Philippines - there is no doubt about the
growing importance of",'t, wage-ec0nomy." The' condusion regarding the
peasantry as a transitory social group therefore seems appealing. However,
this definition tends to undervalue non-economic - e.g. cultural -
mechanisms in the superstructure that work for the reproduction of a
subjective domination of the peasantry. We will therefore be careful in
, mechanically regarding the social formation as ruled by the contradiction
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and regard the discussion on
peasantry as a transitory or stable social dass as too abstract for our
purpose.
2.2 Social formations and the state
Postulating antagonistic contradictions between dasses in the production
sphere, leads to the condusion that "the state can not be seen a neutral
arbiter between competing interests as in pluralist state theory, but must be
understood in terms of dass structures and struggles" (Stokke 1992, p.
102). The state in the Philippines can be seen as underpinning the political
and ideological superstructure of the existing economic base in the interest
of the ruling dass.
However, even if state formation in both feudal and capitalist societies
operates in favour of the ruling dasses, the state should not be seen as an
inevitable result of the objective interests of the ruling dasses. The state in
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the Philippines is known to be "privatized"by the ruling families. Research
made in the Philippinescondudes that the state has been controlled by 60-
100 families during the last 50 years (GutieITez et aL. 1992). The state thus
represents certain factions of the elite and not a united ruling dass.
In disarticulated economies, the bourgeoisie is commonly divided into a
national and a comprador faction. The national bourgeoisie has an interest
to invest in productivity increases and thus in the production of relative
surplus value. The comprador bourgeoisie maintains its interests through the
state apparatus. It bases its power on historical and feudal grounds, as did
the former hacienderos and collaborators with the colonial powers in the
Philippines. The comprador bourgeoisie thus has an interest in transfeITing
thesurplus value into political power, which normally coincides with the
production of absolute surplus value. As de J anvry puts it:
Dominance of the allance among international capital (metropolitan
bourgeoisie), dependent: bourgeoisie" and Janded elites(fundamentally
involved in the production of exportables, inputs for industry, and luxury
foods) implies that the logic of disartIculated accumulation - and hence
cheap labour and cheap food - prevails. Foreign capital and multinational
corporations are pervasive. The proletariat is in open opposition, and the
'state 'thus needs to assume arepressive role (de Janvry 1981, p. 41-42).
De J anvry focuses on the internal contradictions within the elite in societies
with coexisting modes of production. He daims that factions of the elite
struggle against each other in order to maintain or gain access to the
domain of the state:
The struggle between these allances to gain access to the state results in
a tendency towards considerable instabilty in public policies as the state
falls under the dominationof one allance or another. It also implies that
the relative autonomy of the state is lessened in the periphery as the state
becomes a more direct instrument of domination of the dass alliance in
power (de Janvry 1981, p. 192-193).
The contradiction between different segments of the bourgeoisie has also
been subject to discussion in the Philippines. Ricardo FeITer argues that the
traditional elite, basing its power on feudal relations and reproducing its
capital through a certain form of monopoly capitalism injected from
outside, controls the state. The existence of a national bourgeoisie, cUITently
suffering under state restrictions, supports the thesis that the mode of
production in the Philippines still cannot be considered fully capitalist. The
significance of this debate in the Philippines comes from the political
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consequences drawn. It FeITer is right, there is a progressive national
capitalist bourgeoisie4 "whose objective interests are in conflict with the
bourgeoisie in power. The elite in control of the state monetizes their profit
deducted from absolute surplus value, without reinvesting the profit in order
to increase productivity. The articulation between feudalism and capitalism
in the Philippines thus brings out the "evils" of both feudalism and
capitalism:
In competitive and progressive capitalism, expansion as well as innovation
get to be objective necessities for each unit of capital because, in fact, it
is only by expansion or innovation that capital can be preserved. It is this
economic mechanism for the preservation of capital which ispractically
absent in the Philippine economy. As aresult, there wil be a general
tendency to generate monopoly via influence, power, extortion, coercion,
bribery, teITorism, etc, in a word, force (FeITer L 984 b, p. 45).
.' '
FeITer insists that the existing mode of production shoûld not be regarded
as a transitory mode ofproduction but rather as an unfortunate outcome of
a mode, brought about by an "evil maITiage" of two exploiting modes of
production, feudalism and capitalism. He therefore opposes de J anvry, who
insists 'on charactèiizing the existing mode of production as transitionary.
The exploiting modes FeITer refers have produced a distinct third mode, an
"evil child" which is so powerful that it only can be destroyed through a
"divorce" between the feudal and capitalist modes (FeITer 1984 b). The
"evil child" is called a semi-feudal mode of produetion, a name that:
(...) suggests that a bourgeois revolution has been long overdue, a
bourgeois revolution that cannot be waged by the bourgeoisie for the
simple reason that the feudal and imperialist forces have stunted the
growth of a revolutionary bourgeois dass (FeITer 1984 b, p. 46).
However, de Janvry also agrees with FeITer that reformism within the
present system does have severe limitations due the interests of those
controlling the state. De J anvry advocates collective action, land reforms
and development programmes conducted by the peasants themselves as a
possible path for constructive development. He argues that supporting an
alliance induding the national bourgeoisie which promotes a kind of
bourgeois revolution is based on an undervaluation of the strength of the
4 Progressive in the sense that it operates companies by mechanisms which increase
productivity - i.e. through production of relative surplus value, as well as through a high
degree of reinvestment.
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capitalist mode of production in Latin America. He comes dose to FeITer
when he accepts that even though the peasantry to a large degree has been
proletarianized, it has not acquired a dass consciousness as proletarians.
Collective peasant struggle will be a tool in developing this dass
consciousness and is therefore inevitably more important. This leads us to
the discussion of the agricultural producers' position within social
formations.
2.3 Social formations and the agricultural producers
The peasantry in the Philippines should not be regarded as one homogenous
dass. Shanin (1988) argues that peasants are defined by their use of simple
technology and that their production is mainly for home consumption.
However, this definition is inadequate to understand the nature of the
peasantry in the coconut sectorinJlie Philippines. Undoubtedly, the Filipino
peasânts use a rather simple technology, but the majority of their product
is actually exchanged in the'domestic or even in the international markets.
We will define the peasantry as agricultural producers tilling the land, as
those doing agricultural work as a major economic activity for their
livelihood: small owner-cuiiivators, tenants, farm workers and alike. In the
analysis of the socIal formations in Candelaria, presented in chapter four,
emphasis will be placed on those actually producing and harvesting the
coconuts, i.e. the tenants and farm workers.
The Philippine Department for Agrarian Reform supposedly registers all
those owning 50 hectares of land or more, as landowners subjected to land
reforms. These owners are normally considered to be landlords in the
Philippines. Landlords usually do neither paricipate in the administration
of the land nor in production. However, particularly in the south, there are
commercially oriented plantation owners who do participate in the
management of the farm, and thus indirectly in production. The objective
interest of a landlord is to maintain the existing power structure. This can
be done through participation in market competition by continuously
increasing productivity or by using non-economic coercIon - e.g. patron-
dient relationships, authoritarian and non-democratic mechanisms as the
use of armed forces. It is therefore necessary for the landlords to secure
representation in the state, which they seem to be doing in the Philippines.
There are also those owning less than 50 hectares. They are refeITed to
as landowners, both by official statistics and by the people. It they
participate in the production, as an owner of 1-5 hectares normally would
do, they are considered to be small owner-cultivators, and regarded as
members of the agricultural middle dass.
24
As many landlords and owners do not participate in production, an
overseer, who will supervise the production and represent the interests of
the landlord in the field, is needed. The overseer has as many titles as there
are dialects in the Philippines. The title of the overseer in Candelaria is
katiwala. The katiwala serves as an agricultural manager. His reward can
be paid in two ways, either as a fixed monthly wage or as a wage relative
to the production he has responsibility for. The objective interests of a
katiwala can be considered to be doser to those of the middle dass, but his
loyalty to the landlord makes his subjective dass interest more biased to
those of the landlord. Being the perpetuator of the policy of the elite, both
as a katiwala and as a central power-holder through work in the local
government, katiwala' s social position depends on the power of the
landlords.
Tenants rent the land from the landowner. The cost of rent can be
relative - i.e. a share of the total production - or fixed. In cases of a fixed
rent, the rent is' normallypaid in cash, and the sameamount is paid
regardless of the value ,of production. These cases are called lease-holdings.
In cases of a relative rent, the rent can be given in kind, in cash or as
unpaid labour. The sharing arrangement is not regulated by the laws, but
by ,the individual, agreement between ,landlord and ten ant. Normally, the
arrangements are biased in favour of the landlord, giving the landlord the
biggest share of the agricultural production, even if the landlord in no way
participates in the actual production. The interest of tenants is expressed
through dass struggle, which operates mainly in two ways: legal/reform-
oriented work, which accepts the legitimacy of the state apparatus, and
focuses on the ne ed for reforms regarding the means of production, and the
control of these means. The other type of dass struggle is more radical, it
often makes use of dandestine means. Its primary aim is to remove the
existing state apparatus through revolutionary means, induding armed
struggle. This kind of dass struggle has a long tradition in the Philippines,
being pursued by the peasantry since the beginning of the Spanish era.
The Filipino advocates of the theory of disarticulation and stagnation
argue that the persistence of landlord-tenant relations in the coconut
production proves the continued existence of pre-capitalism today
(Quisimbing 1990). Furthermore, the semi-proletarianization of the
peasants, who are both wage-workers and subsistence producers, indicates
a disarticulation within the coconut sector itself. This suggests that
capitalism so far has not been able to dissolve the peasantry as a social
dass.
While the tenants pay a certain price in form of rent to the
landowner/landlord, the farm worker receives a wage for his/her work on
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the farm. He or she can be paid by the tenant, the katiwala or the
landlord/owner. The major distinction between the farm worker and the
tenant is that the farm worker has no economic relationship to the land. The
farm worker is normally paid according to his production, not a fixed daily
wage. The farm workers' alienation from the means of production makes
their dass interests different from the dass interests of the tenants.
Considering the high unemployment rate in Candelaria, getting a paid job
is of paramount importance. Once that is secured, the dass struggle of the
farm workers is oriented towards limiting the absolute surplus value created
- i.e. higher wages and shorter work days.
The book Philippine Society and Revolution written by Amando
Guerrero, an alias of the founder of the outlawed Communist Pary of the
Philippines (CPP), is an influential source for those advocating radical
political change in the Philippines. Guerrero sees the tenants and farm
workers as belonging to the same social dass: they have common economic
and political interests in:fighting the:iandlords;''to achieve this they tend to
organize, where possible, Into peasant organizations and participate through
these organizations in dass action. Guerrero further divides the peasantry
into three sub-groups: the rich peasants, the middle peasants and the poor
peasants. He notes that ~~together with the farm workers, the poor peasants
are about 75 to 80 percent of the rural population" (Guerrero 1979).5 The
proletariat on the other hand is defined as those who are dispossessed of
any means of production and sell their labour power to the capitalist owners
of the means of production. In Guerrero' susage, those participating in agri-
cultural production are defined as peasants - even if they receive a wage.
This image of unit y of the agricultural producers - the tenants and the
farm workers - might appear different in Candelaria. Instead of having a
land-pattern and a mode of production operating with either tenants or
farm workers, we assume we will find productionarrangements operating
with both tenants and farm workers. We will darify the relationships
between tenants and farm workers better with this assumption. In chapter
four, we will present the coconut producers and their relationships with
each other in Candelaria and investigate the degree of correspondence
between their dass consciousness and their objective dass positions. We
will examine the position of tenants and farm workers in the production
sphere and see whether or not their operations are beneficial to the
landowners.
5 Philippine Society and Revolution was written in 1971, but Guerrero insists that the
eomposition of classes in the eontemporary Philippines has quantitatively and
qualitatively remained unehanged sine e the 1960s.
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2.4 The methodological approach
2.4.1 Realism
Human geography as an academic discipline was dominated by empirical
and descriptive regional geography until the 1950s (Johnston 1985). It
provided descriptions of places rather than searching for causal
mechanisms. Each place was considered unique and the scientific approach
was strongly idiographic. The geographer searched for empirically
observable differences between places. With the development of spatial
analyses during the 1960s, geography emerged as a nomothetic science
searching for theoretically explainable regularities in the spatial distribution
of phenomena. Today, both idiographic and nomothetic approaches are
acceptable. The choIce of methodological approach of this thesis is
influenced by the emphasis on Marxism as a theoretical framework. By
using Marxism, thepositivist:methodological approach is exduded, simply
because the causal mechanisms emphasised in Marxismare not necessarily
seen by the eyes of the researcher, and cannot always be plotted on a
map.6
The ,.choice of a"Marxist ".theoretical frameworkdetermines to a certain
degree the choice of the methodological approach. Empirical positivism,
which regards each empirically found data as something unique and
independent, is rejected. The methodological approach of Sayer's (1985)
realism is chosen. This approach attempts to link the empirical world of
appearances to the actions of agents interpreting socIal structures. This leads
to an understanding of certain social structures or frames, making the real-
world appearances more understandable for the scIentist. With this
methodological approach, the socIal formations in the coconut producing
sector in Candelaria will be studied. These social,formations make the
coconut producers what they are today: a heterogenous group of individuals
all very poor who appear to be without the power to change their situation.
The methodology of realism is used because it accepts the fact that
observed reality does not explain itself but can only be explained by
mechanisms behind the observed reality. In this way, realism appeals both
to natural science and socIal science (Johnston 1985). Contrary to the
methodological approach of geographical studies during the 1950s, realism
is neither idiographic nor a theoretical. Furthermore, it is not positivistic.
6 It should be noted here that Marx himself did, not necessarily refuse the positivist
approach. It was particularly the Marxists of the so-called Frankfurter-school who
rejected this methodology.
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Positivism is wanting in causal explanations, as Sayer puts it, "what causes
something' tohappen has nothing to do with the matter of the number of
times it has happened or been observed to happen and hence with whether
it constitutes a regularity" (Sayer 1985, p. 162).
For example, how should we understand the relationships between
different groups of coconut producers? The power, or lack of power of a
tenant, derives not from the individual occupying that position but rather
from the political and economical mechanisms related to that position. It is
exactly this that makes it possible for us to use a theoretical framework and
at the same time understand the producers' understanding of their own and
others' positions. Human geographers should therefore make efforts to
understand how people understand their own situation and analyze their
activity by focusing on both objective positions and subjective
understandings. In this way, it will not only be understood that the coconut
producers are poor, but why and by what means, and how they understand
their poverty. By using the, realist ápproach, it willbe conduded that
women in the coconutproduction are, economically more oppressed than
men and there will be an effort to explain why this is the case.
2.4.2 Choice of area and respondents
Since the main task was to understand the causal mechanisms operating
within the socIal formation among coconut producers, the first agenda was
to establish a proper framework for the study. Next, an appropriate study
area was chosen. It was emphasized that the study area should make it
possible to focus on those mechanisms deriving from socIal differences and
not from spatial inequalities. Candelaria was chosen for a number of
reasons. Firstly, positive contacts with the local people had been secured
through long-term work and cooperation with people in the region. The
locallanguage and culture were somewhat familiar. Secondly, the variety
of tenurial holdings and labour arrangements in the Philippines was present
in the area. The relationships between wage-labourers and tenants could
thus be studied, as well as their relationship with other groups. Thirdly, the
area was in one of the major coconut producing provinces in the country.
It was dose to the highway and had good access to the markets for
coconuts and it was surrounded by buyers as well as by coconut mills and
factories. These factors also reduced transportation costs and practical
problems related to the fieldwork.
Being a typical case-study, the main agenda of the field work was to get
detail ed information from a limited number of respondents. These kinds of
case studies require a mixture of methods: personal observation, use of
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informants, straightforward interviews and the use of secondary data. The
main tool thus becomes the analytical capability. Casley and Lury (1987)
call the researcher outright for an investigator.
The questionnaire was extensive and had several open ended questions.
It was constructed in dose cooperation with social scIentists from the area
in order to limit the misunderstandings based on linguistic and cultural
differences. When informal chats were possible after the interviews, this
was welcomed. On these occasions, notes were made on the back of the
forms, normally after the interview session was over. Certain reasons
favoured doing the majority of the interviews with hired research assistants.
The argument for hiring research assistants is that a white (and perceived
rich) woman could influence the answers given by the respondents. A
counter-argument is the lack of control of the gathered data. To offset this
drawback, there was extensive training of the research staff.
It was best to do the interviews during the evenings, when the
respondents were at" home. 'The införinal'ä.tmüspheremade it possible to
grasp cultural mechanisms like the, views' on women' s work, their relations
to the landowner etc. Even if the research staff did the majority of the
interviews, some of the interviews were done by the researcher to measure
the oapabilityof4he questionnaire to grasp this reality. "
The sensitive nature of some of the questions created a strong need for
trust between the respondents and the researcher. The local research
assistants initially interviewed respondents who trusted them and accepted
their reasons for asking questions. In turn, the research assistants were
introduced to other possible respondents by the previous respondent. In this
manner, the reliability of the data was increased. This kind of "snowball"
sample can hardly be representative for the entire community, but was
necessary in order to increase the Teliability of the survey. Since it was of
interest to interview respondents with different relations to the coconut
production, several "snowballs" were initiated.
There were certain qualifications for being a respondent. The respondent
had to be more than 20 years old, be a resident in the area for the last six
years, andparticIpate in the coconut production as his/her main economic
activity. It was also decided to interview an equal group of tenants and
- farm workers, 20 respondents in each group. Unfortunately three of the
interviews with farm workers were later rejected because of inappropriate
information. Also a minor sample of other groups were interviewed. Four
small owner-cultivators and five factory-workers were induded in the
survey to give additional information about those two main groups of
coconut producers. Although the factory workers did not produce coconuts,
their information could help us understand the possible connection between
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the peasantry and the non-agricultural wage-labour in the analysis of the
socIal formation. Besides these groups, representatives oftraders, overseers,
official representatives, scientific personneI and factory-managers were
interviewed. Landlords were not induded in the survey because they do not
produce coconuts nor do they participate in the socialization among the
producers.
The research assistants were local citizens. They were not dosely
associated with any of the power structures, like the authorities or the
armed forces in the area. They were known for supporting the idea of
organizing the peasants into various non-governmental organizations. The
research staff was easily accepted by the respondents because of their
earlier efforts. The idea of the researcher "going native" was rejected
because this would destroy the pattern of social roles. The people in
Candelaria are basicallypoor and many of them live below the poverty
line. They would not understand the purpose of a researcher deciding to
live like them. As a white person, you are petceìved tõ be rich. Pretending
to be anything else wouldhave been considered, foolish. However,
"stepping down" to the local middle dass is accepted and appreciated.
Living with the family of the pastor in the area made acceptance in the
local community easy.
2.4.3 Data and reality
The tabulation of data was done during the field work with an assistant
from a neighbouring municipality. Her understanding of local culture was
substantial even though she did not know the respondents personally. This
supported the ethics of socIal research to keep personal information given
by the respondents confidentiaL. Analyses were also made with the help of
other resource persons. This is advisable since the Filipino culture
sometimes makes it difficult for a westerner to understand the respondents '
answers. The main agenda was to reveal the actual social situation of the
coconut producers in Candelaria. Official surveys regarding the households
of the local population do not exist in Candelaria. This was an additional
reason for the research team to choose the respondents.
Mark Twain speaks of three kinds of lies: white lies, bloody lies and
statistics. So also in the Philippines. Data concerning unemployment is a
good example. While governmental sources state that the unemployment
rate was 9,1 per cent in 1987 (Republic of the Philippines 1990), other
sources daim an unemployment rate of 11,3 per cent and an
underemployment rate of 30,3 per cent, indicating that 41,6 per cent of the
30
labour force are unemployed to a certain degree (IBON 1988).While the
authoritiesstate that 49,5 per cent of the people live below the poverty-line
(Republic of the Philippines 1990), other sources estimate the percentage
to be between 70-80 per cent of the total population (IBON 1988). Inquiries
revealed that the estimates of the authorities were based on the defined
poverty-line of 1984 and the official average inflation-rate. This disregards
the question about the validity of the poverty-line set in a period with
dramatic political events and with high price increases. The trade unions
daim that 80 per cent of the people live below the poverty line. They set
an income standard that will also provide the household with education and
dothes and not just a minimum amount of calories. The official poverty-
lineinS.outhern Tagalog in 1988 was 2,832 pesos per month for a family
of six family-members. This is equal to 472 pesos (approximately
USD21.5) per person per month. The estimated poverty-line of the Food
and Nutrition Research Institute was 4,423 pesos per month in 1988 (IBON
1988). This is more than150 per cent ofwhatthe authorities sugge st, and
illustrates the differences. in data regarding economic living standards in the
Philippines. The choice of sources for second-hand data was based on
subjective experience from living in the Philippines for a longer period.
The actual field work was done '"during a period of six months. The
researcher lived in the Philippines for approximately two years, in the same
region. The reasons for this were many. It should be emphasised that the
benefit of staying in the country for a long time made it possible to
eventually "see", if not always understand, important cultural mechanisms,
which could not easily be noticed during a short-time field work. The entire
period was spent in middle- to lower dass Philippine communities, and
gave invaluable help in the effort to analyze the cultural complexity of the
coconut producers.
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3. Economic and political formations in the
Philippines
3.1 Spanish colonial feudalism
They are healthy people, for the c1imate of that land is good. Among them
are found no crippled, maimed, deaf or dumb persons. None of them has
ever been possessed by evIl spirits, or had become insane. Therefore, they
reach an advanced age in perfeet health.l
According to historians, Jhe above .quotation can bea reasonable represen-
tation of socIal conditions in pre-colonial Philippines. The system of
livestock production was well developed, with swine, carabaos, chicken,
fowls, goats, dogs and cats, and agricultural production gave rice, ginger,
coconuts, bananas, orai;iges"millet, sorghum and cotton. Wax and large
quantities of gold werealso produced in the islands, and both dothing and
jewellery were exported (Constantino 1990, Salgado 1978). Coconuts were
used for several purposes. Coconut meat was shredded or desiccated and
used in food. Coconut water was drunk as a juice. The meat was also
processed into oiL. The oil was .used for cooking, for lamp oil, as soap, as
cosmetics for the hair and even as a cure for dandruff. The coconut sap
gave vinegar and liquor, the fibres were used in ropes for the boats and the
shell provided carbon.
The socIal unitinpre-colonial Philippines was called a barangay, a word
derived from the Malay term balangay, meaning a boat. A barangay was
quite small, normally with 100 to 500 people. Maynila2 was the biggest
barangay. None of the houses were public buildings and none were made
of wood or stone, but of light organic materiaL. This indicates a society
with a rather low level of political and socIal organization, and also a
society on the move. The temporary character of the houses indicates that
Miguel Lopez de Lorca, aSpaniard, describing the natives at the time of the arrival of
the Spaniards. (quoted from Salgada 1985, p. 3).
2 Former name of Manila.
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people moved around, as demanded by their shifting cultivation, kaingin..1
This production system was predominant in rice cultivation, although
permanent wet-rice agriculture had been established in the lowlands of
Luzon (Constantino 1990).
There was no private property of land in the Philippine community
before the Spaniards colonized the archipelago. Tools and land were
communal and the economies that existed at the time did not seem to have
any gear towards exchange and profit. The means of production were thus
not only communal, but also decentralized (Constantino 1990).
The Philippines was already known to the Portuguese through their trade
in the area, when the Spaniard Ferdinand Magellan sailed into the shore of
theIsland Samar in 1551 (Choinski 1969). Magellan was slain in Cebu, a
neighbouring island of Samar, less than six weeks after his arrivaL. After
the death of Magellan, it took 14 years before the Spaniards came back
with the purpose of colonizing the area for the Spanish Crown. In 1565, the
fleet of Miguel,. Lopez "Legazpi,/'an experienced colonizer who had
participated in the conc¡uest of Mexico arrived in the Philippines and soon
colonized the archipelago for the Spanish Crown (Putzel 1992).
From the early period of conquest, the colonizers began to establish
encomiendas. This institution ser-ved bothas an instrument of pacification
of the people and as a source of personal enrichment for the Spaniards.4
A definite number of inhabitants of a territory were entrusted to the care of
the encomendero. The encomenderos were deserving generals and con-
querors, and their position was granted by the monarch in Spain. The same
arrangement is also known from Latin America. In Latin America it was
prohibited as early as 1528, presumably because of the difficulties it
imposed on the local population. According to Alain de J anvry (1981), the
encomienda-system granted an elite groupof settlers full controlover the
indigenous population. Although the encomienda was supposed to protect
the Indians from slavery, in reality the native labourers were brutally
exploited in mines and plantations and were decimated in many areas (de
Janvry1981). This was also the case in the Philippines. The feudal
economic system was to a certain extent based on slavery. The natives did
not get the protection they needed and the Spanish lords blocked any
3 Kaingin is a form of "slash and burn" agriculture, which stil is predominant in several
areas in the Philippines.
4
The word encomienda is deri ved from the verb encomendar, meaning to commend or
to commIt or charge to one's care. The term also belongs to the military orders in Spain
and corresponds to the English word commander (see also Constantino 1990 and de
Janvry 1981).
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chance for the Filipinos to recover and create a solid economic position for
themselves.
As in Latin America, the encomienda was not a land grant. It was an
administrative unit set up with the purpose of exacting tribute from the
native population (de Janvry 1981, Constantino 1990). Theoretically, each
encomendero, in whose care a native settlement was entrusted, had a
threefold responsibility: (1) to protect the natives by maintaining peace and
order within the encomienda; (2) to support the missionaries in their work
of converting the people to Catholicism; and (3) to help in the defense of
the colony (Constantino 1990). In return for these services, the Crown
authorised the encomendero to collect a tribute from all male inhabitants
between the ages of 19 and 60 of his encomienda. This tributtSwas payable
in money or its equivalent in kind. The cabezas de barangay, the former
native chiefs of the barangay, were usually given the duty of collecting the
tribute and forwarding it to the encomendero who lived in the town centre
or in the capital (Constantino 1990).
Whereas the encqinendagave administrative control, but not ownership-
controlover the land and productive forces, the hacienda system did. The
haciendero had the right of inheritance and free disposition of the land, two
rights not covefedòby the' encomIenda grant. The shift from encomiendas
to haciendas took place gradually . The haciendero extracted tribute and
labour, just like the encomendero, but he did so from his tenants. The
developing links with the world merchant capitalist trade, made landowning
very attractive. This became a rich source of profit, extracted from an
absolutesurplus value, since the demand for agricultural raw-materials was
high and the labour-costs very low. The landowner, who was often absent
from the hacienda hired an inquilin05 to represent him in dealing with the
tenants. Inquilinos were also found in areas with haciendas in Latin
America. De Janvry (1981) describes the Telationship between the
inquilinos and the tenants as a pre-capitalist relation of bondage.
The tenants were supposed to be self-sufficient in food and subsistence
products and the labour expenses could thus be kept at a low leve!. The
tribute and rent paid to the landlord were extracted in the form of shares of
the harvest and unpaid work by the tenant. Pars of the production were
exported (Constantino 1990).
The introduction of the encomienda-system, and later the hacienda-
system with private ownership in land led to an increasing social
differentiation, whereby the vast majority were being increasingly
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marginalized. The marginalization of the majority led to a rapid increase in
the population because of widespread poverty. Even child labour was used.
From less than 700,000 inhabitants in 1591, the population grew to almost
6 million in 1885 and 7 million around the turn of the century (Constantino
1990). This spurred the cultivation of idle land and thereby increased the
market value of land itself.
U sing the barangays as the basic unit of local administration, the families
of the cabezas de barangay were recruited for the local administration and
positions of power. By confirming this political authority, the Spaniards
converted most of the local chiefs and cabezas into willing allies and useful
intermediates between the people and themselves. These local administra-
tors received a new title, the principales.
The Philippines were at this time exporting raw materials, while
importing various kinds of manufactured goods, like machinery, steel, iron,
liquor, beer; luxury-goods like candies and chocolate and above all, textIles
(Constantino 1990),. Britainc,wonthe economic,trade 'battles among the
western nations. The British traders "drankthe milk" of the Philippine trade
and production, even though Spain was the formal owner of "the cow".
The intern al trade was basically controlled by the Chinese inhabitants of
the islands. The Chinese have always hadavery particular role in the socIal
formation of the Philippines. When landownership was a possibility for
those with money, the Chinese were by law exduded from the right to own
land. They concentrated on trade, where they developed their own trade
pattern among themselves, in a fraternal manner. In this way they
developed an almost complete controlover domestic trade. This control was
regarded by the Spaniards as a threat. There were several massacres of the
Chinese population, dramatically decimating the Chinese population.6
However, the Spanish attitude towards the Chinese changed in the 1830s.
Chinese trade was thereafter encouraged. In the sec ond half of the 19th
century, the Chinese population grew from 30,000 to 90,000 by
immigration from China (Constantino 1990). Children born by Chinese and
Philippine parents were called Chinese mestizos. They were exempted from
the landownership-ban. Over time, the combination of familiarity with
trade, strong c1an-ties and their rights to own land made them the most
powerful ethnic group and powerful hacienderos in the Philippines.
The Royal Decree of February 13, 1884, also known as the Maura Law,
gave landholders one year to secure legal titles to their land. After the
deadline had expired, untitled land was deemed forfeited. Naturally, only
6 According to Salgado (1985), the major massacres happened in 1603, 1639, 1662, 1668,
1755 and in 1766. It is unkown how many Chinese actually got killed.
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those cognizant of the law and literate in Spanish were able to register their
land. Many smalllandowners in the provinces did not even know about the
decree. They suddenly found their land induded in the titles of big land-
owners and were left with no other recourse but to accept tenant-status on
their former land (Ofreneo 1980).
Economic changes had brought into being in Philippine society a number
of transitional economic and socIal groups. Five principal segments of the
dominant dass existed before the revolution in 1898. At the top were the
peninsulares: Spaniards who came from Spain and who were given
positions in the government and administration. Next in line were the
creoles, or the insulares: Spaniards born in the Philippines. At the same
leveL were the Spanish mestizos. Then came the Chinese ml!stizos, who
were permitted to own land. Finally, the Chinese, who were still powerful
because of their hegemony in intern al trade. These five socIal groups were
threatened by the growing Philippine middle dass. Members of the middle
dasses held positions asinquilinos;'shop~keepers,mêrchants, employees,
small landowners and professionals.All of thesewere called the ilustrados
(Constantino 1990).
The ilustrados led the masses in the uprising against the Spaniards in
1898. Because ,of theirsocial'position, their aspiration was to possess what
had exdusively been reserved for the elite. The change to cash crop
cultivation in the countryside deepened economic inequality. This process
made the tenants and the vast majority of the people not only relatively but
also absolutely poorer (Constantino 1990). The depression, which the
Philippinesexperienced from 1891 to 1895, politicized both the ilustrados
and the peasantry. The Spanish government in the Philippines was over-
thrown in 1898 by a social uprising led by the Katipunan movement.7
However, on December 10, 1898, the Spaniards and the Americans signed
the Paris Treaty, under which Spain ceded the Philippines to the United
- States, for the price of US 20 million dollars (Choinski 1969, Rocamora
1993). There were four major forces on the stage in the crucial days of
1898: the Spanish Colonizers, the American imperialists, the Philippine
ilustrados and the Philippine masses. The first three wanted to control the
fourth. The ilustrados supported by the Philippine masses in 1898, fought
the Spaniards. The AmerIcans secured by the Paris Treaty the formal
colonial rule over the Philippines.
7 Katipunan is a Tagalog word, literally meaning union or association. The organization
Katipunan is also called "Sans of the People".
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3.2 US colonial and imperial power
American land policy in the Philippines was conservative. It did not change
but rather strengthened the landownership pattern created by the Spaniards.
OfficIally the policy intended to encourage the growth of a dass of small
to middle farmers. However, in reality the policy worked to support and
encourage the big landlords (Choinski 1969). The mestizo landed elite was
the stabilizing factor needed by the Americans. The Americans had a two-
fold interest in strengthening this elite. The landholdings of this elite
provided the raw-materials that the Americans required. The Americans
wanted the raw materials as cheaply as possible and encouraged the landed
elite to orient their production towards production with minimal production
costs. This is called a production for absolute surplus value. The drive
towards a mode of production producing an absolute surplus profit and at
the same time connected to a merchant capitalist world economy can be
understood as a co-existence between two modes of production. This co-
existence of modes ofproduction served, as discussed in chapter two, the
interest of the colonizer. Endogenous development of capitalism in the
centre-nations dissolved feudalism in the centre and replaced a capitalist
m?de of production.
Even if feudalism were replaced by capitalism in Europe, the feudal and
pre-capitalist mechanisms were strengthened in order to obtain profit from
an absolute surplus value. In other words, as we discussed in chapter two,
the economic basis, created a social formation where P olitic al and
ideological power still were. strong ruling mechanisms in the society. The
ideological power was introduced by the Spaniards, and was the cathulic
church. The church still is the single most powerful,ideological force in the
Philippines today.
The demand for export cropswas a powerful stimulus for more land
purchases by landowners. Hacienderos enlarged their holdings and intensi-
fied the exploitation to take fuller advantage of the demand for their
products under free trade conditions. The hacienda system that hadbeen
born as a result of foreign- Spanish rule, did not vanish in the way feudal
formations vanished in Europe, i.e. by the entrance and conquest of
capitalism.
From the American colonial takeover in 1898 until nationalliberation in
1946, the Americans were occupied with the development of agricultural
export production. There was an increased demand for imported raw
materials in the US. Since the Americans had controlover the Philippines,
they had an interest to, keep production costs as low as possible. Low cost
were possible by making the Filipino people work as tenants. The key
instrument for the trade policy was a free trade arangement imposed by the
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US government on the Philippines through the Payne Aldich Act of 1909
(Ofreneo 1980). This meant thatAmerican goods could enter the
Philippines without any taxation or import regulations. The imported items
were mostly processed goods while the Philippines exported raw-materials
to the US. Before 1909, this kind of exdusive free trade agreement was
hindere d by the Paris Treaty, giving Spanish merchants equal trade
opportunities with the Americans for a period of ten years. Both the Paris
Treaty as well as the Payne-Aldich Act should thus be seen as regulation
for the benefit of an increased absolute surplus value controlled by the
colonizers.
American business grew fast and became decisive for the economic
development of the islands. In 1905 the US share of the total value of
imports was only 18.6 per cent, by 1920 it was 61,8 per cent, and by 1945
it was 87.3 per cent (Republic of the Philippines 1990). The US share of
exports also increased from 44.4 per cent in 1905 to a peak of 82.8 per cent
in 1940 and then rapidlydecreasedto 34.1, per cent of total value of exports
in 1945 (Republic of the Philippines 1990). 1945 was, however, a special
year. The share of exports going to the US rapidly increased during the
1950s. Figure 3.1 shows these trends. The tendencies found here have been
used by theorists arguing that a trade dependencyestablished during the
colonial period prevented the development of the home market. It can
safely be conduded that the US was the most important economic partner
for the Philippines in the first half of the twentieth century.
Coconut production, which at this time was an important part of export
trade, developed quickly because of the soap and margarine industries
abroad which stimulated the production and trade in copra. By the time
World War I broke out, one-fourth of all the copra in world trade was
supplied by the Philippines. The war created a brisk demand for coconut
oiL. Its high glycerine content made it highly prized in the manufacture of
explosives. By the time the war ended, 40 relatively large coconut oil mills
were in operation in the Philippines. However, with the coming of peace,
a heavy drop in demand forced most of these mills to dose. Eight large
plants remained; two American, two British, two Spanish, one Chinese, and
one Filipino (Constantino 1990).
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Figure 3.1
Export and Import trade with the US, 1905-1945
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From 1920 to 1930, coconut exports induding copra increased by 223
per cent. Of the USD12 million invested in mills and refineries, USD5,5
million was American capital, USD3,5 million was British capital and the
rest was Chinese and Philippine capital (Republic of the Philippines 1991).
By 1935, ten factories were supplying almost all the desiccated coconut
being exported to the United States. Six of these factories were American,
two were British, one was Chinese and one was Japanese. The three largest
soap factories in the Philippines were American, Swiss and Chinese
(Constantino 1990).
This was a time of widespread social unrest in the Philippines. The
guerilla organization established to fight the Spaniards was still active in
the mountains and enjoyed support from the peasantry. The politically
organized opposition became stronger with the creation of the Katipunan
Pambansa ng mga Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KPMP) (Union of Patriotic
Peasants of the Philippines) in 1928, a peasant organization with
connections to the Chinese Communist Party. Two years later, the Partido
Kommunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) (Communist Party of the Philippines) was
established (Constantino 1990).
The social formation in the coconut production, particularly in Luzon,
was dominated by share cropping. The big landowners had patron-dient
relationships with tenants, often through their overseer. One way of
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securing the loyalty of tenants was to provide them credits from time to
time. Credit often had usury interest rates which were impossible for the
tenant to pay back in cash or kind. The system was part of a relationship
based on a debt òf gratitude, utang na loob, which is a very prominent
cultural factor in contemporary Philippine society. The loyalty bondage in
this cultural system seems in many cases decisive for the Philippine
people's immediate choices and behaviour.
The Republic of the Philippines dedared its independence on June 12,
1946 (Constantino 1990, Salgado 1978, Putzel1992). The Bell Trade Act,
which passed through the American Congress in October 1945, was the
most significant trade act signed by the two countries and laid the premises
for the continuation of the existing Philippine economic structures.. The
basic objective of the trade act was the continuation of free trade between
the two countries (Ofreneo 1981). This ensured in reality the continuation
of the old trade pattern, with raw-material exports to and imports of
manufactured goods from the US. The only restrictiöns made were on
exports to the US ofPhilippinesugar, coconut oil, tobacco and cordage, to
prevent competition from these products with the American agricultural
sector. The US later adopted other protectionist measures which induded
all imports ofany"gøods from the' Philippines.
The US-Military Bases Agreement was signed during the same period.
The agreement gave the US free use of 23 base sites for 99 years,
renewable on expiration. The J oint US Military Advisory Group
(JUSMAG) was paid by the Philippine government to secure education,
training and advisors for thè Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the
constabulary, Air Force, Navy and the intelligence services (Ofreneo 1981).
The third provision was the "equal rights" or parity amendment which
obliged the Philippines to grant American citizens and corporations the
same rights as Filipinos in the exploitation of Philippine natural resources
and work power. The Bell Trade Act met resistance in the Philippine
Congress, but passed. Probably because the act was accepted, the
Philippines also received more than USD 690 million in war damage
payments from the US (Constantino 1990).
During this time, there were several areas where the existence of guerillas
was widespread. The HUKBALAHAp8 also known as the HUKs grew
dramatically and changed their name to Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan
(HBM), or Army of National Liberation. Central Luzon, where the
indigenous and tribal people and the HBM were united and partly in control
in mountainous areas, became a battlefield. Several peasants were killed or
8 Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon; Peoples Anny Against the Japanese.
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arested and tortured there. The war dose to the mountain areas was
particularly intense, for example in Quezon Province and the municipality
of Candelaria. The HBM were first and foremost fighting to gain a land
reform. Peasant organizations which were suspected of having connections
with the HBM, were outlawed in 1948 (Constantino 1984, Hayami 1990).
The coconut lands did not attract the biggest landowners. Most of the
coconut landholdings were small. A survey in the mid-1960s showed that
more than 300,000 coconut farms were owned by 250,000 landowners.
Plantations larger than 1000 hectares accounted for less than 1 per cent of
the total area allocated to coconuts (Ofreneo 1980). The national average
of coconut landholdings was at this time 3,41 hectares. The mestizo-
Chinese ,controlled the domestic market during the 1960s,while the
processing and export trade of coconut products was dominated by
Americans, British and Chinese (Ofreneo 1980).
Despite the backward technology and farming practices used at most of
the coconut farms, the coconut industry did notsuffer any major dislocation
in the post-war years. The primary reasonwas that the world market price
for coconut products was fairly stable because of world demands for fat and
oils. Consequently, copra entered the ports of many importing countries
duty free. Coconut oil and other processed coconut goods faced a number
of trade barriers, particularly in West Europe, where there were big copra
crushing mills.
3.3 Formal independence and privatization of the state
It is well known in the Philppines that one needs a godfather for
everything, from the time one gets baptized to the time one dies, to obtain
justice, apply for a passport, or to start any business.9
A new era started when Ferdinand Marcos became President in 1965. He
represented the Nacionalista Party and advocated a strong and independent
state as the main tool for lifting the living standard of the poor. Marcos
ruled for 21 years, from 1965 to 1986, and for ten years from 1972
onwards, by marial law. The insurgency intensified in this era and the
society became torn by civil war (David 1977).
Partly as a result of governmental overspending in electoral campaigns
in 1969, where different dynasties fought for local political positions, the
national foreign exchange reserves were dramatically reduced. The
9
Translated from the nov el El Filbusterismo by Jose Rizal, one of the revolutionary
hero es from the war against the Spaniards (quoted from Manapat i 99 i, p. 98).
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Philippine policy makers turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the W orId Bank (WB), which granted loans in exchange for a strong
influence on the country' s economic policy. Devaluation and opening up
for foreign investments led to increased foreign investments and bankruptcy
for several local entrepreneurs. The strategy of export-oriented
industrialization was daimed to be the most appropriate development
strategy because of the existence of comparative advantages such as cheap
labour and raw-materials (Eviota 1990).
The state invested heavily in several corporations and increased the size
and power of the governmental bureaucracy. The persons holding power in
the state belonged to the powerful dynast y of Marcos. The coalition in
powerconsisted of Marcos' family and friends, wealthy business associates
(the "cronies" or "bureaucrat-capitalists"), and a group of high-level
technocrats and military officers. They werealso called the comprado,J°
bourgeoisie, signifying their dependence on collaboration with foreign
capital (Guerrero 1979). The number of soldièrs in AFP increased from
58,000 in 1965 to 250,000.1n 1985 (Eviota 1990).
The export-oriented policy failed by the end of the 1970's. This was
caused by external factors induding the oil-crisis and dedining terms of
trade and intern al factors, suchas'conflicts between the families in power,
flaws in development projects, bureaucratic failure, inefficiency and
corruption as well as an increasing insurgency among the mas ses (Bello
1982). The policy, which officially sought to increase employment, had to
implement a rationalization of the manufacturing sector . A substantial
number of workers in the manufacturing sector lost their jobs, most of them
women, since the main sector rationalized was the garment industry (Bello
1982). Real wages fell by 25-30 percent between 1970 and 1980 (Eviota
1990). This should be regarded as an effort to change the surplus value
from an absolute to a relative size, two different types of surplus value
which explains something about the overall economic system. The
presentation of the different types of surplus values was presented and
discussed in chapter two.
The effort failed to spur economic development because of
monopolization of the ownership by a few people within the government.
The domestic market was not developed since production was exported and
not used to increase the capability of the workers to participate in the
market. Rather, the wage decreased, polarizing the sOcIety even more.
10 Comprador is Spanish, meaning buyer.
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3.3.1 Philippine agriculture
The Philippine economy is commonly described as an agricultural
economy. Putzel's (1992) estimations of labour-participation in the three
sectors of agriculture, industry and service show that almost 50 per cent of
the employed population in 1986 worked in the agricultural sector (Table
3.1). Approximately 13 per cent of the employed population worked in the
industrial sector. 66 per cent of those working in the industrial sector were
wage workers, while more than 30 per cent were self-employed or unpaid
family labour. Within agriculture, approximately 78 per cent were self-
employed and 22 per cent were wage workers.
There is a highly differentiated peasantry which can roughly be divided
intò three groups. The rich peasantry own the land they till and have
surplus land as well. By tilling the land themselves, and by exploiting
others on the surplus portion of the land they own, they derive a surplus in
grain or in cash aboye their own consumption, and can thus Invest in more
effective means Òfproduction. The ,. middle peasantry is considered by,
among others Guerrero(1979), as those peasants which are self sufficIent
from their own production. They might own small portions of land, and
temporarily hire labour for agricultural work. This group can again be
divided into three groups, according to their use of paid wage-labour and
to their subjective dass orientation. The upper level of the middle peasantry
strive to reach the rich peasantry status both economically and culturally.
Themiddle-middle and lower-middle peasantry have less surplus, if any,
and associate themselves more easily with the poor peasantry, both eco-
nomically and culturally. Those belonging to the category of the poor
peasantry are normally living under the poverty line. 
11 In the beginning of
the 1970's, this group represented between 75-80 per cent of the rural
population (Guerrero 1979), and represents probably the vast majority of
the peasantry today. This group constitutes the main target of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the National Democratic
Front (NDF) in their objectives of accomplishing a social revolution of
Philippine society. The industrial working dass continues to retain strong
organic linkages with its peasant origins. Furthermore, a large surplus
labour force has emerged which is either unemployed, underemployed or
participates in the huge informal sector.
11 Poverty line is a relative and normative line set by the government or others, indicating
minimum facilities a person should have for a decent standard of living. The government
in the Philippines estimates that about 50 per cent of the population liv es below the
poverty line, while other organizations, like Kilusang Mayo Dno (May First Movement),
state that 80 per cent of the population is to be found below the poverty line.
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Table 3.1
Employment by sector, 1970-1989
Sector 1970 1984 1985 1986 1989
Agriculture 53.3 50.3 49.6 49.8 44.8
Wage and salary 22 % 22 % 22 %
Own account and 78 % 78 % 78 %
unpaid family labour
Industry 21.0 14.7 13.8 13.3 18.6
Wage and salary 64 % 68 % 66 %
Own account and 36 % 32 % 34 %
unpaid family labour
Service 24.6 33.8 34.6 34.7 36.4
Wage and salary 71 % 71 % 70 %
Own account and 29 % 29 % 30 %
unpaid family labour
Other family workers 1.1 1.2 2.0 2.2 0.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Putzel 1992, Republic of the Philippines 1990.
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Table 3.2
Relative importance of major agricultural products expressed as share of
total agricultural land and share of total agricultural value produced
Crop 1980 1985 1989
% of % % of % % of %
area value area value area value
B anana 2.1 5.2 2.2 5.0 2.2 3.4
Coconut 25.0 13.4 25.1 17.4 23.7 15.2
Corn 24.7 9.0 26.9 10.4 28.0 11.2
Palay 26.8 24.5 25.4 27.7 26.6 26.8
Sugar 3.1 2.8 5.6 2.0 6.9
N.A.
Fruits 1.0 5.8 1.1 5.1 1.1 7.1
Vegetables 5.1 13.3 4.9 9.8 5.0 8.2
Other crops 12.1 28.7 11.5 18.9 11.3 20.6
Total 99.9' 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 100,0
Source: Republic of the Philippines 1990.
Table 3.2 shows the relative importance of coconuts and other major
agricultural products. The steep dedine in the value of "other crops" from
1980 to 1985 is because of some reduction of production of "other crops",
but the most important cause is the increase in productivity of palay12 and
coconuts, as well as increased price of palay and other food crops at the
home market (Republic of the Philippines 1990).
Ma. Agnes Quisimbing identifies 'each type of farm enterprise in the
Philippines according to a certainmode of production. This corresponds to
certain dass position for the producers. These dass positions are defined
by the mode of production to which the producers belong (primitive
communal, peasant, semi-feudal or capitalist) and the socIal relations which
determine the forms of payment to the producers and positions in the labour
market (as buyers or sellers of labour power). The agricultural production
activities can also be dassified according to their market integration, i.e; the
sources of supply and demand. Supply is ensured through imports and
domestic production. This dassification system produces four major
12 Un-husked rice.
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categories of crops on the demand side: peasant foods, wage foods,
industrial and luxury crops and export crops (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2
A typology of crops and farm enterprises in the Philippines
Demand Peasant Wage foods Industrial Exports
foods and luxury
crops
meat, dairy
& feed
Supply
Imports flour
grains
Pre-capitalist
farms:
-- - - - - - - --- - - - - - -- - --- -- -- -- -- ---- -- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - --peasant/subsis- nce, corn, nce, corn, tobacco
tence farms fruits, fruits,
vegetables, vegetables,
root crops, root crops
backyard
livestock
-- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - --- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - --
Decentralized upland rice and corn coconut co con ut,
estates farms, rice (below 7 ha) abaca,
(tenanted and corn vegetables tobacco,
holdings ) (below 7 sug arc ane
ha)
Centralized
estates
(Haciendas)
Capitalist
farms:
-- - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - - --- -- -- -- -- - - -- -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - --Commercial fruits, corn coffee,
farms (small vegetables (yellow), cacao, ramie,
and medium livestock banana
size)
-- - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - --- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - --Modern nce corn coconut,
plantations (yellow), banana,
livestock pineapple,
ramie
sugarcane,
coconuts
Source: Quisimbing 1990.
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The dassification of Quisimbing reveals the heterogeneity of Philippine
agriculture, both in production and in the market for agricultural goods.
While production for the home market is first of all on farms categorized
as pre-capitalist farms, export production is mainly on commercial
plantation estates, using capital intensive equipment as well as low paid
labour. It seems that the incentives for increased of productivity through
capital intensive means of production have been strongest for the export-
oriented production, such as coconuts, fruit and ramie, while the tenanted
holdings and subsistence farms producing food for the home market are still
dominated by mechanisms and technology reflecting a pre-capitalist.
However, coconut production is undertaken both on decentralized estates
and haciendas, as well as on commercial farms and modern plantations.
This variety is reflected geographically, with a dominance of tenancy farms
in the north, and with modernized plantations in the south of the
Philippines.
Table 3.3
Physical farm areas, by type and tenure of operator, 1980
Tenure of farm (as percentage of)
area planted by crop)
Type of % of total Fully Ownerlike Share Leased Rent - Others
farm farm area owned possession tendency (fixed) free
All types 100.0 61.2 11.2 20.5 4.3 1.4 1.4
Palay 38.5 55.2 12.9 21.9 7.5 1.3 1.2
Coconut 29.2 64.5 9.3 24.0 0.9 0.7 0.6
Com 20.3 65.1 10.2 18.4 1.3 2.4 2.6
Sugarcane 3.2 65.2 12.1 13.9 7.6 0.3 1.0
Tobacco 0.1 49.4 8.6 34.7 3.7 2.5
Vegetable 0.5 56.0 17.0 15.1 5.2 4.0 2.7
Banana 0.8 55.8 10.8 7.3 21.7 2.5 1.8
Pineapple 0.2 6.8 1.4 28.1 62.6 0.7
Coffee 1.2 78.9 11.5 4.4 0.5 1.8 3.0
Source: Dios et aL. (1990).
The production of palay accounts for nearly 40 per cent of the total
physical farm area (Table 3.3). More than 55 per cent is fully owner
operated, 22 per cent under share tenancy, and 8 per cent under leasehold.
Sugarcane production is mostly cultivated on fully-owned farms (65 per
cent), while 14 per cent is under share tenancy (Quisimbing 1990).
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In the effort to understand the structure of agriculture in the Philippines,
certain aspects in Table 3.3 ne ed to be highlighted. Fully owned farms
indude farms fully owned by one person but tilled by others. Hence, the
very large percentage of coconut area said to be owner operated, refers to
the coconut plantations in the south of the Philippines, administrated by the
owner but certainly not tilled by the owner or his family.
"Ownerlike possession" is likely to be two types of landholdings. Certain
groups among the indigenous minorities in the Philippines tillland which
is formally owned by the state, but which is under the control of the
indigenous tribes. This is so because the tribes not operates with private
ownership to production means. Another group which might has been
cat~gorized in this column, is a group of the peasantry, which has occupied
state and privately owned land - normally idle, and use it "as if it was their
own". It has been recorded that in 1987, 70.000 hectares were occupied by
peasants belonging to the biggest peasant federation in the Philippines,
Kilusang Magbubukidng' Pilipinas (KMP) (Lara n.d. ).
The national figures çlo not reveal the wide interregional differences in
prevalent tenure arrangements. In the Philippines, 30-40 per cent of all
agricultural producers produce coconuts, making roughly 20-25 million
peopledependenton coconut production as a source of income (Lactao
1990, Putzel1992). While the coconut production in the southern provinces
is done largely by wage farm workers, the production in the northern
provinces is commonly undertaken by tenants. Coconut production in the
actual study area of this research, which was situated in Southern Tagalog,
is an example of the latter production system. Estimates based on extensive
field research by David in 1977 and Tiglao in 1983 sugge st that among the
coconut producers, approximately 60 per cent are wage farm workers, 35
per cent are tenantsand less than 5 per cent are small owner-cultivators or
wage workers in coconut factories (David 1077, Tiglao 1983). In Southern
Tagalog, where tenant relations in the coconut sector are common, it can
be assumed that the groups of farm workers and tenants are not of equal
size, with the former group operating as multiple farm workers in several
areas, i.e; they work on several farms.
Small family farms and tenanted holdings predominate in old settled
areas with high population density. In Luzon, plantation estates and
haciendas are more common than in newly-settled areas as Mindanao and
Negros. The study of Quisumbing and Hayami found a dominance of share
tenancy in the traditional coconut belt of Quezon Province in Luzon
(Quisimbing 1990). In contrast, the large coconut plantations tend to be
concentrated in the southern part of the country, Mindanao. In the case of
sugar production, tenant-farming is found mainly in the traditional
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settlement areas like in Batangas. The so-called sugar industry is primarily
found in the Visayan island of Negros, where the haciendas are few and
very large. The operational characteristics of the plantations also show
significant variations between the different provinces. While Mindanao has
capital-intensive plantations where profit maximization seems to be the
primary objective, the plantations in Negros, (commonly called haciendas)
are large tracts of land where patronage and power seem more important
than pure profit generation. Finally, while Negros produces mainly sug ar,
Mindanao hosts several new export crops like bananas, pineapples,
coconuts, rubber and ramie. Finally, the plantations in Mindanao come
dose to being isolated endave economies, owning their own transport
equipment as well as input providing or manufacturing factories.The
involvement of external capital is also very high.
Coconuts are a prime export earner. However, investments for
productivity increases are relatively low. This is particularly so in the north,
on Luzon island wherethis, research was,carriedout. -Table 3.4 shows
coconut productivity per treeper year for selected regions. This table
demonstrates a very large difference in productivity between the study area
in Southern Tagalog, with an average production of 37 nuts per tree per
year and Southern Mindanao, with an- average harvest of 78 nuts per tree
per year. The reasons are many. The use of High Yielding Variety palms,
with a high level of input expenses, is normal at the large coconut
plantations in the south. General international market competition the last
decades has lead to increased investment in the coconut plantations in the
south, which also have intensified the monopolistic ownership-structure we
find in this area.
Table 3.4
Nut productivity per tree per year by selected regions and selected years
Regions (selected) 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
Philippines 54 48 49 53 49
Western Mindanao 55 46 45 48 41
Northern Mindanao 42 40 43 44 40
Southern Mindanao 62 61 65 69 78Southern Tagalog 60 47 46 48 37Central Luzon 39 37 41 43 21
Source: UCAP 1990).
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Producers in Southern Tagalog, and also Central Luzon, operate with
practically no capital-demanding inputs ~ the trees are old, and the extent
of re-planting is very limited. There has been a dramatic dedine in
productivity in Southern Tagalog during the 1980s. One reason for this is
probably the rapid negligence of the land, by landowners who traditionally
only have been concerned with the productivity in a very limited scale.
Economic difficulties and capital investments in other sectors might be the
reason why landowners in Southern Tagalog cares even less than before
about their land. Old trees, increased socIal unrest and general difficulties
in the coconut sectors makes the landowners look for other profitable
sectors. They cannot compete with the rational production in the south, and
keepthe land control for other purposes than for the profit of the coconuts,
This will be discussed further in chapter four.
The relatively low production in the north, keeps the producers poor. It
they work as tenants, the relative share they receive from the total harvest
is small because of low productivity. In the south, the high productivity
does not benefit the producers because the vast majority of them are farm
workers, receiving wages below subsistence leve!.
It may be of interest to situate the coconut sector in the agricultural
context of the Philippines. There+are alsoother production activities that are
important for the economic development of the people, like sug ar and
palay. Even if mining and manufacturing industries have an important posi-
tion in the national economy, they are less decisive for the general socIal
formation found in the country than the agricultural sector. To exemplify
the varieties of arangements of the relations to the Ìneans of production,
the production of sugar and palay13 will be given a doser look.
Sugar: Established in the mid 19th century, thePhilippine sugar sector
played an important role in Philippine production as late as the late 1970s.
The sugar planters, millers and traders were called the "Sugar-barons" and
were mainly mestizos and church representatives. They constituted a "sugar
bloc", playing a crucial role in Filipino politics during the American
colonial period as well as after independence. By their strong linkages with
the ruling elite, the industry has a disproportionate influence on the
country' s political and economical affairs. It is considered to be a very
important sector of the economy although only 2 per cent of the land is
used for production of sugar and a rather small group of the people rely on
sugar production for their survival (Republic of the Philippines 1990). The
sugar production is concentrated in a few areas. The most important areas
13 Un-husked rice.
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for sugar production are the islands of Negros and Panay in Visayas,
Pampanga, Bataan and Tarlac in Central Luzon and Batangas in Southern
Tagalog with more than 90 per cent of the production (Ofreneo 1982).
There are two general types of workers in the sugar sector, those
producing the sugar, and those processing the sugar. In the agricultural
production sector, there are dumaans, the sacadas and the pangayaws
(Hayami et aL. 1990).
The regular field workers, known as dumaans, have a tenurial
relationship to the haciendero and reside on the hacienda. Their cash
income is lower than for the sacadas, but their relationship with the
landlord is more paternalistic. This patron-dient relationship provides
opportunities for credit and a certain extent of protection as long as the
dumaan operates with the acceptance of his lord. It the hacIendero has land
that is not utilized, his dumaans normally till this land for their own
consumption. Where this arrangement is found, the share of the harvest
given to the landowneris small, and in some'casesnon-existing (Ofreneo
1980).
The sacadas are seasonal migrant workers and dearly the most numerous
and marginalized group of sugar producers. They are marginalized by the
landlord, the haciendero, because"ofthe low wages.However, they are also
marginalized by the contratistas, those recruiting them for the hacienderos,
because of the commssion deducted from the wages of the sacada. Their
salary is in general low and below what is considered as a minimum wage.
The sacadas normally buy food in the cantinas or stores, also owned by the
hacienderos. The wage is paid on pakiaw-basis, i.e; by number or the
weight of cut and loaded canes. The sacadas are provided common
accommodation at the expense of the haciendero. These are long huts, made
out of nipa, that are also used for livestock.
The casualworkers, the, pangayaw, represent the "reserve army of
labour". They live on the outskirts of the hacienda and are only working
irregularly for the hacienda (Hayami et aL. 1990). Some of them might be
former dumaans who failed to perform satisfactory work, or for other
reasons were kicked out of their former position.14 Whereas small sugar
farms mostly hire pangayaws, the number of sacadas and dumaans increase
with the size of the farm or hacIenda.
The workers in the centrals and sugar mills represent the other kind of
workers found in the sugar industry. Sugar milling is the activity where the
capital-investments have been confined. The workers in the mills have
dearly a proletarian position as related to the means of production.
14 Such as disloyal political work, or oppositional tendeneies.
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The sugar industry has been regarded as the agricultural sector most
developed into dassic exploitative capitalism. It is also a sector that is
strongly dependent on the capitalist market, as well as on the high number
of low-paid farm workers, sacadas, in the production.
Palay: Rice is the principal food throughout Asia, and also in the
Philippines. Palay land has been the main target for various land reforms,
mainly because of the socIal unrest in this particular sector. The production
relations in the palay sector are different from what are found in the sugar
sector .
Palay production has been proven to be more productive in small-scale
ratherthan in large-scale farms derived from extreme variety oftopography,
soil conditions, irrigation possibilities and monitoring of the farm workers
(Quisimbing 1991). In 1980, almost 90 per cent of all rice farms were less
than 5 hectares (Quisimbing et aL. 1990). Tenant farming is by far the most
common way of operating'ricefields that are -hot cultivatedby the owner.
The sharing arrangements for the palay~producing tenants vary. In one
research project in Central Luzon, the normal sharing of net output was
found to be 50 per cent to the tenant (Wolters 1984). In farms that are
larger than 10 hectares,'the-landowner is normally absent, and the control
of the cultivation is taken care of by a farm manager. Conflicts in the rice
sector have been most visible between the tenants and the representatives
of the landowners.
The prime area of palay-production is Central Luzon and the northern
part of Southern Tagalog. Large areas of Central Luzon were covered with
ash and mud in 1991, due to the volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo. So
far, little is known about how the impossibility of palay production in this
area will effect the economic pattern of production and control.
Palay is often intercropped with corn, and the two crops comprise almost
60 per cent of all agriculturalland in the Philippines. Seasonal differences
make it possible to intercrop the two. Palay requires steady water-supplies
which is only available during the wet season. Corn can be grown with less
amounts of water in the dry season. In the flat areas of Central Luzon, the
productivity of palay has increased sharly since the introduction of High
Yielding Varieties and modern irrigation technology. The International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI), based in Laguna, Southern Tagalog, is one of the
main factors why these innovations are widely adopted in the Philippines
as compared to new technology introduced in other agricultural sectors. The
costs of inputs have increased with the introduction of commercial seeds
and fertilizers. Whereas the average co st of non-labour inputs in the
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coconut sector counts for only 2.1 per cent of total output, the same figure
for palay is 12.4 per cent (Solon 1990).
Coconuts: The Philippines is the world biggest producer and exporter of
coconuts. From 1979 to 1988, the export of coconut oil and copra from the
Philippines supplied 69 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively, of world
demand (Lactao 1990). In spite of being one of the prime foreign exchange
earners, the coconut sector has not developed economically and
technologically as would be expected within a capitalist mode of
production. The export of coconut products is still basically an export of
raw-materials like crude coconut oil, copra, and desiccated coconuts.
Roughly one third of the population in the country are engaged in the
coconut sector. The production is mainly located in Southern Luzon and
Mindanao. Table 3.5 shows the changes in cultivated coconut area in
selected regions.
The main trends identifiedhereare'that'West Minda.nab and Bicol have
maintained or even.slightly increased thecoconut area, while the total
coconut area has decreased during the last 5 years, probably because of
dedining prices in the export market, and an increased market for coconut
lumber.
Table 3.5
Cultivated coconut area in selected regions, selected years
in ' 000 hectares
Year The Southern Bicol North/East South West
Philippines Tagalog Mindanao Mindanao Mindanao
1980 3,236 593 352 368 835 455
1982 3,203 581 350 365 829 453
1984 3,223 568 364 378 832 458
1986 3,284 569 378 384 849 473
1988 3,222 550 370 373 852 463
Source: UCAP 1990.
From 1985 to 1989, the average annual market value of coconut products
was more than USD500 million. From a temporary increase of demand, the
export income from coconut-products increased to USD664,5 million in
1987 and USD693,5 million in 1988. After 1988, the tendency dearly is a
decrease in both prices and income for the Philippine nation (Republic of
the Philippines 1991). Table 3.6 shows the tendencies of export values of
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Philippine products from 1988 to 1989. Even if the total export value
increased by 6.8 per cent, the value of coconut products decreased
dramatically. The lumber export, which has been formidable, consists
mainly of exports of trees other than coconut trees. There has been a
tremendous increase in logging of coconut trees during the 1980s and
1990s. The trees are not of the same prime quality as the trees from the
rainforest, and are thus used for the domestic market.
Table 3.6
Ten principal exports, value of 1988 and 1989 in million USD
Crop/ export - value %-change
Copra
Desiccated coconuts
Coconut oil
Logs and lumber
Sugar
Banana
Pineapples, canned
Gold
Abaca
Copper concentrates
Total
Mill. USD Mill. USD
1988 1989
28.0 25.2
78.3 75.7
408.1 376.8
157.2 238.4
60.2 80.0
146.0 146.4
83.2 94.3
118.0 109.4
16.3 17.6
216.2 237.4
1,311.4 1,401.2
-10.0
-3.3
-8.8
51.7
32.9
0.3
13.0
-7.0
8.6
10.0
6.8
Source: Republic of the Philippines 1991
The dedining value of exports of coconut prodiicts, shòwn in Table 3.6
and Table 3.7, has several reasons. First of all, the international market-
price has dedined. Competition in the vegetable oil market is the cause.
Soy beans in particular have increased their share of the market. The Soy
Bean Association, which is the American association for soy bean
producers and traders, has publicized information about the possible health
damages caused by extensive use of coconut oiL. This campaign is based
on research projects, sponsored mainly by US banks, conduding that the
use of coconut oil can cause high levels of cholesterol. The lobbying
activities of the Soy Bean Association is one of the main reasons for the
dedine in the coconut oil market (Wizkens et aL. 1989). The dedine in the
American market has also been linked with other international political
changes. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the US Congress
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decided to stop trade with the USSR. This also effected the soy bean-oil
export to the USSR. The US, which was a major market for Philippine
coconut oil, got an over-supply of domestic vegetable oils, which out-
competed imported coconut oil from the Philippines.
Table 3.7
Real value of coconut products exported, 1983-1989
Year V olume Value FOB 15 FOB USD EquivalentMetric Tons USD /MT 1983 value
1983 1,762,219 696,144,869 '395.0 100.0
1984 1,036,253 714,986,285 690.0 115.8
1985 1,134,658 460,028,707 405.4 58.1
1986 2,205,462 427,073,691 214.0 30.9
1987 1,919,243 561,428,462 292.5 39.0
1988 1,474,934 580,915,416 393.8 47.7
1989 1,427,327 527,582,833 369.9 40.4
Sources: Republic of the Philippines 1991, UCAP 1990.
Another reason for the dec1ine in the market, both in copra, copra meal
and coconut oilis the well-documented quality-problem ofPhilippine-made
copra and copra meal. A high level of aflatoxin in the copra and copra meal
used for animal feed in Europe has caused diseases and death of European
livestock. AfIatoxin is also transferred to the coconut oiL. The EC has
decIded to lower the accepted lev el of afIatoxin from 30 parts per billion
(ppb) to 20 ppb (PC A 1990b). This decision incidentally also protects the
EC production of vegetable oiL. The problem regarding afIatoxin is also
mentioned in chapter four, with regard to the experience of high level of
afIatoxin in Candelarian-made copra.
As mentioned earlier, the relations of production in the coconut sector
differ geographically. The relatively newly settled Mindanao is dominated
by large plantations and haciendas, while old settlement areas, like Southern
Tagalog (Map 2), is dominated by the share-tenancy system and rather
small landholders. The number of small owner-cultivators in this area is
less than the average size of landholdings would suggest. The reason for
this might be the low income generated by one hectare of land and a
15 FOB: Free On Board. Indicates prize including transport-expenses to the Philippine
border.
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consequentnecessity of having off-farm sources of income. Those holding
5-10 hectares of coconut land can normally afford an education and thereby
become an employee of the local government or get other white collar jobs
in their local municipality. The specific socIal formations found in the
coconut sector in Candelaria, situated in Quezon Province, Southern
Tagalog, will be discussed in the next chapter. Before that, a presentation
of the socIal formation at the nationallevel will be presented in order to
provide a sufficient context for the analysis of the socIal formation among
coconut producers in Candelaria. Then state policy in the PhHippines
regarding coconut production will be looked at, before the form of the
socIal unrest as a result of the present sItuation will be presented. The
socialdasses and their positions in the Philippines today will be reviewed
first.
3.3.2 Contemporary class structuresin thePhilippines
In order to understand state' power in the Philippines, one has to examine
the dass structure of Philippine socIety. Since the dass structure is
complicated, it is difficult to operate with a rigid Marxist dass analysis.
The subjective dass- and family-based identity seems decisively strong and
is not always in accordance with the objective interests deri ved from their
belonging of a specIfic dass. The difficulties of a dass analysis of the
Philippine society is compounded by the fact that political and economic
behaviour do not immediately reflect socIal dasses but tend to be based on
dan and family bonds. People do not necessarily belong to only one socIal
dass or group from the multiple and diverse economic relationships
between people.
Figure 3.3 indicates the major soëIal dasses in the Philippines. This table
also indicates the political power of different socIal and economic layers in
society. Since people very of ten belong to several "neighbouring" socIal
groups, it is impossible to count the exact percentage belonging to each
group. However, general estimates suggest that the most numerous are the
poor peasants, followed by the middle peasants, the workers and lumpen
pro L etariat.
It is of vital importance in order to understand the Philippine elite to
elaborate the dannish family system, creating an elite where families
compete with each other even if their objective interests are the same. This
is a phenomenon very well known from the feudal period in Europe. Then
the main goal for a family was to gather land and property not in order to
reinvest for further profit accumulation but rather in order to accumulate
political power.
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The landed and comprador bourgeoisie: In the Philippines, this dass is
called the big comprador bourgeoisie. Family relationships work as a ticket
to power positions, particularly if big landholdings and big groups of
producers are under the control of a family. This dass controls the state
apparatus. Some of the families that gained power during the early stage of
Spanish colonialism, still hold some of the most powerful positions today.
The state is founded on the comprador bourgeoisie and has become a
private tool in the hands of the dynasties holding power. This means that
the state itself is not used in the interest of the bourgeoisìe as a unified
dass, as Marx suggested, but is used to further the subjective interests of
segments of the dominant dass. The state is today controlled by an elite
holding large haciendas as well as the majority of enterprises in the
manufacturing and finance sectors and is therefore representative of the
landed elite as well as the compradors (see Figure 3.2). This dass has big
interests in the coconut production. Roughly speaking, the members of the
landlord dass operate as compradors~ with art interest of monetizing
absolute surplus value into cash. They are of ten supported by foreign
capital, unless the plantation is foreign owned. In these cases a small, fixed
rent is paid for the land to the government. The small rent reflects the high
level of mutual extra-economic'arrangements.In the centre and north of the
Philippines, the big landlord operates more from the rationale of a feudal
landlord, investing his property directly in political power. The rivalry
within the elite should be considered as an economic rivalry expressed as
a struggle for political positions. The political dispute between the Marcos
and Aquino families, which became internationally known in 1986, is a
dassic example of this. The present bourgeoisie holding power over the
state has the same characteristics as the elite during Spanish and American
times, as well as during the Marcos period. This condusion is strengthened
by analyzing the.elite representationin Congress. Out of those entering the
Congress after the snap elections in 1986, 83 per cent were former congress
members and relatives of the present elite families. The remaining 17 per
cent were not really new-comers in, the arena of economic and political
power (Gutierrez et aL. 1992), although they had not held as distinct and
prominent positions as the majority of the Congress representatives. From
this it can be conduded that the Philippine political parties tend to operate
as functional organizations of the family dynasties.
The national bourgeoisie: Another group of the bourgeoisie is national
bourgeoisie, and has received particular attention in the ongoing theoretical
debates in the Philippines. Kuusinen, participating at the Sixth W orId
Congress of Comintern in 1928, stated that the alliance between feudalism
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and imperialism blocked the emergence of a national bourgeoisie and
thereby cancelled the historical progressiveness of capitalism (de J anvry
1981). This is also the argument of.FeITer. According to FeITer (n.d.), these
owners of the means of production, who reinvest their profit in the
enterprise in order to increase productivity, following the traditional steps
of capitalism as sugge sted by Adam Smith, should be considered as be-
longing to the national bourgeoisie, with objectively different interests than
the big comprador bourgeoisie. FeITer suggests that roughly one third of the
employers in the manufacturing sector constitute the Philippine national
bourgeoisie (FeITer n.d.). The critics of FeITer, however, daim that there are
no major differences between the different blocks of the elite. They all
belong to' the bourgeoisie and the obvious variety of practicesamong them
should be considered as subjective differences of economic interests and
dass affiliation and not as objective interests. It the national bourgeoisie is
present in the coconut sector, it would be in the manufacturing sphere, in
the coconutmills or desiccatiùn factories, ptoducIng for adomestic market.
The domestic marketfor coconut products is substantial but it doe~n't seem
as this factor can change the socIal formation and the economic
mechanisms in the coconutmanufacturing sector, at least not in Candelaria.
At tliis point,' vie tlierefore sugge st that the national bourgeoisie is to be
found within other sectors, or at least within other geographical areas.
The petty bourgeoisie: The petty bourgeoisie indudes small entrepreneurs,
small merchants, professionals, salaried technicians and governmental
employees. It was particularly the urban petty bourgeoisie in Manila that
was recruited in the crucial days of 1986. The petty bourgeoisie is
represented in the underground movement National Democratic Front
(NDF), unlike the national bourgeoisie, with organizations for church
people, health workers (nurses and doctors), teachers and artists. The petty
bourgeoisie plays an important role in the marxist vie w of dass struggle
and change. As the founder of the CPP explained in 1970:
The petty bourgeoisie deserves our dose attention because its support for
and participation in the people's democratic revolution is decisive in
shifting the balance of forces against the national and dass enemies of the
Filpino people (Guerrero 1979, p. 138).
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Figure 3.3
Class formations in the Philippines
Class Sub-c1ass Characteristics.
Bourgeoisie Landlords Absent and non-participating. Control more
than 50 ha of land. Very powerfuL. 5 % of the
people owns 83% of the land.16 Very few.
Compradors Control major extemal capitallinkages with
foreign countries. Of ten landlords as well.
Very few.
Middle Bourgeoisie Also called national bourgeoisie. Power is
related to capital derived from the home
market. Said to be 1/3 of the employers in
manufacturing sector.
Petty Bourgeoisie The intellgentsia and employees in the official
sector. Some of them hav.e smalllandholdings,
and can enjoy limited local power.
Peasants Rich Peasants Smalllandowners who participate in
production.Might have 'Yhite collar jobs in
addition to landownership. Also referred to as
petty bourgeoisie.
Middle Peasants Small owner-cultivators who of ten work álso
as tenants. Smaller in number than the landless
peasants.
Poor Peasants Landless peasants (farm workers and tenants).
Is said to be the largest sodal group in the
Philippines. However, they do not hold any
political power.
Proletariat W orkers Industrial and service workers. This group is
probably growing. However, their linkages
with their peasant origin is stil very strong.
Inc1udes a large number of overseas workers.
Many in this group could also be considered as
semi - proletarians.
Semi-proletarans, Unemployed and underemployed. Participate in
Lumpen proletariat the very large 'Ínformal sector. A big number
of those belonging to the other social groups
of the peasantry and the workers, are also to
be found here.
Source: Guerrero 1979.
The petty bourgeoisie is growing in size in the Philippines. Their wages
do not give them a traditional petty bourgeois social position. They usually
receive only minimum wages or lower and are frustrated by the lack of
proper materials at work, like books, medicine and other equipment. The
16
Putzel (1991).
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petty bourgeoisie is to be found in the coconut sector, as white collar
employees in the factories, having college-education. They are also found
in the agricultural sphere as small owners producing a surplus beyond
reproductive needs. It can also be suggested that the katiwalas belong to
this dass, by virtue of their subordination to the landowner. Although they
are powerful, they are only so as long as they act on behalf of the landlord.
Their position is therefore determined to a great deal by subjective factors
and circumstances other than their position as katiwala.
The industrial and service workers: According to Putzel (1992), 13.3 per
cent of the employed labour force are employed in the industrial sector, and
34.7 per centin the service sector. According to studies done in 1984, 74
per cent of the industrial labour force was engaged in manufacturing
processes, and 70 per cent out of these were working in small rep air shops
employing less than ten workers (De Lima Sison 1984). The vast majority
of this dass is thus working insm:all units' whiêh cannöt automatically be
considered as industrial units.Until now, the .sector of industrial workers
has been relatively unorganized. Trade union struggles, particularly by
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), (with 700,000 members) play a significant
role inthe effort towards+betteringthe-working andliving conditions for the
workers. This dass struggle indirectly promote an increase of relative
surplus value.17
The logic behind the decentralization of industrial production lies in the
orientation toward absolute and not relative surplus value. Whereas relative
surplus value normally is produced in ce-ntralized units, in order to increase
the productivity, absolute surplus value increases with decreasing
production costs and not with increased productivity. The Triumph
Company is one example. This company has decentralized their production
to small family units. According to Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), which
organized the female workers at the factory before the decentralization, the
reason was the trade union's demand for higher wages and better working
conditions for the workers.18
The workers are to be found in the coconut factories in the coconut sector.
Some would sugge st the farm workers also belong to this social dass.
Because of their agricultural position, however, it is difficult to indude
them in this group. Although he or she works for a wage, they do so by
17 Interview with Crispin Beltran, Chairperson of KMU, in Tokyo, November 1992.
18 Interview with KMU, November 1992. The fired union members work today in a KMU-
run cooperative, sponsored by Norwegian NGO funds.
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subordinating their tools under themselves, having a certain controlover the
production. The farm workers also tend to associate themselves with the
peasantry - particularly when they (eside at the land they work on, and
relate to tenants and small owner-cultivators. The position of the farm
workers will eventually decide which social dass dominates the Philippine
sOcIety. It all farm workers belong to the working dass, the role of the
peasantry would be a less significant socIal group in the economic analysis
of the Philippines. Based on the fact that the Philippines has an economy
dependent on agriculture, we therefore categorize producers of agricultural
products as peasants - tnduded the farm workers.
The, peasantry: In 1992, around 50 per cent of the labour force was
engaged in agricultural production (Putzel 1992). However, 70 per cent
resides in the countryside, 65 per cent of which is considered engaged in
agricultural production as main income generating activity (de Lima Sison
1984). It is particularly in the south, in Mindanao, that the number of farm
workers is increasing. The biggest peasant organization, organizing both
small owner-cultivators, tenants and farm workers, was said to have about
800,000 members in 1992.19 The variety of organizing the agricultural
production, makes thepeasantry extremelydifferentiated, as described in
chapter 1.3. Themembers of the peasant federation KMP are owners,
tenants, leaseholders and farm workers. They have in common a positions
as agricultural producers. They have in common a socIal position that for
a big degree provides non-economic decisive mechanisms (as feudal patron-
dient relationship with the landlord). They have in common a general
controlover their labour force, and they are not sub-ordinated to the
machinery.
This creates a situation where the farm workers, the tenants, the small
owner-cultivator and for that matter, the lease-holder subjectively define
themselves as peasants. This influence their position in the present socIal
formation. Farm workers, tenants and leaseholders are landless, since they
only rent land, or work for wage. They are here identified as a part of the
peasantry because they subjectively belong there, and because their
objective relation to the means of production are far less alienated than the
relation between the factory workers and the means of production at the
factory. The problem of defining the peasantry, has also been discussed in
chapter two.
The peasants have been the main dass or social group involved in dass
struggle in the Philippines. The peasants are today the most organized
19 Interview with vice-chairperson Felicisimo Patayan, Tokyo, November, 1992.
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socIal group in the Philippines, playing a crucial role in the underground
movement. The coconut producers in this study belong to this group or
dass. Their main focus have been the biased ownership of land and the
president candidates have always induded the interests of the peasantry in
their electoral campaigns. However, the situation of the peasants is still
characterized by poverty and landlessness.
3.3.3 The coconut monopoly
The coconut-land owners established their official organization in 1947, the
Philippine Coconut Planters AssocIation Inc., later renamed the Philippine
CoconûC,Producers Federation Inc. (COCOFED). The members of the
organization were never the actual coconut producers. Of the founding
members in 1947, half of them were influential residents of Manila and the
rest were influential provincial landlords .from, Southern. Tagalog (David
1977). COCOFED was not anactive organizationuntil the late 1960s. From
that time COCOFED has been very active, using their access to state power
to support the interests of the central members.
Family-power has always been a vital part of the reproduction of dass
hierarchy in the Philippines. 'Through the use of the organisation
COCOFED, levies were put on coconut production in 1971. Those gaining
most from these laws and regulations represent specIfic families. The levies
were monopolized by very few persons within the Marcos- faction holding
the state-power.' The coconut monopoly was organized with many pre-
capitalist features in the Philippines. According to the Asiatie mode of
production, tax was paid directly to the state or King. In this case, the taxes
were by law paid to specific families and their companies.
In the Philippines, those families and dynasties controlling the state us ed
the state apparatus in order to monetize as much profit as possible. Hence,
they privatized the state to a degree that ran counter to the objective
interests of the bourgeois dass in a capitalist society. Two of these
dynasties deserve further attention; the dynasties of Juan Ponce Enrile and
Eduardo Cojuangco.
Juan Ponce Enrile was one of Marcos' most trusted men. He was the
Secretary of Defence but also chairman of Philippine National Bank,
National Investment and Development Corp., Philippine Coconut Authority,
United Coconut Planters Bank, United Coconut Mills in addition to holding
other positions in public corporations (Manapat 1992). He is further
involved in law firms, logging activities, telecommunication, real estate and
shipping, to mention a few, beside the coconut sector. Today he owns and
controls coconut land and factories through JAKA Investments, a company
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founded in 1977.20 His position in the coconut production and industry
was a decisive factor in the development of this sector throughout the
presidency of Marcos:
Concurrently with his position as Minister of Defence, Enrile was
Chairman of Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA). The latter position,
though innocuously named, was the key to Enrile's controlover the
country' s most important economic activity, the coconut industry, a sector
which provides the income for almost a fourth of the total cropland.
Enrile was able to control the coconut industry through numerous laws
and presidential decrees mandating the complete cartelization of the
industry at every leveL. This was achieved through an elaborate system of
controlover the financing, planting, milling, processing, local marketing
and international trading aspects of the industry. These decrees also
imposed gigantic levies on the produce of the coconut farmer, resulting
in extreme poverty for many small farmers but generating bilions in
revenue for the few,jndividuals wholorded over the industry (Manapat
1991, p. 174).
His position in PCA lasted until1978. However, the rest of the board were
constituttd by ML, Enrile) good friendsand associates. One of them was
Mr. Cojuangco.
The Cojuangco family traces its roots back to China and emigrated to the
Philippines in the middle of the last century. Their original name Kho
Huang was hispanicized into Cojuangco, where the suffix co denotes
assimilation with the Chinese mestizodass (Anderson 1988). The
Cojuangcos have always been influential in the Philippines. The
grandchildren of the first immgrants have had substantial influence in state
affairs. Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco is the cousin of Corazon Cojuangco,
who maried Aquino, and later became President of the Philippines from
1986 to 1992. Danding Cojuangco is the one in the family with most
substantial interests as well as power in the coconut business. He was one
of the dosest and most loyal associates of President Marcos. They were
godfathers for each others' children, which in the Philippines signifies very
dose personal relationship. Cojuangco controlled in 1983-86 some USD1.5
billion in corporate assets, which in the same period was around 25 per cent
of the GNP (McBeth 1990, Republic of the Philippines 1990). He headed
and controlled entire sectors of the economy, like coconuts, sugar,
agribusiness, banking, and he also had substantial interests in other areas.
He was granted finance and support from the Republic Decrees issued by
20 JAKA Investments is the owner of one of the coconut factories in Candelaria.
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the President. His paricipation in the coconut industry is formidable,
largely made possible by the intervention of the state. From confiscation of
what the Aquino regime called "ill-gotten wealth" during the former
dynast y, some of his positions and stocks are today controlled by the new
families in power.
COCOFED was not particularly dominant in the coconut policy before
1971, when Marcos decIded a major change in politics of the state towards
the coconut sector. More than 10 million pesos were used for the purpose
of making COCOFED a strong organization. This was paid by the PCA.
The official number of members rose more than incredibly 9000 per cent,
from about 3,000 members in 1972 to almost 300,000 members within five
years. The meetings of COCOFED were hel d in Manila, at five star hoteIs,
and displayed a jet-set lifestyle of the organizations representatives.
President Marcos supported the activities with public funds. It was obvious,
however, that the representatives by no means were actual coconut
producers (Manapat 1991);
During the first five years(from 1971 to 1976) more than 150 million
pesos were given by the government as support for various meetings and
projects like free High Yielding Variety-seeds and fertilizers for selected
members. ,Some of thesefunding arrangementswere not decIded by the
President and his Cabinet but by the board of PCA (David 1977). This was
in fact in opposition to the Presidential Decree no. 232, which stated that
the benefits of the development of the coconut industry should be geared
towards the majority of the coconut producers. The actual coconut
associations and decrees, however, benefited those who already had
substantial economic wealth and political power: the absentee coconut
landlords.
In 1971, the COCOFED suggested the creation of the Cocofund, to
sponsor the well-being of the "coconut will" as they called it. In more
concrete terms the COCOFED recommended:
(...) the government to impose a levy on the people of the industry
themselves at the rate of fifty-five centavos (P. 0.55) per 100 kilos of
copra (... ) for ten years, so that a trust fund on behalf of the 12 million
coconut people is collected and invested by the government into the
Coconut Investment Company. (...) The company can invest the funds in
the establishment of oil-mills, soap and detergent factories, other coconut
processing plants, wherever and whenever waranted by coconut
production (...) (...) collateral industries like transport, banks, marketing
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cooperative and others, may be financed by the COCOFUND whenever
warranted byexisting situations (David 1975, p. 141).21
The key to the control of the industry was the levies imposed on all
coconut farmers, by the PCA, through the Cocofund and later the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF), Both levies were dictated by law
(David 1975). The coconut levy, the biggest taxation scheme imposed in
the country, extracted millions from the coconut producers and spawned a
very large international coconut conglomerate worth millions of US dollars,
controlled by Enrile and Cojuangco. With a projected total production of
20 million tons of copra over the 10 year period from 1972 to 1982, the
levies were supposed to extract USD 17 .1 million. There were three
institutions in operation, all controlled by Enrile and Cojuarigco; The
Coconut Investment Company, the COCOFED, and PCA (David 1977).
The two levies (hereby considered as one) were charged to the coconut
farmer during the, first domestic copra sale,.but was collectedby PCA from
the last domestic buyers in the marketing chain. ,The effect of this scheme
was that the levies were directly felt by the coconut producer when the
harvest was sold. He was seId om aware of the fact that the suppression of
the ,prkes resulted from a, levy ,that was supposed to benefit him as a
producer.
When the PCA collected the levy from the end-users, they also produced
a set of receipts that were supposed to be returned to where the copra came
from. The trader getting the receipts from PCA should keep one himself,
and gi ve theother two to the producer. The 'producer should then go to
COCOFED with his two receipts and register them, so as to establish a
proof of ownership in the investments of the Coconut Investment Company
(Manapat 1991). The receipts established that the coconut producer paid the
coconut levy, and that he was entitled to equity in" the company. The
collection of the levy was efficient. However, research on the COCOFUND
levy has shown that only an average of 28 per cent of the receipts were
actually registered, while 72 per cent of the receipts somehow got "lost".
Furthermore, only 5 per cent of the coconut producers who came with
receipts for registration (28 per cent), received registration-receipts from
COCOFED (David 1977). Tons and tons of copra were never registered by
PCA, and after the levy took effect, there was a continuous decrease in the
amount of copra purchased, quite certainly due to under-reporting.
21 P 0.55 is approximately equal to USD 0.08.
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The book of Manapat; Some are Smarter than Others22 (1991) reveals
in detail how ,the' coconut levy drained the coconut producing sector for
capital. Manapat explains that from an initial 1 peso levy for every 100 kgs
of copra, the levy was continuously increasing, going up to 15 pesos in
1973 and to a peak of 100 pesos in 1976 (Occampo 1980). From 1977 to
1981, the levy was 75 pesos per 100 kgs of copra, and from 1982 it
followed the price-fluctuation of the export price of copra (Manapat 1991).
Occampo uses theamount of 60 pesos for 100 kgs of copra and estimates
that the tenants were taxed almost 34 per cent of their coconut income. Still
the burden of the levy reached new heights after 1982 (Occampo 1980). In
Samar, Visayas, the situation was criticaL. The price at the farm gate paid
to,theproducer dropped down to about 80 pesos per 100 kgs. This was
equal to the levy. The coconut producer was therefore left with nothing
(Occampo 1980).
The dedine in the coconut producers' income was supposed to result in
benefits for the farmer. 'The use of thelevies, however, has still not
benefitted the producers. An estimated total of USD585 million has been
collected from the coconut producers. The money has so far been used for
an airplane; Sugar King Air 200 and a twin-engine helicopter which are
used.by Mr. Cojuangco. :Furthermore,' thewife of President Marcos, built
a private castle from coconut materials at a price of approximately USD2
million (Manapat 1991). She also received the total funding of several
projects like the Chess Championships, Miss Universe Contests, cultural
centres and Imelda-scholarships for the children of her friends. Another
friend of Mrs. Marcos received USD675,000 for his privately owned sports
organization. Yet others of the Marcos dan and dynasties received generous
funds from the poor coconut producers (Manapat 1991). Alice Guillermo
uses similar examples in her work, and condudes that the use of surplus
also can indicate the economic system the elite base their power upon:
A characteristic of feudalism is that it abets the wasteful utilization of
surplus and extravagant display. This is due to the fact that extra-
economic factors such as political position or connection to the seat of
power plus the mobilzation of ideological forms function to effectively
secure traditional privilege. Wasteful consumption is likewise an assertion
of economic power and dass position (Guilermo 1986, p. 32).
The point made is not to insist on the greed of those in power, although it
is obvious. The important point is rather that the coconut levies have
22 Referring to a statement by Mrs. Mareos, when she was asked why she was so wealthy.
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resulted in a tremendous drain of capital from the coconut producing sector
into other sectors, which did not lead to increased productivity within the
nation, but rather increased consumption in the private sphere of a limited
and small group of people.
Most of the levy was controlled by the PCA, the COCOFED and other
organizations controlled by Enrile and Cojuangco. PCA decided that Enrile
and Cojuangco could use 10 per cent of the levy for investment purposes.
It was this provision that permitted the two to totally integrate the industry
vertically23 and complete their monopoly. They created two conglomerates
within the coconut industry, the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
which concentrated on finance, and the United Coconut Mills (Unicom)
which focused on manufacturing and trade. Again the point is that capital
was transferred from the coconut production and into non-productive
sectors like finance and to a certain degree into manufacturing and trade.
3.3.4 Social unrest
The socIal formations in contemporary Philippines, express a highly
polarized society. This also affects the w9men. The labour force consists
of all persons above the age of 15 years. However, those who are occupied
with housework are not considered to be part of the labour force. This
means that most women are exduded from national employment statistics.
According to national statistics, the labour force in 1989 counted almost
24 million people, or 40 per cent of the total population of 62 million
people. The unemployment rate was said to be 8.6 per cent in 1989.
However, this is the group of people who did not work for even one hour
in the entire year of 1989, and were registered as unemployed by the
government. It should therefore not be considered as the real unemployment
rate. Reliable estimates suggest that roughly 40 per cent of the labour force
should be regarded as fully or partly unemployed (Werning 1989).
23 Vertical integration was the development strategy of President Marcos. Vertical
integration, which is to be understood as monopolistic controlover all steps in
production, has laws of accumulation which provide fundamental contrasts with those
of dynainc capitalism, since market forces are underinned. However, the productivity
can be essential for a certain period, as in Southem Mindanao which have the highest
productivity of coconut products in the Philippines, and where the vertical integration
is fundamental. It also create a lack of inter-relationship between the traditional sector
and the modem sector, so that whatever surplus value is produced, wil not circulate in
the domestic market, but rather be extracted out of production and used for private
consumption or invested in sectors without linkages to the domestic market (de Janvry
1981).
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While women' s participation in the labour market was recorded to be
48.8 per cent in 1989, the participation of men was 83.3 per cent (KMU
1992). In the formal sector, women made up only 36 per cent of all
workers employed (KMU 1992). The women are mainly engaged in the
informal sector, working under unfavourable conditions and for low wages.
55 per cent of the women are either unpaid family workers or self
employed in the informal sector, working as vendors or operating sari-sari
stores,24 as maids and laundry women or as prostitutes. The poverty is
thus feminized in the Philippines: While the men are poor, the women are
very poor. According to KMU, a woman worker earns only 37 per cent of
a man's wage when producing the same output. Even in the higher levels
oLsociety, only.25 per cent of managerial and executive jobs are hel d by
women (KMU 1992, Montiel and Hollnsteiner 1976).
Whereas the government daims that approximately 50 per cent of the
population live below the poverty line, other sources estimate the
percentage to be döse:tö80per' cent.25 Poverty reports from the 1970s
and more re cent ones leave the reader with the impression that not much
has happened concerning the distribution of wealth and opportunities during
the last 20 years. The only change from the times of Marcos to the end of
the presidential period' of'Äquinowhichregard to the poverty issue, is that
the income distribution has become even more unequal. In seven out of 12
regions, poor families received an even smaller income at the end of the
1980s than what they did in 1985 (Cohen 1990). In 1985, the sugar price
collapsed, leading to starvation among the sugar producers in the province
of Negros.A greater proportion of pre-school children nationwide were
severely malnourished in 1989 than in 1985, according to the Department
of Health. "In the Bicol and Visayan regions, 27 per cent of pre-school
children in 1989 suffered from either second or third-degree malnutrition
- a 5 per cent rise over 1985 levels" (Cohen 1990, p. 38).
This description of dass differentiation depicts a picture of polarization
where the vast majority of the people are marginalized in the economy, as
well as within political power. It ismainly the comprador bourgeoisie
which rules and benefits from the contemporary social formation in the
Philippines. The peasantry, which is induded among the coconut producers,
24 Small variety stores, which are very common in the Philippines.
25 Among them Manila Chronicle, a conservative newspaper, stating that 81.1 per cent lives
below the poverty line (Manila Chronicle June 4, 1991). The biggest labour
confederation, Kilusang Mayo Dno also claims 80 per cent, as do other major NGOs and
NGO research institutes.
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provides a seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of their economic and political
power, by producing a wealth of capital, which is taken away from them.
The present insurgency in the Philippines bases its activities on this
polarized economic situation characterized by injustice, poverty, human
rights violations and lack of democracy. The main underground political
organisation in the Philippines is the National Democratic Front (NDF),
composed of fourteen mass organisations.26
According to the US Senate Intelligence Commttee, the NDF under the
leadership of the CPP and it' s armed wing NP A, represents a major threat
not only to the Philippine government, but also to American interests in the
area (Schrimer and Shalom 1987). In the mid-1980s, they estimated the
NPA to consist of more than 30,000 full-time and part-time guerilla
soldiers, operating in almost all of the 73 provinces in the Philippines and
con trolling areas inhabited by approximately 20 per cent of the entire
population. The executive summary condudes:
The recent rapid growth of the CPP/NP A is attributable to its skilful
exploitation of a growing catalog of popular grievances against the
Marcos regime. Political and economIc power are monopolized at the top
by a small oligarchy, while at the bottom the mass of Filipinos live in
poverty without real input into the political proeess. A few favoured
Marcos cronies have been given control of large agricultural and industrial
monopolies that domInate the economy. They retain their favoured
position by demonstrations of loyalty to the President and financial
support for his political machine. Political corrption and human rights
abuses, particularly by the Armed Forces (of the Philppines J, have fuelled
popular resentment (Schrimer and Shalom 1987, pp. 315-316).
The report condudes that the insurgency movement of NDF is an
indigenous Filipino movement without major support from abroad but with
a major support from the masses in the Philippines (Schrimer and Shalom
1987), particularly from the peasants. What this report does not identify is
the systematic pro gr amme of political education which is being undertaken
26 The organisations are: League of Science for the People (LAB), Council of Lawyers for
the Country (LUMABAN), Patriotic Movement of New Women (MAKIBAKA),
Cordilera People' s Democratic Front (CPDF), Patriotic Health Association (MSP),
Artists and Writers for the People (ARMAS), Revolutionary Congress of Trade Unions
(RKKU), National Association of Peasants (PKM), Federation of Labour Organisations
(KASAMA), Association of Patriotic Teachers (KGM), Patriotic Y outh (KM), Christians
for National Liberation (CNL), The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the
New Peoples Army (NPA) (Rocamora 1992).
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by the NDF, in its efforts to raise the dass consciousness of the people.
The Filipino peasants and workers are special objects of this policy. The
NDF policy regards these two major dasses as being basic to social
revolution. In Candelaria, people relating to coconut production and
manufacturing belong to these basic dasses and are thus important for the
NDF led struggle. Regardless of that, the trade unions and peasant
organizations in Candelaria were very few in i 991. As a matter of fact,
only one trade union existed in the municipality, according to local reports.
The next chapter will reveal the specific socIal formations and economic
constraints among the people in the coconut producing sector in Candelaria,
Quezon Province.
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4. The social formation around coconut
production in Candelaria
Quezon Province is the sixth largest of the 72 provinces in the Philippines.
The Province Capital, Lucena City, is about 137 kilometres away from
Metro Manila on the Manila South Super Highway. Quezon Province is one
of the six provinces constituting Southern Tagalog, which is region 4 (Map
2). The province covers approximately 870,660 hectares. The area
comprises 40 municipalities and one charter city. The total population was
about 1.3 million in 1990" which gives a ,population density of 158 per
square kilometre (Map 3).
The coconut production in Quezon Province is extensive. About 30 per
cent of the cultivated land is grown with coconut palms and approximately
50 per cent of the employed population is engaged in the agricultural
sector. 34 per cent works in the service sector and 16 per cent is engaged
in the industrial sector (Republic of the Philippines 1988).
4.1 Candelaria
The municipality of Candelaria is located in Quezon Province, about 115
kilometres south-east of Manila and 20 kilometres from the capital city of
Quezon Province, Lucena City (Map 4). Candelaria has a total area of
17,500 hectares.l The dimate of the area has an absence of a distinct dry
season but does have a pronounced rainy season from October to J anuary.
Most of the land is flat, except for certain pars in the north where Mount
Banahaw becomes the mountainous part of the municipality. These terrain
and dimate characteristics combined with a soil type of loamy texture,
make the land in the municIpality well suited for extensive agriculture
(Republic of the Philippines 1981).
The local municipality administration claims that the size of Candelaria is 17,500 ha.
The bureau of Soil reports the size to be 12,648 ha, while the Bureau of Forest
Development says 14,870 ha (Republic of the Philippines 1981). No disputes are
reported regarding the borders of Candelaria. It is therefor assumed that the different
sizes are due inaccuracy.
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Candelaria was chosen for several reasons. The coconut production is the
main economic activity in the municipality. There are several coconut
factories in Candelaria as well as coconut land. Within a relatively small
area it would be possible to talk with all types of coconut producers and
workers. Because of certain controversial parts of the questionnaire,
particularly questions about income and expenses, security was important
during the fieldwork. Asking questions in Quezon Province normally is
considered unsafe, due the social unrest in neighbouring municipalities.
Contacts with local people as well as local officials made the work as safe
as could be.
4.1.1 Historical background2
In the Spanish colonial period and up to the mid 19th century, four general
types of landholders were found in Candelaria; (a) Spaniards, who were
assigned encomiendas as rewards for services rendered to the Crown; (b)
religious and charitable organizations, which were assigned land grants by
the Crown for their support; (c) the Spanish Royal Estate; and (d) the
natives, called indios,3 ,whose possession of land were not defined by dear
property boundaries. A fifth category comprised of the pueblos: villages
that were assigned common lands for the benefit of the pueblo residents as
a whole. The Chinese population had no rights to land ownership.
A smooth transition from the encomienda to the hacienda type of
ownership took place in the 19th century. In Candelaria, history shows that
it was primarily the encomenderos who gained the private ownership of
land in the form of large haciendas. Another group that gained ownership
was the Chinese mestizos, usually sons of Filipino mothers and
christianized Chinese fathers. This group, unlike their fathers, was allowed
to own land. U sually the agricultural land was leased to enterprising
Filipino and mestizo families of a nearby town. The lease-holders,
inquilinos, did not till the land but had the estates worked by tenants, called
kasama in Candelaria. The estate owners collected rent from the inquilinos.
The rent was deducted from the crop, and the remaining harve st was
divided equally between the inquilinos and the kasama. The latter group,
2 This short history of Candelaria is based on interviews with Mrs. Stella de Guzman, the
loeal historian in Candelaria.
3
"Indio" were of ten expressed tsunggo, whieh on the loeal language means monkey. This
indieate astrong in fluene e of raeism.
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who actually produced the crop, did not advance in economic terms
whereas the non-cultivators did.
Coconuts were right from the beginning essential for the Spanish empire.
In 1642, every indio was directed to plant 200 coconut trees. The re as on
has been said to be a disaster caused by diminished local wheat harvests.
However, it is well-known that the Spanish galleons needed charcoal from
coconut -shells for fuel and fibres from the coconut husks for ropes used in
galleon rigs (LUSSA 1982). The export of coconut products started only in
the sec ond half of the 19th century and became vital only after the turn of
the century. At the beginning of the international coconut-trade, the Chinese
population had alreadyestablished themselves as traders. The coconuts and
copra were thus sold to the Chinese, who processed the nuts into crude
coconut oil at their langisan, as the "oil mill" at that time was called. The
nuts were left to rot and the oil extracted by letting it seep out of the rotten
nuts piled up on wooden sticks. The oil was sent to Manila to be further
refined. Even today, the smell of a coconut oil mill is peculiar, even if the
raw material used is not rotten but dried. In those times, the odour of the
rotten coconuts made the elite seek other places for living whenever
possible, since the mills were centrally placed along the main road and near
the centre. Absentee landlordship thus became normal in the area. The
copra was made in tapahan, copra-dryers similar to the ones used today.
These activities were concentrated in a few hands, usually in the traders.
This particular phenomenon of concentration of copra-making in a few
hands, is different from other coconut producing areas in Southern Tagalog.
Normally the copra is dried by the tenant at his homestead and later sold
at the farm gate.
4.1.2 Contemporary socio-economic features
Coconuts are the dominant product of Candelaria. Approximately 50 per
cent of the entire agricultural area is planted with coconut palms. The other
major crops are rice and maize, covering about 40 per cent of the
agriculturalland in 1980.4 The population in Candelaria counted roughly
70,000 in 1991,5 of whom about 50 per cent were children and people
above 65 years. The working force is thus about 35,000 people. Various
4 Since 1980 there might have been a slight decrease in the hectares used for coconuts due
to extensive logging.
5 Based on data from Republic of the Philippines (1981). The population estimate for 1990
is calculated by the population data for 1980 timed with average fertility rate of Quezon
Province.
73
oral sources estimate that around 70 per cent of these are directly involved
in coconut production, while 5-10 per cent are involved in coconut
manufacturing alone. A vailable data shows that 4,310 coconut farmers and
2,873 coconut farms were found in Candelaria in 1988. The average family-
size is 6, and the father is usually the only one in the family who gets
registered as a breadwinner. It the approximately 2,000 people working in
the coconut factories are added, it could be conduded that about 50 per
cent of the population depends directly on coconut production for their
survivaL. More farm workers are registered per farm in Candelaria than for
Quezon Province as a whole. The ratio of people tilling the coconut-land
divided by the number of registered coconut-farms is 1.5: 1 in Candelaria
and 1: 1 in Quezon Province.
In 1980, 54 industrial units were recorded in Candelaria. The majority of
these are small rice mills and family-based artisan production. Six of the
industrial units were coconut oil mills and desiccated coconut factories. It
is first of all the coconut factories that exceed small-scale production. The
largest factory employs 1,100 workers alone. This factory, owned by the
Peter Paul Philippine Corp., was the first industrial manufacturer in the
area, established in 1946. It is one of the largest producers of desiccated
coconuts in the country. It also 'operates a private hospital, the on ly fire
station in the area and other service facilities. The manager as well as the
director are American citizens.
Practically all children in Candelaria are enroled in primary school, but
far from all finish primary school education (6 years). In 1980, 54 per cent
enroled in secondary level education and 5 per cent enroled in tertiary level
education, i.e. college.
Local private hospitals and doctors provide the only public health
services in Candelaria. These offer health services only to those who can
afford to pay for it. The last noted epidemic in Candelaria, a typhoid fever,
occurred in 1974. Malaria, tuberculosis and pneumonia are still common.
The local authorities con sider it impossible to provide a sufficient number
of health personneL. Hence, in the Development Plan from 1980 it was
recommended to:
(...) improve the quality of health care in every harangay through training
of "hilots" and quack6 doctors (Repuhlic of the Philppines 1981, p. 131).
6 Both "hilots" and quack doetors are health workers without formal health education. In
northern regions, near the American bases, "hilots" are known as "women-doctors",
helping pregnant women with abortion, which is ilegal in the Philippines.
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The population is generally poor, with a very high number of people below
the official poverty-line. Malnourishment was found in 69 per cent of
surveyed pre-school children in 1980 (Republic of the Philippines 1981).
According to local respondents, the economic situation has worsened during
the past decade. This corresponds to an overall de dine in export prices of
coconut products in the same period. The municipal papers condude that
the incidence of malnutrition was very common in the area where the
workers of Peter Paul Philippine Corporate Factory live. They note:
Among the barangays, third degree malnutrition ranked high in Pahinga
Norte due to a large number of the parents who work in the Peter Paul
Philppines Corporate Factory. These parents often times neglect their
children resulting in malnutrition and negligence (Republie of the
Philppines 1981, p. 68).
4.2 The production of coconuts
The local authorities estimated the number of trees in Candelaria to be 1.9
million in 1988. Almost 5 per cent of these trees were unproductive,
probably from the manufacturing of alcoholic coconut liquor, lambanog.
The liquor is made of juice extracted from the coconut flower. Extraction
of this juice prevents the nut from developing.
The production of coconuts does not require daily labour inputs. Roughly
seven labour days per harve st per hectare are normally required to maintain
production. Several tasks are undertaken by those producing the nuts:
Planting: This work indudes the tasks of dearing the land, planting and
nursing of seedlings, staking and hoIing, transplanting and replanting
(PC ARR 1975). The work is done with traditional and simple tools, even
though more technologically advanced methods are known among the
producers. There is no planting of new trees going on in Candelaria today.
The average age of the trees is 80-100 years, and the productivity per tree
is dedining.7 The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) and United Coconut
Association of the Philippines (UCAP) both state that an average of 3,000
coconut trees are logged in Quezon province daily (UCAP 1990). This
equals roughly 15 hectares of coconut land. The reason for this logging is
partly due to the governmentalland reform policies and partly to the very
high domestic demand for coconut timber. The recommended number of
trees per hectare is 150. In Candelaria, the trees have been planted in higher
7 Interview with PCA, Lucena City, May 1991.
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densities, counting an average of 200 trees per ha. This again reinforces the
relatively low productivity per tree in Candelaria.
Caring for the trees: Pests and diseases lead to a demand for constant care
of the trees. This work indudes the tasks of weeding, fertilizing, tilling,
control of pests and diseases, and multi-cropping. The use of chemical ferti
lizers and pesticides is very limited. The main maintenance activity is
weeding. This work is normally done by the tenants. It no tenants are
related to the land, the work is done by farm workers without payment. The
farm workers normally work on the same hectares of land every harvest.
The stability of employment of the workers is thus secured by making them
weed the area they later will harvest. The workers do so, in order to get the
job as a harvester. In some areas, the weeding is poor, making it difficult
to harvest the nuts. Roughly three working days are used to dear and weed
one hectare of land. The tool used is a simple bolo, a long-bladed and sharp
knife.
Harvesting: Coconut trees are harvested every sixth week, with an
exception for the time after the end of the rainy season in February, when
the production is lower than normaL. A total of 6-7 harvests a year are the
average for the respondents. The harvesting process indudes four separate
operations; nut-picking, collecting of nuts, husk removal and transportation.
All of these operations are normally done by farm workers. A normal
working day during the harvest indudes four workers, picking, collecting,
de-husking and transporting 1,000 nuts. This is roughly equal to the harvest
of one hectare of coconut land. With these figures, it can be calculated that
the production per tree annually is on average 32.5 nuts, coming dose to
UCAPs registration of 31 nuts per tree annually (Local branch of PCA,
interview 1991).8
1. Nut-picking: The nuts are picked in two different ways in the
Philippines. One method is to dimb one tree and then move from one tree
to another on tracks made of planks. This method is not used in Candelaria.
The common way of picking the nuts in Candelaria is to use a harabas, or
a kawit, a 10-12 meter long bamboo pole with a sickle at the end. The
work requires specialized skills and great physical strength. The nut-picking
is done by men in their "best" age (25-35 years).
8 Calculating 1000 nuts per 200 trees times the average of 6,5 harvests.
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2. Collecting: Collecting the coconuts is a back-aching work that is
normally done by women and children. This work is done with a pangipon,
a 1-1,5 meter long stick with a hook at the bottom end. The workers collect
the nuts in piles. According to the collectors, good eyesight is necessary in
order to see the nuts falling. It the land is not well weeded, it is difficult
to fin d the nuts unless it is noted where they fall and where they are lying.
At the same time, the collectors have to watch out for falling coconuts. It
is also necessary to be accurate in the use of the bolo to remove the
branches around the nuts. It is first of all the shoulders and arms that hurt
after a day of collecting coconuts.
3. Husk removal: The de-husking of the nuts is normally done by men,
using a tapasaan. The tapasaan is a sharp, double-edged spear which is
ground-based, that splits the husk from the nut. The workers remove the
husks before the nuts can be sold to a trader for processing into copra or
directly to the factories for desiccation.
4. Transportation: The transportation of the nuts is normally done with
jeepneys,9 provided by the trader, or with a carabao. A carabao is a water
buffalo that pulls a paragas, a cart without wheels, unless a more expensive
cart with wheels is in the possession of the one bringing the nuts to the
trader' s place. It a horse is used for transportation, a kariton is used. This
is a cart made for horses and is more expensive than the carts used for
carabaos. The farm workers lift the nuts with their hands or use a small
stick with a hook at the end to move the nuts from one place to another.
This is the last operation in the coconut production process caried out by
the farm workers.
Copra-making: The copra-making, which in other municipalities in the
province normally is done at the farm, is in Candelaria done at the traders'
place. This work has thus been removed from farm workers and tenants to
copra-makers working for the trader. Copra-making in Candelaria is a
women's occupation. Normally, 4-5 women work together in a team. The
process takes 2-3 days because of the necessary drying process. The first
step is to split the coconut (which is already de-husked) in two halves. The
coconut water is spille d on the ground. The nuts are then put on a gridiron
with burning charcoal underneath. The charcoal comes from the nutshell
9 A vehicle, built on the model of American military jeeps during the second world war.
Today, the jeepney is the most common vehicle for public transportation in the
Philippines.
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and the husk of the coconuts. The nuts are slowly dried for about 24 hours.
There is an enormous development of smoke during this procedure,
endangering the women with toxic and cancerous PAH-containing gases.lO
After the nuts have dried, the meat is loosened from the shell with a knife
affixed to a stooL At this point, a short note should be made about the
problem of aflatoxin.ll Aflatoxin is a toxic which develops in copra which
is not properly dried. It can also develop in copra made of unripe nuts, i.e.
nuts which are harvested too early. Aflatoxin is a problem in Candelaria
because the copra is sold to the coconut oil factories by weight. The trader
often adds water to his copra before selling it to get a higher payment.
Since the nuts are bought by the 1,000 and the copra is sold by weight, the
risk of getting the copra destroyed by aflatoxin is considerable in
Candelaria. Aflatoxin cannot immediately be seen on the copra but becomes
evident after a storage period of at least two months, as light green mould
on the copra meat.
4.2.1 Ownership of production tools
Most of the interviewed tenants own their tools, which are cheap and
traditiona1. Six of the respondents (30 per cent) had more expensive though
traditional tools in their possession, like a carabao or horse and a
cartJparagasl12kariton.13 Tenants do not own land but pay a rent that is
relative to the size of their production. Small owner-cultivators own their
basic tools like bolos as well as more expensive but still traditional tools
like carabaos. Three respondents even own a vehicle, which is used for
10 Poly-Aromatic Hydrocarbons.
11 Aflatoxin is a group of chemicals produced by a mould called Aspergilus Flavus. The
most abundant aflatoxin, called Aflatoxin Bi, is the most powedul cancer-formng
chemical known. Aflatoxin causes death when present at high concentration. It kiled
100,000 turkeys in the UK in 1960 when the presence of aflatoxin was 10 parts per
milion. At lower doses, it causes stunted growth and poor feed efficiency. It is also
reported to decrease immunity to diseases. When the livestock is fed with copra, the
aflatoxin wil be carred further in the ecological cycle. The EC, which is ane of the
main markets for Philippine copra, decided in 1991 that the quality requirements for
imported copra ought to be more demanding. They lowered the limit of aflatoxin from
50 parts per bilion (ppb) to 20 ppb, or 0.02 parts per milion (PCA 1990).
12 A very simple cart with no wheels, but a kind of rails or skis undemeath. Drawn by a
carabao.
13
Cart for a horse.
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tran sp ortati on of his harvest, as well as other' s harvests. These respondents
reported operating as katiwalas besides being tenants.
Table 4.1
Tools, prices and ownership of tools used in the coconut
producing sector in Candelaria, 1991
Tools, prices and ownership
Tools Price Lifetime Price per 1000 Owned by U sed for
Pesos nuts (pesos)
Bolo 100 12 harv. 0,85* SOC/F IT Weeding
Harabas 600 12 harv. 17,00 FW Nut picking
Pangipon 50 6 harv. 2,80 FW (w omen) Collecting
Tapasaan 200 12 harv. 5,50 FW De-husking
Paragas 700 6 harv. 11,70* T Transportation
C arabao 13,000 90 harv. 16,00* , SOC/T/Tr Transportation
C art 1,500 12 harv. 12,50* SOC/T/Tr Transportation
Horse 5,000 60 harv. 840* SOC/T/Tr Transportation,
Kariton 24 harv. 29,10* SOC/T/Tr Transportation
7,000
Vehicle 70,000 60 harv. 30,00* SOC/Tr Transportation
Coprahan 3,500 36 harv. 32,40 Tr Copra-making
Note: FW = farm worker, T = tenant, SOC = small owner- cultivator, LO = landowner (not
participating in the production) and Tr = trader. * indicate that only 30 per cent of the price
is included due multiple use of the to ol (source: fieldwork, Candelaria 1991).
The farm worker respondents own, with one exception, their own tools.
These tools are all relatively cheap and simple. The farm workers own no
land of their own but are wage-labourer in the production. Table 4.1 shows
an overview of tools used, the prices of these tools and their normal owner.
An effort has been made to calculate the cost of these inputs per 1,000 nuts
which equals one labour day. Some comments should be made on the
calculations. The prices were contemporary prices at the local market. The
tools have a certain life span and the third column, "lifetime", shows how
many harvests one tool can be used for before it is exhausted. The next
column, calculates the cost of inputs in the form of wear and tear of tools
per 1,000 nuts, or one labour day. Several tools are used for purposes other
than coconut harvesting, and in these cases only 30 per cent of the
calculated co st is presented. These cases are marked with an asterisk.
Column five indicates who owns and uses the too1. The work the tool is
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used for is indicated in the last column. The table is meant to show the low
costs of inputs used in the coconut production and at the same time, that
whatever the co st of inputs, these are paid by the producers themselves, and
not by the owner of the land.
4.3 The social formations in Candelaria
The socIal formation should not be rigidly constructed, regardless of
economic system. In the coconut production in Candelaria, there are
primarily four participating groups: the small owner-cultivators, the tenants,
the farm workers and the katiwalas. The small owner- cultivators often
work part~time as tenants or as katiwalas for other landowners. The tenants
can also work as either katiwalas or as farm workers. The farm workers for
their part have usually only wage-work in coconut production. Women
participate in the coconutproduction as coconut collectors and as copra-
makers at the traders' place. However, their largest work-load is in the
reproduction of the labour power, as domestic labour. They subsidise costs
of labour and make it possible for the wage payers to pay the workers
under the costs of reproduction, regardless of whether the wage-payer
himself is atenant, katiwala or landowner.
In the socIal hierarchy, the ten ant is placed above the farm worker but
is subordinated to the katiwala and the landlord (Figure 4.1). Sharing
regulations are based on personal agreements between tenants and land-
owners. Due to the existence of a reserve army of labour in the area, the
landowner is in a powerful position to develop a patron-dient relationship
with his tenants. Tenants normally pay for the inputs required in the
production, since the landowner is absent. Economic contradictions of
interest between landowners and tenants are normally not expressed. This
absence of expression is also facilitated by the presence of a middleman,
a katiwala, who controls the production and very often the purchase of the
products as well. The actors very of ten possess more than one position,
high-lightening the complexity of the social formations in the coconut
producing sector. Within each distinct group, there are hierarchies. These
hierarchies are to a certain degree decisive for the individuaL. Within the
group of farm workers, some of the actors received more than twice as
much in wage as another. This was determined by gender, and perhaps
other non-economic relations between the farm workers and the employer.
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Figure 4.1
Major groups participating in the production and processing of coconuts
Coconut production Coconut proeessing
Landowner ----iI
I
I
i
I
I
i
I
Tenant
I
I
I
i
I
I
i
i
-----1
i
i
I
i
I
I
i
I
---_J
Trader Factory-ownerKatiwala
Copra-maker Factory-worker
Farm worker
Normal transactions
Occasional transactions
As atenant, additional income can be derIved from the coconut
production, either from working as a katiwala or by working as a farm
worker. The intern al stratification was striking. One tenant could possess
a vehide, electricity, television and other goods - another ten ant could have
a broken radio as his only possession beside minimum survival assets.
Some of the tenants were better off thansome of the small owner-
cultivators and some were worse of than the farm workers. This complexity
is also found in the national social formation which was presented in
chapter 3.3.2. Because of this, non-economic mechanisms in social analysis
must be considered. This limits the strength of Marxism in the theoretical
search for the explanation of poverty in Candelaria. Given the average
values for the variety of questions, it is still possible to measure distinct
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economic differences between the three groups harvesting nuts; the farm
workers, the tenants and the few small owner-cultivators. The small owner
cultivators operates slightly more on his own than the other groups. It he
also rent land, his position in figure 4.1 would be that of the tenant.
4.3.1 The farm workers
The farm workers combine into gangs of three or four persons that work
together every harvesting season. They are hired by the katiwala or the
tenant. With a general surplus of labour in Candelaria, they are sub-
ordinated under the power of both the tenant and the katiwala and above
all the landowner, who has the final say in cases of conflicts. Responding
to direct question, the vast majority of the farm workers immediately hailed
the landowner, giving him very good marks for his attitude towards them.
Particularly his understanding of the need for credit once in a while made
the landowner a very popular patron. The entire group of farm workers
interviewed lived below the poverty line and had no means for betterment
of their life situation. The landlord was seldom identified as the source of
credit. This role was divided between the neighbours, the family and the
katiwala.
The wages paid to farm workers vary. This creates a hierarchical
structure even among the farm workers. All parts of the harvest are of equal
importance in the production process but the nut-picker is paid twice as
much as the collector, who is normally a woman. The wages of the de-
husker and the persons doing the loading and transportation are somewhere
in between the wage of a nut-picker and a de-husker. When there is no
female farm worker in the gang, the tenant will employ his own wife
unpaid and thereby reduce the overall expenses of the production.
According to the collectors in the area, about 20 per cent of the collectors
did not receive any payments for their labour.
It the land on which the farm worker works is regulated by tenancy, the
ten ant will pay the wage to the farm workers, regardless of whether they
were hired by the katiwala or the tenant. It no tenants are present, the
payment is done by the katiwala. In a few cases, when the landowner is a
small owner operator with less than 50 hectares, the payment is made
directly by him.
The average wage paid to the nut-pickers in the sample is computed to
be 81 pesos per 1,000 nuts. The wage varied from 50 to 100 pesos per
1,000 nuts. In the cases where the collecting is done by a hired farm
w orker, the wage also varies considerably from farm to farm. The wage
varies from 30 to 60 pesos per 1,000 nuts, with an average of 48 pesos.
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The wage for the de-husker varies from 50 to 100 pesos per 1,000 nuts.
The average wage here was 64 pesos per 1,000 nuts. The transportation
costs averaged 67 pesos per 1,000 nuts. The cost again varied from 50 to
100 pesos per 1,000 nuts. This amount indudes payments to those loading
and de-loading the truck or carabao at the farm gate and at the place of the
buyer, as well as gasoline. The farm workers thus responded that an
average of 260 pesos were us ed for work and transport of 1,000 coconuts.
Later, we will reveal that the average payment to the farm workers made
by the tenants were 182 pesos per 1,000 coconuts. The differences is
probably due two factors; (1) while all in the respondent group of farm
workers are paid wage for their work, the unpaid farm workers (normally
wives) of the tenants decrease the average expenses for the tenants; (2)
some tenant respondents share their labour costs with the landowner or
katiwala. The point, however, is that the farm workers receive less than
what is necessary for maintaining a life over the poverty line. Further, they
are frequently paid by the tenant, and thus subordinated the tenants.
The wage for copra-making is paid collectively to the team. The work is
normally led by the oldest woman in the team. The wage is said to be
equally shared. The producers get 120 pesos for one day of work. In one
week they normally work for 3 days. The complete production for one
work-session of three days correspond to 3,000 nuts, or approximately 670
kilos of copra (4.5 nuts give 1 kilo of copra) The wage expenses for the
trader are thus about 54 pesos per 100 kilo of copra. The production cost
for 1,000 nuts is about150 pesos, which indudes 30 pesos for wear and
tear of the coprahan. The coprahan is owned by the trader as noted in Table
4.1. The copra-making team earns around 120 pesos per 1,000 nuts turne d
into copra, i.e. 24 to 30 pesos each.
Farm workers who are the coconut harvest performers, are of ten hired by
the tenant during the harvest periods. However, almost half of the farm
workers were hired by the katiwala14 although paid for by the tenants.
Where no tenants are present at the farm, as on large haciendas with more
than 50 hectares under the ownership of one family, the hired farm workers
are paid by the landlord or the katiwala. A total of 76 per cent of the
surveyed farm workers, operating on land without tenants, said that they
were paid by the katiwala, while the rest were paid by their landlord.
Most of the farm workers work on several farms and may have several
employers either on a c ontractu al or seasonal basis. The work is
concentrated in the harve sting seasons, which means that the farm workers
are unemployed or underemployed between the harvest periods. The
14 An overseer who supervises produetion on behalf of the landowner.
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average area harvested by each farm worker was 17 hectares. The far
worker thus harvests an average of 17,000 nuts, earning somewhere
between 816 and 1,377 pesos per harvest, depending on gender and
relationship to the employer (tenant or katiwala) and wage payer (tenant).
Even though it is said that harvests takes place every six weeks, there is a
period at the end of each rainy season where there is no harvest.
Calculations in this study will use an average of 6.7 harvests per year.15
Wage is, according to Marx, the result of turning labour power into a
commodity for a capitalist market (Marx 1990), and hence a part of the
basis of a capitalist mode of production. The wage is supposed to cover the
costs of reproducIng the labour power. The wages found among the farm
workers do not reflect the officiallocal minimum wage of approximately
110 pesos per day. 16 The variation in wages indicate that wages depend
on very strong feudal patron-dient relations between the farm workers and
tenants, as well as between the producers (farm workers and tenants) and
the katiwala and landowners. The findings indicate a support for the theory
of de J anvry regarding the co-existence of several modes of production. The
farm workers can be paid less than what it takes to reproduce their labour
power, because of other sources of income and food. This functional
dualism would thus depress the daily wage below the necessary minÏmum
(de Janvry 1981). The relations of production of coconuts in Candelaria
indicate a socIal formation reflecting mechanisms other than capitalist
market mechanisms for the coconut labour.
4.3.2 The tenants
In Candelaria, a position as a ten ant can be inherited or purchased. The
price varies, depending on the landlord, the former tenant and the new
tenant. One of the respondents bought his position in 1973 for 1,500 pesos.
This would be the equivalent of 13,890 pesos in 1991, given the general
rate of inflation.
The average net income for the surveyed coconut share-cropping tenants
was 3,317 pesos per year. The sharing system is normally said to be 30 per
cent of gross output to the ten ant and 70 per cent of the gross output for
the landowner, with the tenant covering all production costs. However, if
there is a katiwala present, he normally gets 10 per cent of the gross output.
15 6,7 harvests per year is the average in aur sample of 19 tenants.
16 110 pesos per day are what an average sized family need for daily survival and
reproduction in 1990, according to governmental sources.
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Thus,the ten ant receives only 30 per cent of 90 per cent, i.e; 27 per cent
of gross output. It production costs are deducted from the tenants ' share,
what remains as the tenants ' share in the sample is an average of merely
16 per cent of the gross output from coconut production - at first lev el sale.
Candelaria has several sharing systems, depending on the relationship
with the landowner. Some respondents explained their better sharing
agreement with the earlier presence of the NP As. The guerillas forced the
landlords to accept a sharing system of 70-30 in favour of the tenants. This
sharing system is called baliktad, which means "turned around", and has
been one of the most profound short-term political goals for the
underground movement in areas with share tenancy. It was the NP A
introducIng this sharing system as a tentativ e goal under the present
economic system, and they managed to implement this in several areas
where they enjoyed local support from the peasants. The NP As were
present in Candelaria up to 1989, when a massive military operation forced
them to retreat to are as further away from the centre. The effects of NPA
should still be regarded as present, and for some of the tenants this means
a bigger share of the coconut harvest.
One should expect that a good and tight relationship with the landowner,
would provide a bettersharing-systemfor the tenant. This appears not to
be so. All kinds of personal relationships between owners and tenants were
found among the respondents. There was no dear correspondence between
such relations and the established sharing system.
The utang na loob17 can be an explanation for this, making the tenant
accept a smaller share for the sake of maintaining the chances for aid and
good-will from the landowner in other matters in times of family crisis. In
other words, the landowner decides the share for the ten ant. Table 4.2
shows reported sharing arangements, income and costs of production
among coconut producing ten ant farmers. The first column lists the number
of the twenty respondents (T-1 to T-20) in the survey. T-4 is missing due
inaccurate replies. The sharing system is shown in the second column, and
is given as two or three numbers, adding up to 100. The first number is the
share of the gross output received by the tenants. The last number is the
share of the gross output received by the landowner. This is normally also
his net share, since the costs of production are paid by others. It three
numbers are present in the tab le, the number in the middle is the share
given to the katiwala. 17 of the respondents reported that the inputs were
paid by the ten ant. Only in two cases (T -3 and T -8) do ten ant and
landowner share these expenses (indicated by an "E" in Table 4.2).
17 Debt of gratitude, a very strong cultural mechanism in the Philippines.
85
The next column is labelled "price per 1 ,000 nuts last harvest" and
present the prices per 1,000 nuts paid for the last harvest. "Wages paid by
tenant to farm workers per 1,000 nuts last harvest", which is column
number four, present wages paid by the tenant to the farm workers for the
harvesting of coconuts. Column number five gives present the actual share
the tenant receive of the net value produced, in percentage. As we see, the
share vary substantially - and does not automatically coincide with size of
harvest. Number of harvests per year is presented in the sixth column, and
indicate a variety of practices - the average however is between six and
seven harvests per year. The seventh column presents the size of the last
harvest, counted in nuts. The last column shows the calculated total income
per year the respondents receive, as atenant. Evidently, the variation in
annual income is substantial.
Table 4.4 shows actual data for income and sharing arangements. This
table reveals that regardless of sharing system, the earnings per 1,000 nuts
lie between a net loss of 0.5 per cent and a net positive share of 35.4 per
cent The average net earning was 172 pesos, which is only about 16 per
cent of the actual farm gate market value. The farm workers, who operate
in groups of four, earned on average approximately 17 per cent of the farm
gate value. Since they are four, less than five percent of the market value
goes to the farm w orker. These results reveal that people may not enter
tenant relations for the sake of income opportunities in coconut production.
It seems that tenants rent land in order to have a place to stay for the
family and to have land to till beside the coconuts. This leaves them
without strong interests in developing the productivity of the coconut trees,
simply because the gains from the invested work are minimaL.
Based on traditional culture in the Philippines, a landlord can apply both
"subtle and overt pressure on his tenant" (Putzel 1990, p. 7). The ten ant
accepts an inferior position to the landlord, even in matters where he has
a legal right to decide. The economic structure makes it desirable for the
ten ant to follow the old, feudal, patron-dient relationship to his landowner,
represented by his katiwala, among other things because the katiwala
provides the tenant with better trading possibilities. No katiwala or other
patron normally means worse deals with the trader. If the ten ant produces
crops beside coconuts, like bananas and other crops, regardless of a
personal disapproval from the patron, the patron (or landlord) can punish
the tenant, even to the extent of cutting the coconut trees with the result
that the tenant loses his position as atenant.
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The immediate profit for the landlord would be 50,000 pesos18 for the
timber per hectare in 1991 and a certain price for the land which would be
offered at the free market as real estate. In this way tenants are forced,
because of the necessity for survival, to do whatever the landowner or
katiwala wants him to do. The coconut logging in Quezon Province is by
the United Coconut Association of the Philippines (UCAP) estimated to
cover about 2,000 hectares per year (UCAP 1991). The average size of
farms in Candelaria is noted to be 3.6 hectares. It Candelaria has the
average rate of coconut logging, the coconut logging would estimated cover
between 10-12 hectares a year, or on average the area of responsibility for
4-5 tenants.
4.3.3 The small owner-cultivators
The surveyed small owner-cultivators are both small owners and tenants,
each on a small parcel of'land. They are tenants for small landowners
owning less than 30 hectares of land. Those selling the coconuts to the
katiwala of the landowner, received a higher price for their products than
those who controlled the sales themselves.
The sales prices received by small owners varied from 430 to 1,350
pesos per 1,000 nuts. The lo west price was given by a small trader and was
traded by the respondent herself, who was a widow. Her income was far
below that of her fellow small owner-cultivators and she had no relations
with katiwalas or other influential persons.The better prices were given by
bigger traders. The small owners did not in these cases particIpate in the
trade themselves but left the deal to a bigger landowner; the landowner of
the land they rented. As explained before, most small owner-cultivators in
Candelaria work as tenants or katiwalas beside tilling their own land.
The small owner-cultivator that got the best price also had a jeepney and
was also the only one who was able to earn a substantial income from a
secondary crop, e.g; other crops grown on coconut land, like bananas,
coffee, fruits and vegetables. All in all, he earned 3,500 pesos per month
on his secondary crop, which was sold by the katiwala working for the
landowner of the land he tilled in addition to his own. He thus eared more
than necessary for having a living standard above the poverty line. These
observations indicate that the best prices are given when the trade is
handled by bigger landowners or their katiwalas, which explains a
dependency relationship even between small owner-cultivators and the
18 Based on market price of 250 pesos per tree.
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bigger landowners, regardless of whether this is actually acknowledged or
not by the respondents.
4.3.4 The katiwalas
In Candelaria, several of the local politicians also work as katiwalas for
large farms. A katiwala works on behalf of an absence landowner or
landlord. At the same time he has an outstanding position in the trade of
coconuts since he alone chooses which trader to deal with. He has the
possibility of cheating, by documenting a smaller price than the actual. This
offers him an additional profit, in addition to the normal 10 per cent of the
gross price. Usually, a katiwala serves as the first buyer, immediately
reselling the coconuts to a second buyer with a net profit.
In chapter three, a brief history of the Philippines was presented. The
history showed that in the colonial period of Spain the encomienda system
and later the hacienda system were infroduced. The Spaniards owned the
land and gave former chiefs and cabezas the title of principales. These
principales were willing allies and useful intermediates between the people
and themselves. It seems as if the katiwalas are as useful for the
landowners as the principales were in historical times.
The price the tenants are given by the katiwala varies from 600 to 1,750
pesos per 1,000 nuts. When the tenant himself sells the product, the price
varies from 700 to 1,450 pesos per 1,000 nuts. In those cases when the
landowner purchased the nuts, the price varied from 600 to 1,300 pesos per
1,000 nuts. These data are not condusive as to whether it is profitable to
sell to a small or big trader or whether it is best for the tenant to let the
katiwala or the landowner handle the sale. Even if big traders were to
prefer small owners, this does not necessarily benefit the tenants. The
reason for the observed variation is probably found in the variety of
relationships between trader, katiwala, landowner and tenant. It can be
conduded that there are extra-economic relationships between different
actors that are decisive for explaining the price variability. These extra-
economic relationships are also found in the suki-system. Cornista described
it in her study (1983) of two neighbouring municipalities of Candelaria.
The suki system is as an arangement which permeates commercial trans-
actions in an imperfect market. Risk is reduced through an extension of
credit from the buyer to potential sellers of coconuts. This creates a
personal bond between buyer and seller. The entire arangement is based
on mutual trust. The agreements are made necessary by the insecurity in the
coconut market.
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4.3.5 The landlords and landowners
The landlord/landowner gets the greater part of the value of the nuts
without participating in the production of coconuts or the trade, with an
average share of 63 per cent (see Table 4.2). His power lays in the very
fact that he owns the land. This ownership is far more important in a feudal
production system than under a capitalist production system. A feudal lord
uses his ownership to maintain his power, by the extraction of an absolute
surplus value from his land. The profit is used for the maintenance of this
power or even increasing it. On the other hand, a capitalist who also gains
power from his control of the surplus value is forced by market
mechanisms to increase the productivity of the means of production. He
thus collects a relative surplus value. The profit in a capitalist system is
bound to be reinvested in a higher degree than in a feudal system.
Reinvestment is necessary for competition in the open market. This
capitalist market mechanism is not to be found in the coconut sector in
Candelaria today. The productivity is low and the only one who could
invest for a higher productivity, the landlord, does not. Since the tenant
only receives about 16 per cent in net terms of the value of his coconut
harvest, there are minimal incentives for the tenant to invest more labour
to increase the coconut "productivity. The absentee landlord does not have
the knowledge of what has to be done, nor the interest in pursuing it, and
is busy with other income-generating businesses in other sectors.
Both the katiwalas, tenants and the farm workers fear today the effects
of the Aquino-government s land reform act. The land reform law, called
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP), which has yet to be
implemented in Candelaria in spite of the official start in 1987, could cause
the landowners to cut down the trees in order to avoid their land being
dassified as coconut land, and thereby avoid the land to be part of the
reform plan. This will give the landowner an immediate gross output of
approximately 50,000 pesos per hectare19 plus the price for the actual land
if he chooses to sell it. This will make the katiwalas, tenants and farm
workers lose their positions.
4.3.6 Households and domestie division of labour
It is difficult to compare domestic work on equal terms with wage-work.
Women's work in homes tends to be undervalued, argues FeITer (1989),
19 Based on market price for coconut lumber in Quezon Province 1991.
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simply because household work in one' s own house is not regarded as a
commodity. He continues;
The entire question about the valuation of housework and other work
performed by women in the house, to our mind, is misguided, not so
much for the apparent futilty of providing an exact answer, but more so
for the implicit assumption that housework can (or is it should?) be
treated like a commodity. The more important question to raise, perhaps
is why housework is primarily done by women rather than by men, or by
both of them (Ferrer 1989, pp. 6-7).
This leads us back to the question of what is happening in the wage-labour
sector: In the coconut production, women particIpate to a certain degree in
the harvesting of coconuts, but the wages they receive are far less than
what men get for their work. Because of this difference in wages, women
concentrate on the necessity of reproductive work. Men concentrate on
work that provideswages, "simply because they possess agender with a
higher value in the labour market.
Coconut producing men also participate in the reproductive work,
although on a limited scale. Without exceptions, household-work is the
responsibility of women. Ifgender anddomestic work are compared to the
general division of labour, some interesting observations can be made
(Table 4.3). Analyzing the average time spent on household work, it is
found that ten ant women work 8,5 hours a day, while the farm worker
women works 10 hours a day on average. The men spend approximately
two hours a day on household w ork, regardless of whether they are farm
workers or tenants. While the children of the tenants normally gave 30
minutes every day of their time to household work, the farm workers'
children spent on average 10 minutes a day (one hour a week). The small
owner-cultivators (SOCs) reported that the women normally spent 9 hours
daily working in the household, while the men participated two hours daily.
Table 4.3
Time spent on household work daily stratified by sex and occupationGroup Women Men Children Total
Farm-workers 10 hours 2 hours 10 minutes 12.17 hours
Tenants 8.5 hours 2.25 hours 30 minutes 11.25 hours
SOCs 9 hours 2 hours 15 minutes 11.25 hours
Factory-workers 7.4 hours 2.2 hours O 9.6 hours
Source: Fieldwork, Candelaria, 1991.
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The questionnaire also recorded the respondent s and the family' suse of
their free time. Not surprisingly, household work was considered as a
leisure activity. Consequently, the actual time for housework had to be
adjusted. The tenants quite often considered their household work as a
leisure activity while only few farm workers defined sweeping, deaning
and repairing in such a way. The men first of all participate in household
activities like fetching water and gathering fue!. The children participate
first of all in child care for their brothers and sis ters and in sweeping and
dusting the interior of the house and the house lot.
Some qualifications should be made here. Only the respondent s
perception of the time spent on domestic work was recorded. No actual
measurements of time use were undertaken. Personal observations during
a two year period in the Philippines, support the condusion that women
belonging to households of the broad masses, work from early morning to
late evening. They have many responsibilities and wash dothes, care for the
babies, prep are food, teach their daughters about life and exchange local
news with the womenneighbours, all at the same time.
The men have a decisive hegemonic power as the external representative
of the family while the women are the centre of the households. Of those
households engaged in the coconut trade, the man almost always dealt with
the coconut trader. Dealing with sources for credit and loans was in contrast
quite equally divided between the two genders. Religion in the Philippines,
which for the vast majority is Roman Catholicism, presents the ideal of
both men and women roles. The men are supposed to be associated with
Jesus, being active, external and deciding which new paths to take, while
the women are associated with Virgin Maria: loving, caring and more
concerned with the welfare of other people than themselves. The
anthropologist Niels Mulder made the following observation in the
Philippines:
(...) households tend to be matrifocal, revolving around the mother more
than the father, with the former and in the long run her relatives,
providing the primary source of stability and continuity for the children.
The house is c1early her domain, the world outside of it being male
territory. Matrifocality is further fostered by the cult of the mother, the
children being indoctrinated with the ideal of the moral exemplariness of
the mother. She is so, not just because of giving life and nurture, but also
because of her self-sacrifice and unconditional love (Mulder 1992, p. 70).
However, enjoying the domain of the household and controlling the income
may make the woman a central, but not an empowered person in the
household. Studies of Montiel and Hollnsteiner (1976) condude that the
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purse-holder in poor families does not enjoy any power at all since the use
of the money is predetermined by poverty. This is the case for most women
in the coconut producing sector in Candelaria. Even if the woman controls
the purse and decides what to buy, given what must be bought, it should
not be considered as a position of power. Since all the requirements are
impossible to meet, the position means making painful choices and
priorities every day.
Indeed, peasant women in the coconut sector do have responsibility and
to a certain degree power in their own household. This control is not used
externally and not when the man decides to oppose the decision taken. This
provides a role for women, training her in making choices and taking up
the responsibility of important tasks in the household. It nothing else, this
provides a good basis for a necessary struggle for women's liberation. The
Candelarian women are strong and decisive. They do not have any power
or freedom to choose what to buy or what to do. The money (or the lack
of it) makes these choices impossible. On top of this, a patriarchy which
ensures that the man can make the final decision if he desires to do so,
keeps the Candelarian women in oppression, both economically as well as
gender specifically.
4.4 The coconut industry
Chapter three described the coconut monopoly set up while Marcos was
President. This indicated a strong ownership interest among the leading
elite in the coconut sector. The owner-structure of the coconut industry has
been subject to investigation for a long time (e.g. David 1977, Tiglao
1983), but not after the time of Marcos. Normally, factory owners operate
with middlemen to avoid governmental control and taxation. However, the
main ownership structure found in Candelaria today, is still dominated by
a coconut monopoly, which "officially" was eliminated when Aquino was
President (1986-1992).
There are four operating oil mills and three factories for desiccating
coconuts in Candelaria. The largest oil mill is operated by the same
company which operates one of the largest desiccation factories. The
manager and director are American citizens. In addition to this company,
the second large st company is a desiccation factory without an oil mill but
with a substantial cutting capacity. These two companies have a good
relationship with each other. The smallest factory of the two is owned by
JAKA investments, a part of the economic empire of former Minister of
Defense, Mr. Juan Ponche Enrile (discussed in Chapter three). These long
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established factories found themselves threatened to a certain degree by two
new factories introduced in the area in 1991.
The two new factories are owned by a family with Chinese ancestors.
The Chinese Filipinos have a reputation of being very "profit-oriented
businessmen" (quotation from one of the municipal officIals). They
received, according to the management in other factories, the machinery
very cheap from the government. The machinery had been confiscated from
Mr. Cojuangco, the cousin of the ex-president Marcos and an affiliate of
Mr. Enrile. The Chinese did not talk to the researchers or to others who do
not belong to their family-dan about their production. According to the
management in the other factories, the Chinese are stock-piling coconuts
and copraby overpaying the coconuts they buy (in order to speculate in the
prices later), hire only labourers belonging to a minority religious seceo
said to have strong anti-trade union traditions. It is also said they speculate
in the anti-monopoly policy set up by President Aquino. According to
official policy this is a strategy to cn.sh the power and monopolies of the
Marcos dan and affiliates. The owners of the two biggest factories does not
like this policy. One manager stated:
Two Chinese factories have been established in Candelaria after 1986. The
Philippine Coconut Authority has not done anything to stop them. This is
betrayal. 21
This claimed betrayal towards established factory owners was not as serious
as first believed. During the field work, it was known that the authorities,
dominated by local politicians and the PCA, resisted giving the Chinese
factories the required governmental permits for production. It was also
obvious that the new factories did not benefit from the loyalty of local
governmental employees, as the more established factories did. The coconut
monopoly thus seems to have won the first round in what supposedly
should be an anti-monopoly strategy of the authorities. In other words, there
seem to be very strong unofficial power mechanisms within the official
bodies which work against competition in the coconut industry. The en-
trance of new owners is constrained by these unofficial power mechanisms.
The management of the more established factories saw several obstades
to future production, briefly referred to as the government policy, and the
inefficiency of landowners, tenants and farm workers. Among the obstades
mentioned was the land reform programme of the government, since it
20 I l' . Kr
g esia ni sto.
21 Interview, lune 1991, Candelaria.
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made landowners cut the trees instead of producing sufficient raw materials.
The solution for the coconut industry should, according to the manager of
a large factory in Candelaria, be to continue the vertical integration policy
of Marcos (see Chapter three). He suggested:
The best way of doing coconut business is like they have done in the
south, at Twin River Company. They have created the company into a
stockholding company, and have a vertical inter-linkage with all parts of
production. They own the factory, the plantation, the stores, the bank, the
fertilizer company, the airplanes needed. Everything. The Luisita
stockholding company of Aquino is another example. We should do the
same, and link up with the Sorriano-farnly.22
Twin River Company is based in Southern Mindanao, in the south of the
Philippines. The production of coconuts is controlled by the company, who
owns a huge coconut plantation. The coconut producers in Mindanao,
however, are as poor as they are in Cande1aria, although the investments for
increased productivity are definitely higher in Mindanao.
The technology used in the manufacture of coconuts is the same now as
"ever before": no major change has taken place since the beginning of the
century, although the quality of the machinery has be en improved both in
the coconut mills as well as in the factories for desiccation.
In the coconut oil factories, the workers are men. They pour the copra
into the machines that extract the oiL. In Candelaria they use the traditional
method of mechanical extraction of coconut oiL. This technology uses
copra, wherein aflatoxin can develop. In the processing of copra, 6 per cent
vaporizes in to the air, 61 per cent turns to oil and 33 per cent becomes
copra meal, which can be used as feed for animals. The price for copra
meal fluctuates between 1.80 and 3.60 pesos per kilo. The average is about
2.50 pesos per kilo (fieldwork, interview June 1991). The actual procedure
of coconut extraction is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Half of the value of the
machinery (the gear-box) is imported from the US. The rest of the equip-
ment is Philippine made (Fieldwork, Candelaria August 1991). There is a
wet method to extract the oil in the oil mills. The wet method uses fresh
coconuts and the problem of aflatoxin can thus be avoided. This method
extracts 2-3 per cent more oil from the coconut than the coconut oil mills
in Candelaria do. No one is investing in this method in Candelaria. It would
have been an investment that would benefit both productivity and quality
22 Interview. The Sorriano-family is known for being one of the biggest dynasties in the
country .
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but from a lack of real competition these investments do not seem to be
planned.
The work done by the blue-collar workers in desiccating factories is
basically paring and shelling. Men do the shelling and women do the
paring. The men cut the nuts and separate the meat from the shell. Their
tool is a knife that is specially made for this purpose. The workers daim
that the knives are their property and they thus partly own the means of
production. In terms of capital investments, the cost of this knife is of
course minimal but it creates a direct link between the worker and the
production.
The women peal every nut, removing the brown fibre-containing outer
part of the nuts. Clean and white, the nuts are brought to the desiccators,
where the machines take over. The women also own their basic tool, the
sheller, which looks like a huge, old-fashioned potato-peeler. They also
own the box or stool they sit on during work.
Those operating the machiiies come from the educated middle dass and
normally have education inchemistry at college leve!. The entire procedure
of making desiccated coconuts is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
All by-products produced in coconut factories are used, but not openly.
For instance, sources at a medium-sized factory explained how coconut
water is used today. Before it was wasted. Today the coconut water at this
factory is sold "under the table" to another company belonging to a
conglomerate partly controlled by Mr. Cojuangco. In turn, this company
sells it at the domestic market as pure coconut juice.23 This transaction
increased the monthly factory-income by an estimated average of 60,000
pesos. Furthermore, the waste of desiccated coconuts and products of
inferior quality, are sold for a low price to local bakeries. The peal of the
coconuts, being 6 per cent of the coconut weight, is sold as animal feed for
roughly 20,000 pesos monthly. The coconut meat which cannot be used for
various reasons is also sold to local buyers or the coconut oil mills. For
this, the factory received about 45,000 pesos monthly. All in all, these
additional income sources gave an estimated average of 150,000 pesos
monthly, the equivalent of 150,000 nuts. Crushing capacity per day is said
to be 200 tons or 330,000 nuts. According to one factory manager in
Candelaria, the income reported to the government by the different factories
was as a thumb-rule half of the actual income made from the various
coconut products. This was also confirmed by anonymous sources at the
governmental register for economic activity in the country.
23 Called buko juice only if the juice is taken from a young, green nut, and not the brown
and old nut used for desiccation.
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4.4.1 The social formation on the factories
Factory workers are typically young24 and generally over-qualified in
terms of formal education.25 They work under very tight control by the
foreman. Factory workers are of ten those' who tried to get out of the
agricultural sector by having more education, but who failed to enter the
career ladder .
The unemployment rate is high in Candelaria, as in the rest of the nation.
At the factory, a distinction can be made between workers and employees.
The employees are considered middle dass and have an education of
minimum college leve!. They receive a monthly salary between 2,800 and
3,300 pesos. The workers are poor and are tightly connected to the basic
rural masses. Due to lack of raw materials, the workers seldom work every
day, normally only 3-4 days a week. Their wage is thus far below
minimum wage, even if they receive the stated minimum wage of 110
pesos per day, which is dose to our calculated i 17 pesos per day as a
minimum. 
26
The requirements for being able to get a job at the factory are not
dependent on particular skills. A job in the factory can be obtained through
relations with the foremen or other key persons whom the foremen relate
to. The foreman at each shift is the one responsible for the production at
the factory. He hires the workers as well as reporting on the worker' s
productivity to the management. The wage system is pakiaw-based,
meaning that workers are paid per 1,000 nuts, as in coconut production.
Getting the foreman to report a full quota every day is important in order
to receive the minimum wage. The foreman also gives instructions to the
workers on behalf of the management. The entire network of sub-
arrangements goes therefore through the foreman. The role of the foreman
is similar to the role of the katiwala in coconut production, playing a
decisive and powerful role which the workers can not disregard.
The method used for recruItment in one of the factories is particularly
interesting, Here the actual decision about who should work at the factory,
is taken neither by the management nor the foreman. When a man or a
24 Child labour was also observed at the factory ground. The respondents were all adults.
25 Normally high-school education.
26 There is also a deduction from the wage for insurance premium, medical service,
paternity- and maternity-Ieave, and social security service of 137,40 pesos monthly. if
there is a union, a 12 pesos monthly membership fee is deducted as weli.
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woman for one reason or another wants to stop working,27 the position
hel d will be inherited by one in the family or sold. The price paid for the
job is based on the position of the worker. The important considerations
here are how lon g the worker has been employed there, what his or her
reputation is among the foremen and management, and most importantly,
what his relationship was to the foreman. The price is normally paid in
cash. Two reported cases show that the amounts paid are substantial (Table
4.4).
Table 4.4
Amounts paid for jobs in coconut factories
1973
'1988
Amount
paid for
job
(pesos)
6,000
29,000
Current
pnce
1991
(pesos)
55,560
39,275
Full wage
one year
(10
months)
26,626
26,626
% of one
year full
wage
Respondent Year
paid for
job
Respondent no 2
Respondent no 3
209
147.5
Source: Fieldwork, Candelaria, 1991.
The highest price for a job was according to the management paid in
1988, when it reached up to 42,000 pesos, which would be equal to 56,880
pesos in 1991. There is a conspiracy between the foremen and the workers,
according to the management of one factory. The manager explained:
A shell er or a parer cannot be fired due to under-productivity before three
months. In this period, the worker, who has bought her/his position, gets
help from the foreman, who over-reports the production. The wage of the
worker is thus divided. One part goes to the foreman, one part to the
worker, and if the worker has to hire ilegal help from the outside to
manage the production of 335 kilos per day, then one part goes to the
ilegal worker as well. Because of this, the control of production is no
longer in our hands, but rather in the hands of the foreman.28
These findings regarding the under reporting of production as well as the
rich system of extra-economic laws in the industry suggest that the coconut
business needs much deeper exposure and analysis in order to fin d the
major bottlenecks in the development of the industry.
27 One respondent explained that she bought the job from one who needed cash (l).
28 From the interview with the management of Peter Paul PhiL. Corp.
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4.5 Survival mechanisms
Table 4.5 shows the several tasks in income-generating work performed by
the respondents. The first column shows the respondent groups. The
subsequent columns show the percentage of the respondents ' total income
coming from tenancy, farm work, katiwala activities, remittances, cash
cropping, non-agricultural work and work in coconut factories.
The second column shows the percentage of total income coming from
tenancy arrangements. As can be understood, the farm- and factory-workers
do not get any of their income from ten ant farming, simply because they
are not tenants. It is striking that less than 10 per cent of the income for
tenants comes from their tenurial arangement with the landowner in
coconut production.
The third column shows the percentage of total income derived from
farm work. Only small owners do not derive any income from this kind of
activity. 20 per cent of the income of the small owners come from their
position as a katiwala (column Jour). Column five reveals a particular
feature which will also be commented on later. Almost 50 per cent of the
income of the interviewed tenants were given to them by their sons and
daughters working in urban centres like Manila and Lucena or abroad. The
small owner-cultivators received almost 30 per cent of their income from
children or relatives living in the cIty or abroad.
The income share from cash crops other than coconuts is in column six,
showing again a higher degree of plurality among the tenants and small
owner-cultivators than among the wage-workers. Column seven shows the
percentage of total income coming from non-agricultural occupations, such
as services, small-scale trade etc. The last column shows the share of
income deri ved from factory work, which in this case means coconut
factory work.
Less than 80 per cent of the income of the factory workers actually
comes from their full time job in the factory. Coconut production is far
from being the main economic activity for the producers. The data show
that no respondent group has more different kinds of jobs than the tenants.
People choose to be tenants not from the earnings of coconut production,
but rather as a stable basis providing them with better opportunities for
other income generating work.
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Respondent
group
Table 4.5
Percentage of total income from various sources for
different respondent groups
Percentage of total income from:
Tenancy/ Farm- Katiwala Remit- Cash
own land work tances crops
Non-
farm
work
Factory
work
Tenants 9.6 0.2 3.0 46.4 20.0 20.8
Farm- 0.0 48.4 0.0 11.2 0.0 37.9
workers
Small owners 16.0 0.0 20.0 29.6 24.6 9.8
Factory 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 2.7 17.0
workers
Source: Fieldwork, Candelaria, 1991.
0.0
2.4
0.0
79.6
About 90 per cent of the land is normally grown with coconuts and
bananas, while 10 per cent of the land is cultivated with other crops, like
rice, fruit, coffee, etc. These secondary crops were planted in order to
increase the income of the tenants income by an average of 20 per cent.
They also increased the productivity of the land. All respondents, except for
one, also had livestock. The livestock consisted mainly of chickens and pigs
with a limited number of cows, horses and carabaos in the more well-off
households. No labour power was hired for work related to secondary crops
or livestock.
It is said in the area that times have changed regarding the control of the
tenants' secondary production activities. The landowner today will normally
approve requests for growing other crops in between the coconut trees, in
contrast to before. Livestock can also be kept by the tenant without the
formal permission of the landowner, also in contrast to before.29 There are
many tenants who still ask for the landowner' s approval before growing
secondary crops or having livestock on his land. Many of the tenants have
a sharing system even for their secondary crops. For secondary crops the
tenant receives a larger proportion compared to the coconut sharing system.
Among those who sold their secondary crops, which was normal for at
least a portion of the bananas, the produce was often sold by using a so-
29 The landlord or owner had more contra L earlier, when he denied the tenants to have
swine, because of the possibility that the swine were fed with coconuts.
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called tawad30 -system, a particular form of ordinary haggling. When the
price is agreed upon, only half the price is actually paid by the buyer. The
buyer resells the produce at the local market, but the producer of the crops
does not receive the rest of the negotiated price. By getting only half a
price (which should be regarded as the market value of the crops), the
producer of the crops can feel certain he has a costumer to purchase the
production with a minimum effort. The buyer on the other hand, can earn
a profit. In other words, the haggling is referring to a possible market price,
and should be considered as a wholesale price. This system, which
guarantees the loyalty of both the buyer and the seller, is very similar to the
suki-system that was found in the neighbouring municipality in 1983
(Cornista 1983) and the tentativ e suggestions regarding the sales of
coconuts. Those who did not use the tawad-system sold their products
themselves on the local market or along the highway.
There seemed to be a correspondence between the numbers of hectares
the small owner- cultivators and the tenants tilled and the number of crops
they cultivated. Those with most land tended to cultivate three cash crops
beside coconuts, normally coffee, some fruits and bananas, while those
tilling less hectares of land had smaller varieties of secondary crops.
Everybody had b ananas as their secondary crop and only one of the tenant-
respondents stated they used all the bananas for consumption in the family.
The others sold part of the banana harvest on the local market or to traders.
The value of the livestock was considerable, with an average worth of
17,325 pesos. Livestock breeding was not primarily for income generation
but for household consumption.
Table 4.6
Average value of livestock held by different respondent groups
Respondent group Average value of livestock (pesos)
Farm workers 10,757Tenants 15,506
Small owners 17,325
Factory-workers 2,400
Average (weighted) 12,485
Source: Fieldwork, Candelaria, 1991.
30 T d d' b' .
.1 awa means iscount, argaining.
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Some very few respondents also bred livestock for commercial purposes.
Table 4.6 shows the average value of livestock owned by farm workers,
tenants and small owner-cultivators. Induded in livestock are animals used
for working purposes, like carabaos and horses.
Regarding access to credit, more than half of the farm workers, tenants
and small owner- cultivators used friends and family members as sources
for loans. The absolute majority of the loans were us ed for reproductive
purposes, like food, rep air of house and very of ten, school fees for the
children. The other sources were katiwalas and landowners. When asking
respondents about repayment agreements, the interest was said to be zero
and the payment appeared to be "whenever possible". This is economically
in the interest of the borrower, while at the same time it contributes to the
necessary loyalty and stability in the socIal formation. In spite of further
probing, there were no indications that the paybacks were different from
what was stated at least when the arangement was between friends or
family members. Another informal credit system is the five-six system. If
the one borrowing money has a lower socIal and economic status than the
credit-provider, the five-six system is common. This system implies a 20
per cent monthly interest rate, when cash is borrowed. For every five peso
bill borrowed, six pesos are paid back the next month. If grain and food is
borrowed, the five-six system demands 20 per cent interest rate over a
slightly longer period. For every five cavans3l of rice borrowed, six will
be repaid during the next harvest. Five-six was the type of credit the
landlords gave their tenants in the old times. It is probably still practised
in Candelaria to a certain degree.
4.5.1 Participation of the state
The participation of the state in coconut production was discussed in
Chapter three. It was argued that the major intervention of the state was in
developing regulations made for the benefit of the coconut-monopolies. The
state is in other words practically privatized and is used for the benefit of
those families in power positions. The coconut-levies also affected the
respondents, although not in the way it was officially intended. Two of the
farm workers, thirteen of the tenants and two of the small owners had been
paying membership fees to COCOFED, but had never received any
benefits, except for one respondent, who could display a T -shirt with the
31 One cavan is traditionally 42-44 kgs of rice in a sack. Officially, ane cavan is 50 kgs.
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logo of COCOFED. Questioned as to why they paid for this membership,
the answer was that it was a governmental "tax" they had to pay.
Important is also the land reform law in Republic Act 6657, or The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP) (Republic of the
Philippines 1988), which was signed on June 10, 1988.
There were two major forces involved in the struggle for a just and
needed land reform, but they strongly opposed each other. The peasant
organizations and numerous NGOs came together in Congress for a
People's Agrarian Reform (CPAR). The CPAR asked for an
implementation within five years and that the retention limit should be no
more than two hectares of land already personally cultivated. The value of
the land should be calculated by a formula based on value dedarations
made by the landowners, the landowners estimate on fair market price and
an estimation of past rents and unpaid work performed by cultivations.
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) suggested particularly that
compensation should be paid ,by the government and not by the
beneficiaries of the land reform.32
The landowners answered the CP AR soon after, and suggested that the
retention limit would be 20 hectares, as well as all land producing major
export crops. They also suggested that no private land should be covered
by the land reform before all public land was distributed. They also
preferred cash as compensation for the land distributed, based on their own
suggested market value - they promised to invest the money in "industry
and commerce" (Putzel 1992).
The CARP which finally was signed by the President, has been criticised
to benefit the land owners more than the agricultural producers. "Reform"
has been redefined to indude both "redistribution of lands" as well as
"production of profit sharing, labour administration, and the distribution of
stock" (Putzel 1992, p. 272). The CARP also secure the landowners to
dictate what they consider as fair market value. In contrast to the House
Bill 400, which stated that the land owners compensation should be based
on estimates both from the land owner as well as the producers, the CARP
limits the decIsion to the landowner only. The retention limit was set to be
between 11 and 14 hectares, depending on family size of the landowner.
32 Interview with KMP, Tokyo 1992.
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Figure 4.4
Timetable for implementation of CARP
Phase 2 Years 1-4
(1988-1992)
Lands Covered
- Rice and corn lands under PD27 (land
reform during Marcos).
- Idle and abandoned lands.
- Lands forec1osed by government
financial institutions.
-Lands acquired by the PCGG.
-Private lands voluntarily offered.
-Public agriculturallands.
-Private lands in holdings greater than
50 hectares.
-Private lands in holdings 24-50
hectares.
- Private lands in holdings less than 24
hectares.
Programme years
Phase 1 Years 1-4
(1988-1992)
Phase 3 Years 4-7
(1992-1995)
Years 6-10 (1994-1999)
Source Putzel, 1992.
Tenants on land retained by the owners, were given only one year to
dedare if they voluntarily wanted to continue as tenants, or to be assigned
elsewhere. Given the choIce of stay where the tenant knew the situation, or
to be sent "elsewhere" without any knowledge about the new place, the
quality of the land etc, most tenants would certainly hesitate before leaving
their owners land.
The timetable for the land reform were set to be 10 years. See Figure 4.4.
The first four years, rice and corn land that former President Marcos was
supposed to redistribute, idle land, land foredosed by financial institutions,
by the Presidential Commission of Good Government and voluntarily
offered land should be covered by the land reform. The next six years
(from 1993-1999), public land as well as private land more than the
retention limits will be covered by the land reform bill. However, there are
no signs that the timetable will be followed. The implementation of the act
was officially supposed to start in 1988. CARP has still not affected the
respondents of this research. It the land reform is implemented, a terrible
threat for the peasants is that the landlords might decide to cut down the
coconut trees and withdraw the land from the reform (real estate is
exempted from the law). The CARP is commented on by Lara and Morales
(n.d.), explaining the content and effect of the law:
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Under the law, retention limits are pegged at a floating leve! of 5 to 11
hectares, and corporate land are protected from redistribution, thus
exempting almost 75 per cent of total agriculturallands. Adding salt to
the wound, the law penalizes the thousands of peasants who occupy idle,
sequestered or forec1osed lands. Although President Aquino, during her
1986 campaign wooed peasants and farmers with a promise of land
reform, indicating that her family' s vast Hacienda Luisita would be the
first to comply, in fact the promise proved false. Hacienda Luisita' s stock
distribution program, which falls far short of actually redistributing land
or power, has been deemed as complying with the 1988 law. (...) Finally,
the 1988 law opens the way for widespread speculation, since landlords
are to be compensated at what they deem "market value ". Recently, for
example, land in Bicol which had been bought six months earlier at 3
milion pesos, was sold to the government for no less than 62 milion
pesos (Lara and Morales n.d, p. 12) (italic added).
The price for the land, set by the landlord, is supposed to be paid to the
government by the beneficiary within 30 years. The payment would not
exceed 5 per cent of gross output, during the first five years and 10 per
cent of gross output during the next years. Due production costs
(particularly for rice), this can be difficult for the beneficiaries to manage.
It three payments are not made by the beneficiary during the thirty year
period, the government will foredose the land, and the beneficiary will
loose everything. This again, will be an argument for the tenant to
voluntarily remain a tenant for the land owner.
In other words, the land reform of 1988 does not seem to work as
President Aquino seemed to intend. Rather, it forces the tenants to be even
more subordinated to the landowners and allies, so that the coconut trees
are not cut down. The landowner for his part, has been given a very good
reason to control the tenants even more, and if he wants to, to deduct
greater shares from the harvest.
The driving force of production in the coconut sector in Candelaria today
is the interest of the big landholders in appropriation of absolute surplus
value. There is no indication of change towards a more dynamic relative
surplus. The capitalist mode of production exists in the sense of profit from
wage labour but it co-exists with another mode of production - the pre-
capitalist feudal mode. The two modes do not exist independently of each
other but have a dose inter-relationship. This is what de Janvry calls the
disarticulated capitalist mode of production, and what FeITer calls the semi-
feudal mode of production. De J anvry explains:
Functional dualism is the contradictory mechanism whereby the
disarticulated economy satisfies its need for cheap labour by taking
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advantage of the large masses of semi-proletarianized peasants created by
the dissolution of pre-capitalist relations (de Janvry 1981, p. 261).
4.5.2 Impoverishment and visions
The vast majority of the respondents live below the official poverty line,
in spite of the fact that the official poverty line does not consider real price-
increases on basic commodities. The official poverty line today can be
calculated by computing reported inflation rates with the official poverty
line in 1988. The poverty line for Southern Tagalog was in June 1991
approximately 42,792 pesos per year for an average family with six house-
hold members, or around 117 pesos (USD4.7) per day. There are problems
involved in this calculation, since it does not allow for real price increases.
Local sources insist real prices have risen much faster than reported
inflation rates during the last decade.33 The wages has to be earned every
day of the year, whichis seldom possible in reallife. The income needed
to satisfy basic needs is thus probably considerably higher than estimated.
Regardless of that, the absolute majority of the respondents end up living
below the calculated poverty line. Even if the factory workers, who are
induded in Table 4.7 earn more money than all the respondents from the
agricultural sector, their living standard might be lower, because they raise
less food at home for their own consumption.
The income reported by the respondents and presented in Table 4.7,
second column, does not correspond to the reported expenses, presented in
the third column. This is quite normal for surveys. The National Statistical
Yearbook for the Philippines presents annual incomes and expenses for
households in Southern Tagalog (where Candelaria is situated). These
statistics show that while the average annual expenses in Region 4 was
26A59 pesos per household in 1985, the annual income was 19,392 pesos,
i.e. only 73 per cent of the expenses (Republic of the Philippines 1990).
The value of assets, like house, furniture, tools and other house
equipment, shown in Table 4.7, last column, was estimated at its
contemporary market value. While for the farm workers normally the value
of assets was less than reported annual income, the tenants value was
higher than one year of reported income. This gives us a signal of the
different social strata the two groups belong to. While the tenants were
poor, the farm workers were very poor. For small owner-cultivators, the
33 This was the opinion of practically all sources, official and unofficiaL.
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value of their assets was far higher than for the other respondents. This
indicates their middle dass position as suggested by Guerrero (1979).
Table 4.7
Expenses and income of respondent groups and average for Region 4
Respondent Income Expenses Difference Assetsgroup (pesos) (pesos) (pesos) (pesos)
Farm workers 20,304 26,811 6,507 12,095
Tenants 29,873 40.572 10,699 42,092
Small owners 30,435 33,652 3,217 105,678
Factory 36,440 44,850 8,410 44,198
workers
Average 27,038, 35,234 7,208
(weighted)
Mean, Region 24,424 33,338 8,914
4, 1988
(1991 prices)
36,646
n.a.
Source: Fieldwork, Candelaria, 1991 and Republic of the Philippines 1990.
Table 4.8 shows how the income is used among tenants and farm
workers. Farm workers use most of their money on food, and the smallest
amount on education. The tenants also spend most of their money on food,
but education and household equipment have a higher percentage of
spending, while the least is used for leisure. Table 4.8 indicates that
planning for the future is more important in the tenant family, while acute
survival seems more important for the farm workers' family.
Table 4.8
Expenditure patterns for tenants and farm workers
Respondent group Food Education Leisure Household
Farm workers
Tenants
66 %
59 %
8 %
14 %
12 %
9 %
12 %
18 %
Source: Fieldwork, Candelaria, 1991.
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In 1988, the national average expenditure for each household was
estimated at 50,7 per cent for food, 38,3 per cent for household items, 2,9
per cent for educational purposes, 7 per cent for leisure and 1,1 per cent for
taxes. Even if this was an average induding rich families, it is possible that
the higher share of income spent on food in the sample indicates a
decreased living standard during the last years. The higher educational
expenses in the sample should be understood as an actual increase of
educational expenses since 1988.
The quality of the houses of the respondents were categorized in five
groups (Table 4.9). The quality of the dwelling increases from the left to
the right with the term "fully concrete" representing the best quality
dwellings. The absolute majority of the respondents lived in old houses.
The number of respondents living in new good quality nipa huts, was very
low. This suggests as in Figure 4.10 that those who stand on the bottom
rung of the ladder are the farm workers. While the majority of the farm
worker respondents live in nipa-huts of poor quality, the majority of the
tenants occupiedmore advanced dwellings (poor quality semi-concrete
houses, where at least part of the house has concrete walls and thus is safer
in times of rough weather).
To illustrate the differentiation within the group of coconut producers
further, ownership of or access to so-called luxury goods, like installed
electricity, refrigerators, televisions, radios and vehides can be compared.
Two of the tenants acknowledged possessing vehides and used their
jeepneys in their secondary work as katiwalas and farm level traders.
Table 4.9
Type of dwelling for different respondent groups in Candelaria
Re- Nipa Nipa Semi- Semi- Fully
spondent poor good concrete concrete concretegroup quality quality poor good
Farm 9 1 7 O O
workers
Tenants 6 1 11 1 1
Small O O 2 1 1
owners
F actory O 1 3 1 O
workers
Source: Fieldwork, Candelaria, 1991.
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Table 4.10 presents patterns in ownership of these consumer goods for
the different respondent groups. All the barangays covered by the research
had installed electricity. It costs from 2,000 up to 10,000 pesos to install
private electricity, depending on the distance from the main line. It the
respondents had assets requiring electricity, without receiving electricity
from the grid, they were using batteries.
Although the number of respondents is small, it is possible to imagine
the poverty of the farm workers. Only 35 per cent, or 6 of the farm workers
had electricity installed in their dwellings, while an average of 75 per cent
of the other respondents had electric al power. In general, the farm worker
scored lower on all assets. Several did not even have a radio. It should be
noted that in the Philippines it is perfectly acceptable to listen to the radio
or watch television at the neighbour' s place.
Table 4.10
Ownership of consumer goods for different respondent groups
Respondent Total Electricity Refrigerator Tele- Ve- Radiogroup vision hideFarm 17 6 1 8 O 11
workers
Tenants 20 15 5 16 2 19Small 4 3 3 3 1 4
owners
F actory
workers
5 3 2 3 o 3
Source: Fieldwork, Candelaria, 1991
Most of the respondents, and particularly the farm workers, thought that
they economically speaking were worse off now than during the presidency
of Marcos. The findings suggest the same condusion. A smaller group said
that there were no changes at all. Those who said that they were better off
now, explained that they received large remittances from their grown-up
children working in the city. Most of these were tenants. The explanation
for the decreasing living standard was first of all the rise in commodity
prices and the fall of coconut prices. This tendency is supported by official
data (United Coconut Association in the Philippines 1991, Republic of the
Philippines 1990).
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The differentiation of distinct socIal groups participating in coconut
production indicates a consistent pattern, confirmed by our Figure 4.12. It
shows that the farm workers are placed on the bottom line, with the tenants
in a somewhat better position above them. The cultural differentiation
should be noted. Cultural perceptions should be seen as a result of the
existing economic basis and should therefore also indicate differences
between the different participators in the coconut production.
There was a difference between how many actually lived in the various
households and how many members of the family the respondents stated.
The extended household is normal in the Philippines. Table 4.11 shows the
size of the households that was part of this study. As expected, the
difference between "extended household size" and "physical household
size" gives a highest difference for the tenants who depend the most on
remittances from family members living in the cities.
Table 4.11
Extended household size and physical household size among
the respondents in Candelaria 1991
Group of respondents Extended household Physical household
size size
Tenants
Farm workers
Small owners
Factory workers
Average (weighted)
7.6
6.9
4.8
6.0
6.9
5.4
6.3
3.7
6.0
5.6
Source: Fieldwork, Candelaria, 1991.
The respondents are very conscious and discriminating in their struggle
for survival. This is evident by regarding expenditures for education among
the respondents, and specifically for the children of the respondents. By
investing a substantial amount of an already limited income, the
respondents demonstrate a high degree of desire for enabling their children
to achieve a higher status. Table 4.12 relates income to education among
both the respondents and their children. Small owner-cultivators apparently
invest less in education than tenants and farm workers. This was a most
intriguing (and puzzling) fact. The respondents might be exceptional and
not representative as small owner-cultivators.
112
Small owners may rather con sider it more important for their children to
take over their land in the future, rather than entering new income
generating professions. That farm workers invest less in education than
tenants, suggest that they are not able to provide the children with sufficient
resources, economic as well as cultural, to leave the coconut sector. There
could thus be a polarization between the tenants and the farm workers on
this issue. The farm workers are extremely marginalized in the society as
a whole. They have no means for changing their situation and invest
enough in education. They are in other words realistic about their situation.
Table 4.12 presents average levels of income of different respondent groups
and average education of their children. Average annual income is induded
in order to see the peculiar correlation between income and education
among tenants and farm workers.
Table 4.12
Income and levels of education within different respondent groups
The poverty line was 7,132 pesos per person per year
in Candelaria in 1991
Respondent Average Annual Average Average
group annual income per education education
income household of of
(pesos) member respondent respondent
(pesos) (years) child
(average size (years)
of household)
Farm 20,304 3,076 (6.6) 5.5 4
workers
F actory- 36,440 6,073 (6.0) 9.4 6
workers
Tenants 29,873 5,532 (5.4) 6.4 8.7
Small 30,435 8,226 (3.7) 5.7 7
owners
Source: Fieldwork, Candelaria 1991.
Table 4.5 revealed that tenants do receive a return from their investment
in education for their children. Regardless of whether their children work
in the industrial or service-oriented sector, they provide almost half of the
tenants' stated annual income, in average almost 15,000 pesos yearly.
113
Education does seldom give the children of the tenants white collar jobs,
which normally require college, but because they are better able to
articulate themselves, both in their nationallanguage as well as in English,
they can enter the service sector more easily, which indudes unfortunate
businesses as prostitution and women-trafficking.34
When the respondents were asked about their personal desires regarding
their relation to the land they tilled or worked on, most of them eagerly
stated their desire to own the land they tilled. This has always been the
daim of different peasant organizations and has also been the expressed
goal of the various governments. Most of the land-hungry farm workers
stated that somewhere between 1 and 4 ha with an average of 2,6 ha would
be enough for their family to live on while the tenants would be satisfied
with some more, varying from 1 to 12 ha. with the average of about 5 ha.
The small owner-cultivators would be satisfied with an average of 6 ha.
This is indeed a modest group of agricultural tillers and workers. The
moderation, however,is cörrelated with the present status. The farm
workers were thus most careful in their aspirations.
Many tenants preferred individual control rather than collective land
ownership. Farm workers were more pragmatic about the type of land
ownership. As long as their living standards increased, the main purpose of
owning land was fulfilled. However, quite frequently, farm workers focused
on the wage system, when talking about their situation. They wanted equal
wages for the work done and opposed the individual wage-decisions based
on their relationship with this employer. Several of them suggested
collective bargaining agreements, which would ne ed a trade union for farm
workers. Others suggested it shoùld be the responsibility of the state to
standardize the wages and thus reduce the effects of the existing patron-
dient system. This indicates that the dass orientation of farm workers is
oriented towards a proletarian and collective understanding of their
situation, even though they own their tools and thus have some investments
in their own means of production. The farm workers can be considered as
a group having both a peasant and proletarian subjective dass orientation.
They can associate themselves with both tenants and workers. This is
important in the search for development possibilities.
34 W omen-trafficking is regarded to be business inc1uding international prostitution and
business where the women are used as objects for men (of ten against their wil and), and
arrangements of marriage through organizations. These women are normally called
"mail-order brides". Because of the negative angel towards the woman, this expression
can be unfortunate. It is therefore preferable to talk about arrangement of marriages in
general.
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Tenants on the other side, had a dear preference for being their own
boss, owning their means of production. Marx once commented that the
peasantry expresses a need to be led in the dass struggle, because they
have an individual orientation and lack of collective spirit and practical
cooperation. Although the peasants he referred to were the peasants during
the French revolution from 1789 to 1799 certain characteristics are
recognizable among certain groups of the Filipino peasants:
Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of
bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by
France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants.
Their field of production, the small holding, admits of no division of
labour in its cultivation, no application of science and, therefore, no
diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social
relationships (Marx 1987, p. 332).
Marx' s description cannot be readily transferred to tenants in Candelaria.
They interrelate first of all with' the farm workers, regarding them as
employees rather than equals or companions in collective interests. On the
other hand, there is a certain development among the tenants, who invest
time and money for education, in order to advance to another socIal group,
preferably urban. In Philippine history the tenants also have of ten played
a crucial role in the political opposition against the ruling elite, participating
collectively in organized work as well as guerrilla warfare. As far as land
and èoconut production relations are concerned, the tenants aspire to own
land in order to be independent. This might isolate them even more from
other members of their dass. After all, as tenants, being subordinated to
landlords and their katiwalas, they have common interests and can
experience this in communication with their fellow neighbours. It the idea
is to organize them for dass struggle, this collective experience is a crucial
factor.
In this misery of poverty, life goes on reproducing a culture of survivaL.
People do not focus on serious political discussions, but dream about
different but unobtainable lives. When the respondents actually were
describing their leisure-time, their activity was first of all listening to
commercial radio and television, if such were available in the area. This
expresses a certain commercial consumer culture, which has been described
by the anthropologist Mulder:
Consumerism, the mass media, and religious zealotry are not really
conductive to the creation of a viable, civil public sphere. and may, taken
together with the amount of energy invested in the struggle for survival
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and the emotions devoted to the prevailing culture of the family, offer a
tremendous challenge to the ideologues and intellectuals - despite all their
coalitions - in their efforts to create a just national community (Mulder
1992, p. 154).
The exotic life visualized in the form of soap-operas and television
commercials about commodities in a setting far from their known lives,
may make people dream of an ideal of a different kind of life than they
actually experience. This reproduces a kind of passivecolonial mentality.
The entrance of mass media, and a culture of consumerism, as a kind of
anaesthetic for their own lives, should be regarded as a hindrance for
political and ideological consciousness among the coconut producers. Still,
political work is attempted, and appears very much possible as well as
needed. It focuses on developing a culture of consciousness among the
coconut producers, pointing at their strength and value as producers. Once
such self-consciousness isgrowing, they will demand more of what
rightfully should be theirs, both in terms of material wealth and in terms of
political power.
Organized peasants in the Philippines are working with a variety of
mechanisms in order to develop their self-determination as well as their
living standards. The existing biggest peasant organization, Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), daiming 800,000 members in 1989,35
is active in a variety of fields in order to make its members participate in
the struggle for empowerment. The leaders of Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP) took up status of their activities and presented the situation
in 1988:
In KMP areas, over 70 per cent of local struggles to lower land rent have
been successful. Peasants in these areas used to pay from 60 to 70 per
cent of their total produee to the landlord, but now they only pay 30 to
50 per cent, with' most landlords agreeing to shoulder half of the cost
incurred in produetion. In case of usury, peasants in the most consolidated
areas under the KMP have been able to reduce interest rate by 30 per cent
(KMP 1988).
In Candelaria, this baliktad sharing system was present during the time
NP A was active in the area. The peasants themselves did not manage to
maintain this sharing system after the guerillas disappeared. The
sustainability of these changes seems limited, probably due arepressive
35 Interview with vice chairperson Felicisirno Patayan and International Secretary Jairne
Cordova in Oslo, Norway, April 1989.
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military force in the area. The situation makes it thus difficult and
dangerous to do organized work, although it is obviously necessary.
However, the KMP is organizing tenants as well as farm workers in peasant
organizations, without regarding their concrete relation to the land. As late
as in November 9, 1993, a letter of Mr. Jaime Tadeo, the chairman of KMP
was quoted in Philippine Daily Inquirer, one of the leading newspapers in
the Philippines:
While the struggle for land remains primary, it is evident that the struggle
for capital has become as important (PDi 1993).
What Tadeo is stressing is that the peasantry should not be regarded as a
homogenous group, neither when it comes to amount of wealth not their
position to the means of production - land. Within an umbrella
organization fighting for general political changes, there should be one
organization for the farm workers, one for the tenants, one for the small
owners and not the least, one for women. Traditionally, only the public
sphere - the society, has be en seen as the arena for political change and the
household is regarded as a private sphere not subjected to political changes.
Vuorela's suggestion of the dialectic linkage between the mode of
production and the mode of reproduction offers the possibilities of political
action taking place in the household. Just as the ruling dass would be
forced to change, the ruling gender would be forced to give privileges away
as well.
Women need each other as well as experienced organizers. The women
in the Philippines have some of the most significant women
organizations36 in Asia and have therefore substantial indigenous
experience in how to struggle for their own emancIpation and liberation.
However, even the most limited improvements to the peasant women in
coconut production is not likely to happen without addressing the existing
social formation of the nation.
Peasants in Candelaria do have an experience with peasant organizations
in their immediate surroundings. Many of our respondents were probably
members of peasant organizations themselves during the times of the NP As.
They stated that it would be very important for them to be organized. But
when asked why they did not organize, they said they needed somebody to
organize them. In other words, they could not - or dared not do it
themselves. And while they wait for the organizers, they watch television.
36 Particularly the women organization GABRIELA should be notified as the women
organization in the Philippines, organizing roughly 60,000-70,000 wornen.
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5. Marginalization, crisis and prospects
This study describes socIal formations among coconut producers in
Cande1aria, a municIpality in the Philippines, in order to explain the logic
of their poverty. The reasons for poverty among the peasantry in Candelaria
are not only to be found in Candelaria itself. Due to national politics and
economics, the role of the state also has to be investigated. The analysis of
the state is important in order to understand the dass formations and the
economic and political framework within which peasants operate in
Candelaria.
Candelaria is oneof those municipalities receiving a substantial amount
of its gross income from coconut producing activities. The province of
Quezon is heavily militarized due to counter insurgency operations, but in
Candelaria the military activity is limited. However, the tension is
expressed in the presence of para-military groups like the CAFGUs, as well
as AFP military personnel. Tension is also expressed by ongoing human
rights violations, like illegal arrests and assassination attempts on suspected
members or sympathizers of the underground resistance movement. It
creates a situation difficult for development purposes, particularly if such
development may lead to a change in power relations. The military tries to
keep a strong controlover the province. In the case of this research, the
provincial military authorities demanded a permit from the national AFP for
the conduct of fieldwork. Without such a permit, the research would not
have been possible.
5.1 The findings
This research attempted to understand socIal and economic mechanisms
found in the coconut producing sector in Candelaria. The first chapter
introduced us to the Philippines and the overall economic situation in the
country. The majority of the people are poor, and the unequal distribution
of wealth has led to socIal unrest in the Philippines. Peasants express their
dissatisfaction with the national politics of the government primarily
through the underground movement National Democratic Front (NDF).
They oppose first of all the unequal distribution of land and demand radical
land reform. The ownership pattern found today in vast areas of the
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Philippines does not differ significantly from the colonial period,
particularly for coconut land in the northern provinces, like in Quezon
Province. The majority of those tilling the land are themselves landless.
NDF has described the economic and political system in the Philippines as
semi-feudal, i.e. a dominant feudal mode of production, intertwined with
foreign monopoly capitalism. They believe and hope that a revolution will
be won by a protracted people's war, that is, the cities will be encirded
from the countryside by a guerilla force. The NDF is also regarding the
international trade pattern of the Philippines as a major hindrance to
development and pro sp erity . The traditional dose links between the US and
the ruling elites in the Philippines have made the Philippines strongly
dependent on the US market and policies. Beside this strong dependency
on the US, linkages with EC and Japan are increasing, first of all through
export agreements.
The theoretical discussion in chapter two conduded that Marxism and
particularly the Marxist theory of co:'existencebetween different modes of
production, was helpful for analyzing the coconut producers and their socIal
formation. Certain key-terms, such as absolute and relative surplus values
were brie fly discussed in light of our understanding of social formations
and'modes of production.The exact form of surplus value produced is
relatively easy to identify in reality, as different types of profit which can
be observed. We wanted to research the social conditions for development
in Candelaria by examining the social formations. Social formations should
be seen as products, resulting from conscious and unconscious choices and
actions of people in the production sphere. As in traditional Marxism, the
base leve!; the economic level would be decisive, but we opened up for the
possibility that political and ideological mechanisms could interfere and in
fact dominate the economic, creating a situation where the dynamic
development towards increasing productivity could be blocked. This
discussion led to a suggestion that a variety of modes of production could
co-exist at the same time. The quality of co-existence between these modes
determines whether there is a dynamism within the economy which will
generate development towards a new mode of production, or whether this
dynamism is paralysed by political conditions.
The methodology was the realist approach, searching for underlying
mechanisms and patterns governing the choices made by the actors. In the
discipline of Human Geography it is today regarded as fruitful to
understand reality in order to change it for the better. The method in the
field was a mixture of several methods; interviews, c ommunication,
participatory observation and analysis of secondary data.
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Chapter three described the historical experiences of the Philippines,
under Spanish as well as US rule. This gave us the needed understanding
of contemporary Philippine sOcIety and economy. The colonial period made
the Philippines a stratified society with a strong feudal colonial order.
Contemporary Philippine state formation is to a certain degree "privatized"
by a small elite. To the degree that it has affected the coconut producers at
all, the policy of the state has been a negative factor for them. The most
effective policy of the state regarding coconut production - the coconut
levy - drained away a very big portion of capital from the production
sphere. The producers have hardly benefitted from the taxation - if at alL.
Those in charge of the coconut monopoly, who were very powerful until
the"fall of Marcos in 1986, are still powerful today.
The role of the state is important in any study of social formations. The
state is generally spe aking an apparatus for the ruling dass, providing both
an economic base and supporting superstructural policy to reproduce the
economic system. The state also seems to act contrary to the objective dass
interests of the ruling dass, being used by small fractions or even families
of the bourgeoisie, who happen to be in central positions. It might be
conduded that there is not one distinct ruling dass in power, but the state
may be con trolle d by a ¡action of this dass - a faction consisting of 60-100
families (as also was the case during the time of Marcos).
Coconut production is vital for the Philippine national economy.
Nevertheless, only limited efforts are made to develop its productivity.
Coconut production also employs a significant part of the labour force, with
at least 20 million people dependent on coconut production as a source of
income. Agricultural products are a major commodity from the Philippines,
and among the main products are coconut oil, desiccated coconut and copra
meal. A vast majority of the people connected to coconut production are
extremely poor, living under the poverty line, and can thus provide only
limited improvements for their children. The state is not working as an
agent for development. It remains instead a tool for the reproduction of an
economic system which is becoming increasingly polarized. It benefits the
ruling elite and marginalizes the rural majority.
In the sphere of superstructure, the reproduction of the state appears also
very important in the Philippines today, both through political and
ideological means. "Wasteful consumption" occurs because the motivation
for production is not increased productivity where profit is reinvested for
this purpose, but rather a profit derived from absolute surplus value, used
for reproduction of the status quo and the individual power position.
The agricultural crops in the Philippines are produced within several
modes of production. While peasant- and wage-food often is produced in
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decentralized small holdings by tenants and subsistence farmers, export
crops are normally produced on centralized estates and commercial fars.
In the south of the Philippines, coconuts are produced on modern
plantations. In the north, where this study was undertaken, they are grown
mainly by tenants and farm workers on decentralized estates. The coconut
sector seems to have severe problems in Candelaria. It is definitely a "sick
business" today, and this can be due to the resistance of the local elite and
the state to motivate increased productivity.
Chapter four describes the socIal formations found in Candelaria, a
coconut producIng municipality in Quezon Province, in Southern Tagalog.
Productivity in the coconut producIng sector in the municipality has
decreased significantly to merely 75 per cent of the national average, and
it seems to continue decreasing. No significant efforts are made to increase
the productivity. We found an undeveloped and stagnated economy,
combined with severe political oppression, and a strong reproduction of
ideological values, which all in all strengthened adisarticulated economy
without any developmental dynamics.
The social groups or dasses directly connected to the coconut production
in Candelaria are the farm workers, the tenants, the small owner-cultivators
and, the katiwalas.It was'discovered that even though the rural poor
perceive themselves mainly as coconut producers, none of the tenants and
farm workers got the majority of their income from coconut producing
activities. They are coconut producers, but only part time. Indirectly the
coconut factory workers are also connected to the same socIal formation,
from their geographical, economic and emotional proximity to the coconut
producers. Outside the narow production sphere, but involved in the
production relations, there are the landowners and the landlords; the
managers and the employees at the factories; the state-representatives, like
the PCA, soldiers of AFP, the CAFGUs and other armed groups; and the
elected elite, local and national, creating the political, ideological and
economical framework of the coconut industry as a whole. The
international market, which involves mainly the US, Japan and EC should
not be forgotten either, although the effect of international price-fluctuations
on the coconut producers is limited. They remain in deep poverty,
regardless of the export prices of coconut products. As aresult, they
actually gro w poorer during ongoing price increase of basic commodities
in the Philippines while the productivity in coconut production stagnates or
even dedines.
The farm workers are at the bottom end of the socIal ladder in coconut
production. They do most of the work but receive minimal wages. Farm
workers relate to all of the other groups in a patron-dient relationship. The
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relationship seems to determine their wages too. Their substantial poverty
makes it enormously difficult to invest in the reproduction of the
household, except for the minimal amount of food needed. Tenants and
small owner-cultivators find themselves below the poverty line as well but
have a higher level of food production for home consumption and thus a
slightly better living standard. The subsistence farm, which can decrease
income to under minimum wage, is a typical feature in so-called
disarticulated economies, economies that seem to be blocked.
The lion's share of profits appropriated from coconut production is not
reinvested in the coconut producing sector. This explains why producers are
getting poorer. Wasteful expenditure of the surplus by those already rich
and powerful has also damaged the coconut sector.
The discrimination of women is visible in Candelaria through constant
undervaluation of women's work, almost regardless of what they actually
do. Division of household labour between the sexes decreases in proportion
to the level of income earned from agricultural production. Those women
working in factories have limited time for household work, forcing men to
accept a slightly higher share of household work than for agricultural
producers. This is so even if the factory workers are poorer than at least the
small owner-cultivators. Women are central in the household but hold
neither the power nor the freedom to choose what to do. It women
participate in coconut production, they receive less wages than men, both
as copra makers and as collectors. A superstructure reproducing a set of
gender roles as in the Philippines, will inevitably lead to a feminization of
poverty. The Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines, to which as much
as 85 per cent of the population belong, is partly the main exponent of a
culture making women sacrifice themselves for the sake of the family.
Changes can be done within the church, it is not necessary to fight the
religion as such. Today, however, regardless whether she is a wife, mother
or daughter, a woman is taught to giv e unconditional love for her family
and only think of herself as a secondary individuaL. Strong family ties, and
the tremendous pressure on women in the Philippines to disregard their own
interests in favour of their family, should also be regarded as a factor
making 34 per cent of the registered over-seas workers seek employment
as maids or entertainers (which also indudes prostitutes). Only through a
de-genderizing of wage and payments, together with a strong ideological
campaign for women' s emancipation, would it be possible to fight and
reduce the extent of women's oppression in the Philippines.
In summary, the findings would suggest that coconut producers in
Candelaria are poor because of the socIal formation they operate in. Most
of the surplus value they produce is drained out of the production sphere.
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The local situation in Candelaria is determined not just by local forces but
by the national socIal formation. The state apparatus is used for the benefit
of a few family dynasties and not for the society and national economy as
a whole. The state reproduces the power of the elite by extra-economic
means such as the patron-dient culture and oppresses those who dare to
question the legality of the power elite. Tenancy is a key factor among the
economic mechanisms leading to the impoverishment of the peasantry. It
indicates a domination of feudalism, in a semi-feudal or a disarticulated
capitalist mode of production. It is not our tas k to participate in the political
discussion of whether one calls the stagnation semi-feudal or disarticulated
capitalism. Our point is that there are no signals of a development that will
make ,', the situation of the producers beUer. There is a need for change
which has to focus on the need of the poor; the coconut producers.
5.2 From marginalization to development
The farm workers are too poor to provide their children with the education
necessary for changing their socIal position in the society. The tenants are
"on the move", investing time and money in the education of their children,
in order to improve their chances of getting better paid johs outside the
agricultural sphere. The small owner-cultivators seem to plan for their
children to take over as farmers. For them a general education for children
today probably appears as more or less wasted, due to the irrelevance of the
education provided in the school system. The high level of investment in
education among tenants should be seen as an effort to move away from
tenancy and into wage labour in other sectors. Since surplus labour is
abundant, their effort in education and other activities does not pay off with
better economic control for the household. At best it only pays off in terms
of an increasing dependence on other sectors, like the service sector, the
informal sector and the industrial sector of production. Almost 50 per cent
of the stated income of the tenants came from these sectors as remittances
from children and other family members. This dependency is reinforced by
strong family ties, an organic linkage between the proletariat and the
peasantry as well as the dyadic ties between representatives from different
dasses.
At the same time, tenancy does not provide direct benefits from coconut
production as such. A ten ant maintains his contract because it gives him
access to land on which he can grow food crops in his spare time. In the
study area, roughly 10 per cent of the annual income of the tenants derived
from coconut production. In other words, the tenants do not depend directly
on coconut production and thus do not invest extensive energy in this
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production. Our methodological intention to interview respondents whose
main activity was coconut production is in this respect put into question.
Notwithstanding, all of the respondents defined themselves as coconut
producers.
Small owner-cultivators did not seem to benefit very much from their
landholding either, compared with other sources of income. Small owner-
cultivators received a significant part of their income ~ almost 30 per cent
- from contributions from their children in the cIties or abroad, while only
36 per cent was deri ved from coconuts. Extensive multi-cropping gave them
almost 25 per cent of their income as well as fruit and vegetables for home
consumption. They are better off than tenants and farm workers but still
have to maintain a dient-patron relationship with the landowner if they also
rent additional land.
It is difficult to find away towards social improvements in the coconut
producing sector in the Philippines, at least in Candelaria, other than
through radical land reform. There is astriking need to increase both the
productivity and the income and living standards of the coconut producers,
and this can be done by reforming the control of land, by giving more
control directly to the producers. Tenants are today extremely deprived
under a dient-patronrelationshipwith a landowner and his katiwala. Even
if they are allowed to grow other crops or have livestock in between the
trees, many of the tenants are still obliged to ask permission from the
landowner. It land were given to the tenants, with or without a symbolic
rent to the state, they would be in a position to earn a substantial portion
of the gross income from production. The tenants would also be motivated
to invest in the productivity of the trees, and could at the same time pay
substantially more wage to farm workers than today. The money collected
during the 19 years of the Cocofund might be used to subsidize replanting
programs, as well as other undertakings for increased productivity. This
type of land reform can be regarded as a transition along the road from a
disarticulated capitalism to a more articulated capitalist development, where
the capital flow circulates both in the traditional (pre-capitalist) and modern
sector. This development model allows to a certain degree the creation of
capitalist big farms as long as they do not dominate the reformed areas. The
land, however, should in principle belong to the state, to avoid
landownership polarization and pre-capitalist extraction of free labour. This
would pave the way for a type of mixed economy, which also can be called
market socialism. Effort to increase productivity alongside with state
controlled reform of power structures is the only way the development in
the country can be considered progressive for both the national economy
and the people of the Philippines. An only focus on increased productivity
124
would probably lead to increased marginalization of the majority, due
expanded unemployment in the coconut sector.
A land reform is necessary although not sufficient for the further
development of coconut production. The Philippines is not an isolated state,
deciding its trade patterns with the international market by itself.
International trade linkages reproduce the elite in power, as well as the
drain of surplus from the producers. International trade arrangements have
to be changed if the surplus value is to be invested in the Philippines, for
the development of the national economy. This would have an impact not
only on the elite in the Philippines but also on all nations importing
Filipino goods, particularly the US, EC and to a certain degree Japan, as
well as those nations controlling production units in the Philippines.
Prices should be fixed and controlled by a democratic and not a despotic
state, in order to equalize prices for equal products, at least at the provincIal
leve!. Increased wages for farm workers would eventually expand the
domestic market, particularly in the rural areas, creating for millions of
families an income above the poverty leve!.
This leads to the importance of participation of the majority, if an
economic as well as democratic development is to occur. The vast majority
of the respondents in Candelaria stated their wish to particIpate in the
development of the Philippines, by working in an organized way to obtain
better living conditions. Filipinos have a deep feeling of democracy, in spite
of the feudal and authoritarian regimes ruling the country. Non-
governmental organizations, trade unions and other peoples' organizations
practice participation, where people experience the ne ed for struggle in
order to obtain better living conditions. This is also the best security against
a new authoritarian regime, in case of a major political shift. The coconut
producers thus ha ve a double reason to get organized; immediate unit y for
the betterment of their situation, as well as an extended dass struggle for
political change after a possible change of the present state representation.
The differentiation among the peasantry in Candelaria is extensive. The
immediate suggestion would be to encourage both tenants and farm workers
to get organized in separate interest organizations. However, they ought to
unite behind their legal and democratic demands.
Privatization of the state, and consequently economic stagnation, is a
logical outcome of the colonial inheritance and experiences in the
Philippines. It is of vital importance that state functions become de-
privatized, that is to say, separated from those families in economic power
positions. This separation would also help to abolish corrption which
today is the rule rather than the exception in state institutions. Changes
within Candelaria alone will not be possible as long as the state remains a
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privatized tool in the hands of the existing elite. This elite controls the law-
making bodies of the country, the export trade and the production of export
crops. The Philippines elected a new president in 1992. Time will show
what President Ramos, a former General under President Marcos, and a
Chief of staff of the AFP and later Minister of Defence under President
Aquino, will do when the peasants march to the Mendiola bridge and ask
for land and more of the national wealth.
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